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ABSTRACT

EXPLORING PRIVACY AND PERSONALIZATION IN
INFORMATION RETRIEVAL APPLICATIONS
SEPTEMBER 2013
HENRY A. FEILD
B.Sc., LOYOLA COLLEGE IN MARYLAND
M.Sc., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor James Allan

A growing number of information retrieval applications rely on search behavior
aggregated over many users. If aggregated data such as search query reformulations
is not handled properly, it can allow users to be identified and their privacy compromised. Besides leveraging aggregate data, it is also common for applications to make
use of user-specific behavior in order to provide a personalized experience for users.
Unlike aggregate data, privacy is not an issue in individual personalization since users
are the only consumers of their own data.
The goal of this work is to explore the effects of personalization and privacy
preservation methods on three information retrieval applications, namely search task
identification, task-aware query recommendation, and searcher frustration detection.
We pursue this goal by first introducing a novel framework called CrowdLogging
for logging and aggregating data privately over a distributed set of users. We then
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describe several privacy mechanisms for sanitizing global data, including one novel
mechanism based on differential privacy. We present a template for describing how
local user data and global aggregate data are collected, processed, and used within
an application, and apply this template to our three applications.
We find that sanitizing feature vectors aggregated across users has a low impact
on performance for classification applications (search task identification and searcher
frustration detection). However, sanitizing free-text query reformulations is extremely
detrimental to performance for the query recommendation application we consider.
Personalization is useful to some degree in all the applications we explore when integrated with global information, achieving gains for search task identification, taskaware query recommendation, and searcher frustration detection.
Finally we introduce an open source system called CrowdLogger that implements
the CrowdLogging framework and also serves as a platform for conducting in-situ
user studies of search behavior, prototyping and evaluating information retrieval applications, and collecting labeled data.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

This thesis investigates how privacy and personalization affect three information retrieval (IR) applications: search task identification, task-aware query recommendation,
and searcher frustration detection. In pursuing this goal, we outline a framework for
collecting and mining data privately, several analyses of the effects of privacy, and
a general procedure for combining global data aggregated from many users with local data pertaining to a single individual to provide personalization. We end with a
description of an open source system called CrowdLogger that implements the CrowdLogging framework and serves as a platform for conducting in-situ user studies.

1.1

Motivation

Most IR applications that web searchers use on a day-to-day basis are not highly
personalized. For example, if a user enters the search “romas” into a commercial
search engine, most results that are returned are related to restaurants. This is also
true of the suggested query reformulations, as illustrated in Figure 1.1. The one bit of
personalization that is widely attempted is the incorporation of location information;
with an Amherst, Massachusetts IP address, most commercial search engines show a
map at the top of the search page with locations of “Roma’s Pizza” near Amherst,
MA. If the majority of users who enter the query “romas” are looking for “Roma’s
Pizza”, this is an effective use of personalization. However, consider the scenario
where, just prior to this query, the user submitted the following queries:
1. tomato varieties
1

Figure 1.1. An example of the query suggestions offered by the Yahoo! search
engine for the query “romas”.

2. cherry tomatoes
3. grape tomatoes
The user’s search history clearly indicates that the most likely intended target of
“romas” is “roma tomatoes”. If this information were taken into account, the query
suggestions and results could be re-ranked to reflect this intention. This example
illustrates personalization. Because the results are tailored to this particular user’s
context, the expected outcome is higher relevance relative to the user, less time to
success, and a better user experience.
Our focus is on IR applications that 1) can benefit from personalization and 2) rely
on global data collected from a large number of individuals. We already saw how
query recommendation could benefit from personalization by taking into account a
user’s previous searches. State-of-the-art query recommendation systems also rely
on global data, namely common query reformulations entered by other users. There
are a number of reasons why global data may be required by an IR application. For
example, when a user’s data is too sparse or when an element of popularity that
cannot be captured by an individual’s data is required.
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The reliance on global data raises an import issue that is a growing concern on the
web: privacy. Collecting data without considering user privacy can have devastating
consequences. For example, identity theft, public humiliation, and loss of user trust.
Take, for example, the query suggestion algorithm discussed above. If we blindly collect all query reformulations from contributing users, then some very sensitive query
suggestions may be presented to another user. Suppose user X submits the query
stolen credit card followed by another query consisting of his credit card number—
222333444888 —perhaps in an effort to see if his credit card number has appeared
somewhere on the web. This query reformulation is collected and stored with the
global data. Now another user, Y , comes along and enters stolen credit card. Unless
some care is taken, it is reasonable to expect that 222333444888 may come up as a
suggestion, especially if stolen credit card is not a popular query. Since this is clearly
a credit card number, Y has information that could be used to take advantage of
X and possibly even identify X.1 This example demonstrates that preserving user
privacy must be a primary consideration in collecting and using global data.
The goal of this work is to explore two important research questions: first, how can
useful global data be collected but sanitized to maintain user privacy, and second,
how can this cleaned-up global data and rich local user data be combined to provide
personalization. We look specifically at three IR applications: search task identification, task-aware query recommendation, and searcher frustration detection. For each,
we analyze the effects of certain types of personalization and privacy-preservation
mechanisms on their performance.
To address these questions, we divide this work as follows. Chapter 3 details CrowdLogging, a framework for logging, mining, and aggregating search activity over a
distributed network of users in a privacy-preserving manner. We also explore some
1

Yes, it is true that a credit card number alone would not be enough information to use the card,
but it illustrates the point that sensitive information can be revealed.
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of the privacy mechanisms that can be used with CrowdLogging to sanitize search
logs. In Chapter 4, we describe a general framework for combining local user data
with global aggregate data to produce useful privacy preserving, personalized IR applications. In Chapters 5, 6, and 7, we introduce personalized models for each of
the IR applications and analyze the effects of both privacy and personalization on
performance. In Chapter 8, we describe a web browser extension called CrowdLogger,
which implements the CrowdLogging framework and provides many functionalities for
researchers to release prototypes of IR applications or conduct in-situ user studies.
Finally, we wrap up with conclusions and some final thoughts in Chapter 9.

1.2

Contributions

The following is a summary the contributions of this thesis.
1. CrowdLogging – We describe a new distributed framework for logging and
mining data on users’ computers and a mechanism to upload and aggregate
user data in a sanitized form in Chapter 3.
2. DPu – In Chapter 3.4, we introduce a novel extension to previous work, creating
a differentially private mechanism, DPu , that considers the number of users that
contribute a search artifact rather than the number of instances of that artifact.
We use DPu as a differentially private parallel for another privacy mechanism
we formalize, called F Tu . We demonstrate that DPu provides coverage similar
to the privacy mechanism from which it was derived, DPa .
3. Empirical examples of privacy leakage – In Chapter 3.4, we describe three
attacks that demonstrate the vulnerability of two privacy policies that we formalize, F Ta and F Tu . One attack allows an attacker to attribute released
information to “power users”, another allows an attacker to infer information
that is not released, and a third allows an attacker with knowledge that a piece
4

of data from a given user was included during data collection to infer additional
data from that user. We demonstrate the practicality of the second attack using
query sequences extracted from the 2006 AOL query logs, showing that a small
number of infrequent—and therefore unreleased—query triples can be inferred
using released query and query pair counts.
4. Artifact coverage comparison – One class of privacy mechanisms analyzed
in this thesis, frequency thresholding, releases considerably more information
than differentially private mechanisms using parameter settings typical in the
literature. As differentially private mechanisms have many desirable theoretical
properties, we consider the settings required to achieve similar coverage to that
produced with frequency thresholding, specifically for releasing query artifacts
from the AOL search log. We find that the settings required to do so are
generally unreasonable, and we conclude that differentially private mechanisms
should not be used to obtain the same level of coverage as frequency thresholding
using the AOL search log.
5. Personalized search task identification – In Chapter 5, we demonstrate the
variability in individuals’ perceptions of what constitutes a search task, finding a
Fleiss’ Kappa as low a 0.53 among six annotators’ labels across ten user histories.
This is the first such analysis in the search task identification literature that
we know of. We gather annotations for over 503 user histories extracted from
the 2006 AOL search log, labeled by ten annotators—38 times as many user
histories as used by the current state of the art research. With this data, we
introduce several models for providing personalization, but find they perform
similarly to using a random forest classifier trained on global data, all achieving
between 94% and 95% macro accuracy across users. Our experiments show
the random forest classifier significantly out-performs the current state of the
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art model. We further demonstrate that sanitization has an overall mild effect
on performance, and can even improve performance under certain conditions,
namely when the F Tu mechanism is used with k = 100.
6. Task-aware query recommendation – We introduce in Chapter 6 a novel
task-aware query recommendation model, which combines query recommendations for each query within a task, giving more weight to queries based on either
temporal distance or same-task likelihood. It relies on personalized search task
identification, as described above. We find that leveraging on-task search context provides a large boost in MRR for many evaluation queries—more than
25% on average. Privacy has a significant impact on recommendation performance, rendering the quality so low as to be impractical in a real system in
most cases we consider.
7. Personalized frustration detection – In Chapter 7 we explore the effects
of personalization on frustration detection and show that personalization can
provide substantial performance improvements–as much as 9% in F0.5 . We also
demonstrate that with a simulated user base of 100,000 users, performance of
global models is not affected by sanitization.
8. CrowdLogger – Using the CrowdLogging framework as a foundation, we implement a browser extension for Firefox and Google Chrome called CrowdLogger (Chapter 8), as a platform with which to perform in-situ studies of user
search behavior, evaluate IR applications, and provide research prototypes to
interested parties. In addition to implementing the key portions of CrowdLogging, CrowdLogger allows researcher-defined JavaScript/HTML modules to be
remotely loaded. CrowdLogger exposes an API for: accessing a user’s real-time
or past browsing behavior; uploading data to a server privately, anonymously,
or in the clear (as approved by the user); interacting with the user via HTML
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and JavaScript; accessing a remote server for computational purposes; and saving data on the user’s computer. We describe two studies and one prototype
that have been implemented with CrowdLogger.
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CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND, DEFINITIONS, AND RELATED WORK

This dissertation touches a number of areas, including privacy, personalization, and
several IR applications. We describe these below and how our work fits in. First, we
present some terminology that will be used throughout this work.

2.1

Terms and definitions

Moving forward, it will be helpful to understand the terms we make frequent use of.
This section tries to put those terms into context; Appendix A provides a summary
glossary for convenience.
Search logs, or query logs as they are sometimes called, are databases containing information about user search activity. A typical log might contain a set of entries
consisting of an identifier, a time stamp, an event descriptor, and pertinent information about the event. Common identifiers are IP addresses, cookie identifiers, or
account numbers. Example event descriptions include query or click. Pertinent information about the event might include the query text or a clicked URL. When we
assume that all identical identifiers correspond to a single individual, we refer to a
collection of search log entries sharing the same identifier as a user search log or user
log for short. An example user log is shown in Figure 2.1.
Search logs can be used to build models of user behavior, which can then be used
to influence search algorithms. For example, learning-to-rank algorithms extract or
mine hquery, search result clicki pairs from search logs to learn a ranking function (Joachims, 2002). Many query suggestion techniques, such as the one used
8

ID
Time
1019 11/15/11 09:02:03
1019 11/15/11 09:02:10
1019 11/15/11 09:03:15

Event Type
query
click
query

Event Info.
running shoes
www.nike.com
asics

Figure 2.1. An example user log where two queries have been entered roughly a
minute apart and one URL has been clicked for the first query.

by Boldi et al. (2008), are based on query reformulations pairs mined from search
logs, e.g., running shoes → asics in Figure 2.1. The pieces of data being mined—e.g.,
query-click pairs and query reformulations—are called search log artifacts, or artifacts
for short. In this work, we refer to a set of artifacts mined from one or more user
search logs as a crowd log and a model built from a crowd log as a global model.
As explained in Chapter 1, when crowd logs are created without concern for privacy,
sensitive information may be exposed. When privacy is taken into account and a
privacy policy is instated to reduce the chance of revealing sensitive information in a
crowd log, we consider the resulting crowd log and subsequent global models sanitized.
An example privacy policy is to include artifacts in a crowd log only if they were mined
from at least k different user logs. An artifact present in a crowd log is said to be
sufficiently supported by the privacy policy.
We can process user logs to build user-specific models, which we call local models. We
do not sanitize local models under the assumption that users interacting with their
own sensitive information do not constitute breaches of privacy. (We do not consider
the case where multiple individuals access the same account, though this may be a
common situation with, e.g., shared computers in homes, libraries, or Internet cafés.)
All of the IR applications we consider use a notion of search tasks. We note that our
use of search task in this thesis differs from others in the fields of information retrieval
and information seeking, which consider a task to consist of several facets such as its
goal, source, and the process by which it is carried out using a variety of digital and
physical media. Li (2009) provides an overview of many of these other definitions.
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For our purposes, a search task is a set of one or more searches entered by a user
pertaining to the same information need. A search consists of a query submission
followed by zero or more non-query interactions, such as clicks and page visits. Tasks
are different from search sessions, which consist of a sequence of one or more searches
within either a specified time period or when a period of inactivity is encountered.
Sessions may consist of multiple tasks, and tasks may span multiple sessions. We
define search task identification to be the problem of grouping a set of user searches
into search tasks.
In the field of IR, personalization is the act of incorporating information about a user
into the processing of an IR application. For example, boosting the rank of search
results that are more similar to web sites a user has visited in the past. Another
common practice is the use of a user’s location, often inferred by IP address or GPS
coordinates. We concentrate on local-only personalization that can be performed in
isolation on an individual’s computer. We consider two different types of personalization: task-aware and supervised learning from user-provided annotations. Note
that, in general, personalization can also involve a group of users; we do not consider
group-level personalization in this thesis.
One of the IR applications we consider is detecting searcher frustration. We define
searcher frustration as the self-reported level of frustration a user experiences while
engaged in a search.
You can find a glossary of these terms in Appendix A.

2.2

Privacy in Information Retrieval

There is an increasing interest in developing methods for preserving search user privacy while still gleaning information to improve IR applications. At one extreme,
no privacy is maintained and search log collectors acquire unfettered access to users’
search behavior. This is good for the collector and potentially users as well, who
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will benefit from more finely tunned IR algorithms. However, users lose all control
over how their information will be used and shared. At the other extreme, privacy is
preserved, but no useful data is passed on to the collector, reducing the amount of
data collectors have to make informed algorithm enhancements.
In this section, we will first take a look at the current state of commercial Web search,
since it touches most of our daily lives. Then we discuss related work pertaining to
several classes of sanitization mechanisms and corresponding vulnerabilities. For the
first part of the related work, we use an informal definition of privacy, namely that a
sanitization mechanism preserves privacy if, given the output of the mechanism, an
analyst cannot make a reliable guess as to who a query belongs to. A little later on,
we will introduce a more formal definition used in much of the most recent research
on the topic.
Some of largest US based search engine companies (Google, Yahoo, Microsoft, AOL,
and Ask.com) have privacy policies that do little to anonymize search data, keeping
IP address and browser cookie identifiers associated with searches for as long as 18
months (Schwartz & Cooper, 2007). For users that do not want their queries tracked,
there are some server-side options. For example, some less popular search engines
state in their privacy policies that they do not log user interactions, such as Duck
Duck Go.1 Another approach is to use a decentralized search engine, as is done with
the peer-to-peer service YaCy.2 On the client-side, the TrackMeNot project (Howe &
Nissenbaum, 2009) is useful for web searchers that want to ensure their data is not
logged, or at least not in a meaningful way, by any search engine. The project, offered
as a Firefox web browser extension, obfuscates user search queries by sending many
other unrelated searches to the target search engine. While the user’s query can be
logged by the search engine, it will be lost in the noise of the other searches, thereby
1

http://duckduckgo.com/

2

http://yacy.net
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protecting the user’s intent to some degree. In the current commercial landscape, the
consumer’s choice is to either allow search engines to collect all pertinent searching
behavior over some period of time and reap the benefits of personalization and high
quality results, or not allow search engines access to any useful information, sacrificing
both personalization and quality of service.
Xiong and Agichtein (2007) enumerated two key privacy concerns for publishing
search logs: how queries are related and how sensitive information within a query
(e.g., a social security number) is handled. generalizing their categorization slightly,
we break the related working into two overarching sanitization classes: 1) techniques
that primarily focus on how log entries are related, i.e., how entry identifiers are
anonymized; and 2) techniques that also consider the contents of the data contained
within each entry. For additional overviews of search log privacy techniques, consult
Xiong and Agichtein (2007) and Cooper (2008).
In an unsanitized search log, entries are primarily related by their identifier, where
each user has a unique identifier. In the event that identifiers contain identifiable information such as a user name, IP address, or cookie identifier, a simple sanitization
approach is to anonymize that information. Anonymizing user identifiers involves
mapping each to a unique string that does not contain private information. AOL
publicly released a three month search log in 2006 in which users were given anonimized identifiers (some search data was also removed). However, at least one user
was identified by a New York Times reporter soon after the release (Barbaro et al.,
2006). The reason users could be picked out did not have to do with the content of the
identifier, but rather the fact that multiple searches and clicks were linked together
using the identifier. It was the text of the queries themselves that provided more
and more evidence about who the underlying user was, finally resulting in a positive
identification.
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Microsoft released a search log to researchers the same year, but only provided
anonymized identifiers for user search sessions, preventing queries from the same user
but different sessions to be explicitly linked (Microsoft, 2006). By mapping users to
multiple pseudo users, it is more difficult to make the same links that the AOL data
allowed. First, queries issued on two different days are not directly connected (provided the user was inactive for part of the intervening time period). Second, sessions
generally consist of a small number of queries and are therefore less likely to cover a
diverse set of topics. When these two points are taken together, it becomes more difficult to gather sufficient evidence to identify the individuals behind the queries. Not
impossible, however: Jones et al. (2007) demonstrated that even when breaking users’
data into day-long chunks, their gender, age, and zip code can be established with
“reasonable accuracy” using classifiers, contributing towards identifying individuals
and their search histories.
Another sanitization technique works in the opposite manner: it maps multiple user
identifiers to a single pseudo identifier. In 2007, Google released a statement asserting
they would, after 18 months, anonymize the IP address associated with each search
event by removing the last octet of the address (Fleischer, 2007). By bundling multiple
users together, it is more difficult to identify individuals due to the noise of all the
other users’ data contained in the bundle. However, Jones et al. (2008) published
several attacks on identifier-based bundling. On a sample of logs, they were able to
identify with 71% precision which queries belong to the same user. By leveraging
users’ tendencies to search for their own names,3 the presence of users that own the
majority of actions within a bundle, and the ability to infer strings of related searches
within a bundle, an attacker can make educated guesses about who a query belongs
to.
3

Roughly 30% of users searched for themselves over a 70 day period.
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To overcome the vulnerabilities of identifier-only sanitization, recent works have considered additional log information, such as query terms. One technique relies on
hashing individual query terms or whole queries (Cooper, 2008). This allows data
miners to analyze query statistics without knowing the contents. However, Kumar et
al. (2007) showed that anonimization by means of hashing query terms can be partially breached by mapping the hashes to terms or queries in another, unanonimized
query log—for example, the AOL query log.
Adar (2007) presented two methods for sanitizing a search log in the interest of
preserving privacy. First, only queries that are issued by at least t users are kept.
This is similar to Sweeney (2002)’s k-anonymity work for databases, which assigns
a subset of database columns to be a quasi-identifier and the remaining columns to
be sensitive attributes. A row in the database is only released if the quasi-identifier
is shared by at least k − 1 other rows. Under Adar’s model, a query serves as both
the quasi-identifier and the sensitive attribute. Adar’s second technique anonymizes
the identity of users who enter a series of queries that may reveal who they are when
taken together, by clustering syntactically related queries from a user’s session and
releasing each cluster under its own identifier. This is similar to the identifier-based
method of mapping a single user identifier to many pseudo identifiers, though the
clustering may reduce the chances of linking data from multiple pseudo identifiers.
Hong et al. (2009) defined k δ -anonymity, where for every user whose data is listed
in the sanitized search log, there are k − 1 other users that are δ-similar to the user
in terms of their data. Their method involves grouping similar users and adding or
suppressing data to make user groups appear more similar. One downside to this
approach is that some data is permanently discarded and artificial data is added.
It is unclear how different types of applications are affected by this anonymization
process.
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A substantial disadvantage with both k δ -anonymity and t-anonymity discussed above
is their lack of theoretical backing. While they make intuitive sense, they do not
provide any formal guarantees of privacy. It is difficult to estimate, for a given
dataset, what the chances are that a user will be identified. Dwork (2006) introduced a provably private approach called differential privacy, targeted to databases
in general. Differential privacy applies to randomized algorithms. Such an algorithm
is -differentially private if for all pairs of input data sets that differ by one item,
the outputs, e.g., a histogram of queries, only differ within an exponential factor
of . Assuming a user is an item, what this means is that, given the output of an
-differentially private mechanisms, an analyst should not be able to tell with any
significant confidence if a given user’s data was or was not present in the input data
set, since the outputs would only differ by an exponential factor of .
Kodeswaran and Viegas (2009) introduced a differentially private framework that
allows researchers to access attributes of a search log, such as a count of the number
of users that enter searches at a certain hour of the day. However, Götz et al. (2011)
showed that differential privacy cannot be applied directly to obtain useful collections
of search log artifacts, such as queries or query reformulations. Several relaxations
can, though, and both Korolova et al. (2009) and Götz et al. (2011) described relaxed
differentially private mechanisms for doing so.
Korolova et al. introduced a relaxed differentially private algorithm to release a query
click graph from a search log. Their work differs from previous work in this field in
two important ways: (1) the output of their sanitization is a query click graph rather
than a search log, and (2) they prove theoretical bounds on the effectiveness of their
privacy-protecting scheme.
Götz et al. developed an algorithm called ZEALOUS to release histograms of arbitrary artifacts of a search log, e.g., queries, query-URL pairs, or query reformulations.
They demonstrated that under one configuration of input parameters, the algorithm
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is similar to Korolova et al., but allows users to contribute d distinct artifacts where
Korolova et al. allow d non-distinct artifacts. Götz et al. showed that under a different configuration of parameters, ZEALOUS provides a more conservative relaxation
of differential privacy and thus yields stronger privacy guarantees.
We develop a framework that keeps users’ data on their own computers and remotely
mines and then uploads data privately to a centralized location. We also explore two
new privacy mechanisms for this framework that stem from previous work. One is
similar to t-anonymity, but with two key differences: 1) search log artifacts in general
are considered, rather than explicitly queries (though those can be artifacts), and 2)
t-anonymous artifacts are not linked to each other, preventing explicit linking. We
consider two variations of this mechanism, one where t corresponds to the number of
users that share an artifact within a search log (called user frequency thresholding)
and another where t corresponds to the number of instances of an artifact in the log
(called artifact frequency thresholding).
As the thresholding methods do not provide any guarantees about privacy loss, we
also consider a variant of the Korolova et al. algorithm, that has potentially higher
utility. Because the utility of data sanitized using differentially private methods is
affected by the size of the search log, we further investigate how to best process
growing search logs. For example, whether search logs should be sanitized each day
or in week-long segments.
Finally, we explore the effects of our and existing algorithms on three specific IR
applications with and without personalization.

2.3

Selected Information Retrieval Applications

In this section, we discuss related work surrounding three specific IR applications:
search task identification, task-aware query recommendation, and searcher frustration
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Query No.
1
2
3
4

Task ID
1
1
2
1

Query
florida resorts
daytona beach hotels
garden hoses
flights to florida

Figure 2.2. An example of a search session consisting of four queries that constitute
two distinct search tasks.

detection. We cover work that focuses on personalization and privacy for each when
applicable.

2.3.1

Search Task Identification

The goal of search task identification is to segment a sequence of searches into a set
of tasks consisting of related searches. This problem consists of two steps: classifying
pairs of searches as belonging to the same task and then clustering searches into tasks
using the classification information. For example, consider the simple search session
of four queries shown in Figure 2.2. Queries 1, 2, and 4 are all related to a trip to
Florida while Query 3 is its own task. To identify these tasks, an algorithm first
classifies each pair of searches, i.e., (“florida resorts”, “daytona hotels”), (“florida
resorts”, “daytona beach hotels”), etc., as belonging to the same task or not. Once
the predictions are made, the searches are clustered into coherent tasks, such as Task
1 and Task 2 shown in the example.
Jones and Klinkner (2008) introduced hierarchical search task identification. They
trained logistic regression models to classify if pairs of queries belonged to the same
task using two different levels of tasks: atomic tasks called goals and meta tasks
called missions. Among the most influential features were lexical features, such as
Levenshtein distance and the Jaccard Coefficient, as well as search log-based features,
such as the probability of one of the queries in the pair being reformulated as the
other in the logs. The authors did not consider the clustering step. Building on this
work, Boldi et al. (2008) created two classifiers for identifying tasks within a session:
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a logistic regression model similar to Jones and Klinkner’s (2008) for use with query
pairs that only occurred once in a training search log and a rule-based classifier for
the other instances. They did not specify any details of the rule-based classifier.
They cast the problem of clustering as an Asymmetric Traveling Salesman problem:
their algorithm reorders searches in a session by finding the Hamaltonian path that
minimizes the weight between consecutive queries in the new ordering (where the
weight is defined as −log(classification score)). Task breaks are then identified in
the reordered sequence of searches where the classification score is below a threshold.
Lucchese et al. (2011) built an ad-hoc classifier that integrates both the syntactic and
semantic distance between two searches’ query text. Among a number of different
clustering algorithms they examined, they found the most effective was applying the
weighted connected components algorithm over a fully connected graph in which the
nodes are queries and the edges are the same-task classification scores. The graph is
pruned of any edges below a threshold and each connected component in the pruned
graph is considered a task. This method is equivalent to single-link clustering.
We build on the logistic regression classifiers used by Jones and Klinkner (2008) and
Boldi et al. (2008) in addition to the semantic features and task clustering technique
used by Lucchese et al. (2011). There are three key differences between our work
and previous work. First, we do not assume a cross-user definition of a search task;
rather, each user may have a slightly different notion of what constitutes a search task.
Therefore, we explore augmenting globally learned same-task models with personalized, locally-trained models. Second, we consider the effects of privacy on globally
trained same-task models. Third, we consider several datasets, one of which consists of full web search histories from 503 users hand-labeled by 10 annotators. We
know of no work has thus far explored personalized search task identification, nor the
performance impact of sanitized training data.
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Figure 2.3. An example query flow graph (left) and query-click graph (right). The
query flow graph consists of nodes that represent queries and direct edges that represent that the source query has been reformulated as target query in at least one search
session. Weights are typically normalized per node across all outgoing edges (e.g., see
the edges originating at the query “nike”). The query-click graph is bipartite; the
solid-circle nodes on the left represent queries while the dotted-circle nodes on the
right represent clicked web sites. Edges can only go from left to right and indicate
that the source query was followed by a click on a link to the target website. As
in a query flow graph, the edge weights are typically normalized per node over the
outgoing edges (e.g., see the edges originating from the query “asics”).

2.3.2

Task-aware Query Recommendation

We also explore task-aware query recommendation, in which previous searches submitted by a user as part of the same task as the current target query are used when
generating recommendations. Task-aware recommendation is an instance of contextaware recommendation, which more generally leverages a user’s search history when
generating query recommendations.
Huang et al. (2003) introduced a search log-based query recommendation algorithm
that extracts suggestions from search sessions in a query log that appear similar to the
user’s current session, thereby incorporating the surrounding search context. They
found it outperformed methods that extract suggestions from retrieved documents in
many aspects.
Filali et al. (2010) presented a probabilistic model for generating query rewrites based
on an arbitrarily long user search history. Their model interpolates the same-task sim-
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ilarity of a rewrite candidate to the reference query with the average similarity of that
candidate to all on-task queries from a user’s history, weighted by each query’s similarity to the reference query. They found that giving some weight to the history, but
most weight to the reference query, did best on a set of manually and automatically
labeled data.
Mei et al. (2008) presented a personalized query recommendation system that relies on
query-click graphs—bipartite graphs where verticies on one side are queries, verticies
on the other side are search results, and edges between indicate a search result was
clicked for the corresponding query (see the right side of Figure 2.3 for an example).
Queries are suggested by performing random walks starting from the initial query.
Personalization is performed by updating the graph with the user’s query-click history.
Zhang and Nasraoui (2006) constructed a query-to-query graph where directed edges
represent reformulations—not necessarily consecutive—that occurred within a search
session. A given query reformulation from a search session contributes weight to the
corresponding edge in the graph based on the distance of the two queries in the session
(in terms of the number of other queries submitted in between) as well as the content
similarity. Boldi et al. (2008; 2009; 2009) constructed query flow graphs, where nodes
are queries and directed edges are created between pairs of queries that are observed as
reformulations in a set of training logs (see the left side of Figure 2.3 for an example).
A list of suggestions is generated by performing a random walk on the graph, starting
at the query of interest. Search context is integrated by giving non-zero weights
to the elements of the random walk initialization vector corresponding to previous
queries entered by the user. They compare against a method that uses a query-click
graph without contextual information and find that query flow graphs work better.
Szpektor et al. (2011) adapted the query flow graph by integrating query templates,
which consist of semantic place holders within queries. This approach is helpful in
generating recommendations for queries not previously seen by the system, but match
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a known template. While not directly related to privacy, this technique may be helpful
in counteracting the degradation effects of privacy preserving mechanisms. Bonchi et
al. (2012) introduced the term-query graph, another adaptation of query flow graphs
to improve coverage of unseen queries. Query flow graphs in their original form can
only provide recommendations for queries that are contained within the graph since
the random walk must start from somewhere. In a term-query graph, an extra layer
is added: each distinct term gets a node with an outgoing edge pointed at each
query in the query flow graph that contains that term. This layer is not used in
the random walk, but rather serves as a kind of inverted index into the query flow
graph. The term-query graph can therefore provide recommendations for any query
that contains at least one term that exists in the term-query graph. To generate a
query recommendation for a given target query, a random walk is performed for each
term in the query, where the initialization vector consists of each node in the query
flow graph in which the term occurs. The geometric mean of the results for each
random walk is then taken to get the final recommendation list. This work did not
consider personalization.
Cao et al. (2008) introduced a context-aware recommendation system that converts
a series of user queries into concept sequences and builds a suffix tree of these from a
large query log. To produce recommendations, a concept sequence is looked up in the
suffix tree and the common next queries are given as suggestions. Cao et al. (2009)
explored an efficient way to train a very large variable length Hidden Markov Model
(vlHMM), which considers sequences of queries and clicks in order to produce query
and URL recommendations as well as document re-ranking. The authors trained the
vlHMM on a large commercial search log. He et al. (2009) introduced the mixture
variable memory Markov model, which models sequences of user queries. They found
that leveraging variable length sequences out performed pair-wise recommendation
algorithms.
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Liao et al. (2012) explored the effect of task-trails on three applications, including
query recommendation. They compare two session-based, two task-based, and two
single-query recommendation models and found they retrieve complementary sets of
suggestions, though the task-based models provided the higher quality suggestions.
To identify tasks, they used an SVM model using features similar to Jones and Jones
and Klinkner (2008), and the weighted connected components clustering method described by Lucchese et al. (2011).
Götz et al. (2011) explored the effect of privacy mechanisms on query recommendation. They use the technique introduced by Jones et al. (2006), which is nonpersonalized, and evaluated the effect of sanitization by measuring ranking metrics
(e.g., precision, recall, etc.) between suggestion lists generated using the sanitized
data and the recommendations using the unsanitized data set as ground truth. This
offers a notion of relative utility, but not of absolute utility.
Our work relies on the state-of-the-art query-term graph described by Bonchi et al.
(2012) and we introduce a model that allows us to incorporate task context in a
more controllable way than previous work, allowing us to more carefully understand
the effects of task context.. In addition, we consider the effects of privacy on the
term-query graph on absolute performance of query recommendation.

2.3.3

Searcher Frustration Detection

Recall that searcher frustration is defined as the self-reported level of frustration a
user experiences while engaged in a search. Knowing that a searcher is frustrated
provides useful feedback about an IR application and could potentially be used in
adaptive interfaces or algorithms (Feild, Velipasaoglu, et al., 2010).
In a related area, Xie and Cool (2009) explored help-seeking situations that arise
in searching digital libraries. They identified fifteen types of help-seeking situations
that their 120 novice participants encountered. The authors created a model of the
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factors that contribute to these help-seeking situations from the user, task, system,
and interaction aspects. In a study examining how children search the Internet, Druin
et al. (2009) found that all of the twelve participants experienced frustration while
searching. The authors pointed out that children make up one of the largest groups
of Internet users, making frustration a major concern. In a similar study, Bilal and
Kirby (2002) compared the searching behavior of graduate students and children on
Yahooligans! They found that over 50% of graduate students and 43% of children
were frustrated and confused during their searches. In addition, they found that while
graduate students quickly recovered from breakdowns—where users were unable to
find results for a keyword search—children did not. Kuhlthau (1991) found that
frustration is an emotion commonly experienced during the exploration phase of a
search process. She states that encountering inconsistent information from various
sources can cause frustration and lead to search abandonment.
While frustration prediction has not been directly studied in the field of IR, searcher
satisfaction has. Searcher satisfaction in search can have different meanings. We
define searcher satisfaction as the fulfillment of a user’s information need. While satisfaction and frustration are closely related, they are distinct: searchers can ultimately
satisfy their information need but still be quite frustrated in the process (Ceaparu et
al., 2004). In previous work, satisfaction has been examined at the task or session
level. These satisfaction models only cover searcher satisfaction after a task has been
completed, not while a task is in progress. As such, satisfaction models are useful for
retrospective analysis and improvement, but not as a real-time predictor. In contrast,
with a frustration model that is defined throughout a search, these real-time solutions
are available.
In one web search study, Fox et al. (2005) found there exists an association between
query log features and searcher satisfaction, with the most predictive features being
click-through, the time spent on the search result page, and the manner in which a
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user ended a search. They also analyzed browsing patterns and found some more
indicative of satisfaction than others, such as entering a query, clicking on one result, and then ending the task. Clicking four or more results was more indicative of
dissatisfaction. Huffman and Hochster (2007) found a relatively strong correlation
with session satisfaction using a linear model encompassing the relevance of the first
three results returned for the first query in a search task, whether the information
need was navigational, and the number of events in the session. In a similar study
of search task success, Hassan et al. (2010) used a Markov model of search action
sequences to predict success at the end of a task. The model outperformed a method
using the discounted cumulative gain of the first query’s result set, suggesting that a
model of the interactions derivable from a query log is better than general relevance
in modeling satisfaction.
Frustration and satisfaction modeling are instances of the more general concept of
user behavior modeling. The features and approaches used to model different user
behaviors are often interchangeable, and there are several different approaches to
behavioral modeling in the literature. Huffman and Hochster (2007) predicted session
satisfaction using a regression model incorporating the relevance of the top three
results returned for the first query, the type of information need, and the number
of actions in the session. Hassan et al. (2010) used a Markov model to predict task
success and found that sequences of actions, as well as the time between the actions,
are good predictors. Downey et al. (2007) created a Bayesian dependency network
to predict the next user browsing action given the previous n actions, parameterized
by a long list of user, session, query, result click, non-search action, and temporal
features. They found that using an action history with more than just the immediately
preceding action hurt performance. White and Dumais (2009) explored predicting
when users would switch between search engines. Their goal was “not to optimize the
model but rather to determine the predictive value of the query/session/user feature
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classes for the switch prediction challenge” (p. 94). They used a logistic regression
model that encompassed query, session, and user level features. They found that
using all three feature classes outperformed all other combinations of feature classes
and did much better than the baseline for most recall levels.
Our work differs from previous work in three ways. First, we consider the prediction
of searcher frustration, something that no previous work explored that we know of.
Second, we consider a combination of globally learned and locally learned models,
tailoring prediction to individual user’s habits. Third, we consider the effects of privacy on both the task identification portion as well as the globally trained frustration
detection models.

2.4

Analyses of Privacy and Personalization

Several works have looked at the interaction of privacy and personalization. Many
of these works assume that a user’s privacy concern is uploading personal information to a server so that it can be used to personalize the returned content. Under this assumption, Krause and Horvitz (2010) explored the privacy-utility trade
off for personalized web search and found that little personal information is needed
to achieve significant utility. Xu et al. (2007) examined user profiles—a hierarchical set of user interests on the web such as: sports→{soccer, football, baseball }—
automatically extracted from their the pages they visit. Their framework provides
two parameters that users can tune to limit the amount of information that is shared
with the server. Zhu et al. (2010) explored anonymizing user profiles for personalized search by bundling users into groups and creating a profile of the group to use
for personalization. Similarly, Zhou and Xu (2013) considered providing peer-group
personalization—personalization tailored to a group of similar individuals rather than
to a single individual—as a means to protect individual’s privacy. As in the other
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cases, personalization was performed on the server-side, and the privacy aspect was
about protecting the information shared with the personalization algorithm.
The key differences between these works and ours is that we assume that the privacy
concern is with creating global models, not personalization. One reason for this
assumption is that we only consider personalization for individuals, not group-level
personalization. We further assume that personalization is performed client-side or,
when a server is required for computational reasons, the server is trusted to not retain
the private information.

2.5

Search logs

We use the 2006 AOL search log for most of the analyses in this thesis. The log
contains search activity for over 617,000 AOL users collected between March and
May 2006. The dataset was publicly released in August, 2006 and then retracted
soon thereafter. However, the data was already copied to several mirror sites by that
point. There has been debate over the ethics of using the AOL data for research,
given it was retracted (Bar-Ilan, 2007).
The AOL search log is one of three large search logs we have access to. The other
two logs are: a one month sample of MSN search sessions from 2006 and several years
of data from a medical best-practices search engine. The primary reason we chose to
use the AOL search log over other the other two is that it is the richest, most general
purpose of the logs. The MSN search log is inappropriate for our analyses because
search sessions are not linked. That is, hundreds of search sessions may belong to the
same user, but we have no way to establish that information. The privacy mechanisms
we study in this thesis rely on having knowledge of all of a user’s search activity, and
thus the MSN log does not allow us to properly analyze them.
The medical best-practices search engine has a few characteristics that make it an
inappropriate data set for our analyses. First, many of the “users” of the search engine
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are medical institutions, such as hospitals, and the search activity is shared among
many individuals. For example, some institutions provide terminals with access to
the search engine that anyone can use. Since activity cannot be associated with an
individual, our ability to analyze personalization is inhibited. Another reason we
elected not to use the medical best-practices search engine logs at this juncture is
that it is a niche search engine, and it is unclear whether our findings would be tied
specifically to that niche and thus limiting their impact. We believe that analyzing
general web search behavior, as is captured by the AOL search logs, allows our findings
to be have greater impact.
The AOL search log is the only large-scale data set we have access to that allows us
to analyze the effects of both privacy and personalization. We believe we are justified
in using this controversial data set since our focus is on better understanding how
search behavior can be captured in a privacy preserving manner, and not to identify
or otherwise do harm to specific individuals in the data set.
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CHAPTER 3
CROWDLOGGING

In this chapter, we describe a novel framework for privately and anonymously aggregating data across a distributed network of users, called CrowdLogging (Feild et
al., 2011). We begin by motivating the need for such a framework and describe the
framework’s internals. We look at several examples of the data aggregated using the
framework before introducing five privacy mechanisms that we will use throughout
the remainder of this work. We explore several strengths and weaknesses of these
privacy mechanisms.

3.1

Motivation

A common approach to collect, store, and mine a search log is to use a centralized
server model : raw search interaction data from a user base is aggregated into a search
log and stored in a central location. This is depicted in Figure 3.1. Search services

Figure 3.1. The centralized server model, wherein raw user data is uploaded to a
centralized location where it can be minded by analysts.
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can provide both personalized and non-personalized tools to users, but it requires
that users submit their data to the centralized server. The data that users provide
may contain sensitive activity and identifying information, raising serious privacy
concerns. In addition, users have little control over what data is stored and used on
the centralized server. Users must trust the data collectors to maintain their privacy.
What we would prefer is an approach to data collection, storage, and mining that
protects user privacy, allows for personalization, and can aggregate data across users.
Users should largely have control over their data, both in terms of what is mined
and how it is collected. And they should not need to place unwaivering trust in the
collectors. In addition, researchers that want to aggregate search behavior across users
and distribute this information to the greater research community may be required
by their institutional review boards to give due diligence in protecting user privacy.
Likewise, large search companies that would like to distribute data about their users
would also like to do so without violating their users’ privacy.

3.2

Framework

CrowdLogging is a framework for privately aggregating search log data over a distributed group of users. It consists of four components: software installed on users’
computers (client software), a bank of anonymizing nodes (anonymizers), a central
server, and a privacy policy. Figure 3.2 shows a schematic of the framework.
The client software is responsible for logging a user’s search activity to a search log
stored on the client machine in its raw form. Though exactly what is logged is left
up to the implementor, search logs likely contain web searches, visits to web pages,
and clicks on web page links among other search events, along with timestamps.
The client software is also responsible for mining data, such as queries, from the log
whenever the server requests. We refer to these as mining applications, each of which
is a function applied to the user log:
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Figure 3.2. The CrowdLogging model. Raw data resides on users’ computers.
Analysts must request mining applications to be run on the raw data, the results of
which are then encrypted, uploaded anonymously, and then aggregated and decrypted
on a centralized server.

M : UserLog → A,

where M is the application, UserLog is a user’s search log, and A is a set of search
artifacts. Recall that a search artifact is any piece of information extracted from a
search log, such as a query, query reformulation, or query-URL pair. When a mining
application is run, the client must encrypt each artifact a ∈ A using a method that
prevents a from being decrypted unless certain criteria are met, subject to the privacy
policy in place—we describe this process in greater detail next. Once the artifacts
are encrypted, they are uploaded to the server via a bank of anonymizers.
The anonymizers are a set of servers that shuffle data between other anonymizers before finally submitting the data to the centralized server. The purpose of this step is
to anonymize the source of an artifact: the anonymizers strip IP information and any
other data that reveals where an artifact comes from, rendering the artifacts themselves anonymous. Once data arrives at the centralized server, it can be aggregated
and decrypted. The final output is a crowd log.
The encryption, aggregation, and decryption stages must adhere to a privacy policy.
Recall that a privacy policy describes how search artifacts must be treated with re30

spect to user privacy in order to form a crowd log. A simple privacy policy is to only
include search artifacts in a crowd log that are mined from at least k user logs. To
support frequency-based privacy policies (covering all the policies discussed in Chapter 3.4) in CrowdLogging, we rely on a secret sharing scheme for encryption called
Shamir’s Secret Sharing (Shamir, 1979). Under this scheme, a piece of information
is encrypted and a partial key is provided. If enough partial keys are collected, the
information can be decrypted. In CrowdLogging, an artifact is encrypted client-side
along with a partial key specific to the contributing user. Under the k-users privacy
policy, the encryption is performed such that k partial keys are required for decryption. Once the encrypted artifacts arrive at the server, they are grouped along with
their partial keys. If at least k partial keys are collected, the artifacts are decrypted.
The others are discarded. Note that if the server is compromised, the unencrypted
artifacts could be decrypted using a brute force attack.
Under CrowdLogging, we allow encrypted artifacts to consist of two fields: a primary
and a secondary field. The primary field is the one on which artifacts are grouped
when being decrypted. The optional secondary field is data that can be revealed if
the primary field is decrypted, but does not need to be shared among other encrypted
artifacts. For example, if a mining application extracts search queries as the artifacts,
then the primary field might be the search terms in all lower case (this is a type of
normalization) whereas the secondary field may keep the original casing:

hbars in boston, bars in Bostoni.

Under the privacy policy mentioned above, the normalized query bars in boston would
have to be extracted from at least k user logs, while each of them may have used a
different casing. By allowing a secondary field in encrypted artifacts, we hope to allow
analysts to recover small details about artifacts that may be useful, but would not be
uncovered if only the primary field were available. How the secondary field is used
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should be specified in the privacy policy. In this thesis, we do not use the secondary
field as it is difficult to quantify the degree to which it compromises privacy.

3.3

Artifact representation

When we extract data via a mining task with a particular IR application in mind,
we must decide the form of the artifacts. For example, if we want to extract data
for a query recommendation algorithm, it is likely that the artifact will be a query
pair. However, the question is raised: how should the query pair be formatted? One
method is to extract the original text of adjacent queries from a user’s log to use as
the artifact. Another approach is to convert the query text in each pair to lower case.
Yet another approach is to additionally collapse adjacent whitespace in the query
text. For example, the query ASICS SHOES (note the extra space in the middle)
could be represented as is, as ASICS SHOES, or as asics shoes. Each of these is a
different artifact representation.
Artifact representation plays a crucial role in CrowdLogging because it determines
in part the ubiquity of the artifact, which effects how likely the artifact is to survive
sanitization under a given privacy policy. More general representations will be at least
as common as less general representations. In this section, we explore several artifact
representation schemes and their effects on the simple privacy policy we described
earlier, where an artifact must be extracted from at least k user logs to be added to
a crowd log.

3.3.1

Exploring artifact representations

We explore artifact representations by considering several simple transformations on
queries, query-click pairs, and query pairs from a subset of the AOL search log,
spanning the month of March 2006. Without a target application, there are two
primary measures of interest: the artifact impression coverage and distinct artifact
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coverage. Artifact impression coverage is the faction of the total number of artifact
impressions that are shared by at least k users:

|C|
,
|L|

where C is a crowd log and L

is the set of artifacts from which the crowd log was generated. An impression is a
single instance of an extracted artifact. Distinct artifact coverage is the fraction of the
distinct artifacts shared by at least k users:

|Distinct(C)|
,
|Distinct(L)|

where Distinct(y) represents

the set of distinct artifacts contained within the given data set y.
The goal of this analysis is to gain an understanding of the effect of artifact representation on both types of coverage. While the ultimate success metric is utility of
the application that uses a crowd log, given two representations that are functionally
equivalent, the representation that conflates more artifacts together leads to higher
coverage, which means more artifacts will be made available in the crowd log. More
data means more informed models, and thus increasing coverage is a reasonable goal.
However, there are some cases—e.g., representing query pairs as feature vectors or
trimming URLs to only the website domain—where over-eager artifact generalization
will lead to greater coverage, but the quality of the artifacts will be so degraded with
respect to a specific application as to make them useless. We explore the effects of
sanitization on utility for specific applications in Chapters 5, 6, and 7.
For representing a query artifact, consider the following classes:
Original: The text as presented in the log.
Lightly cleaned: The strings “www.”, “.com”, “.edu”, “.net”, and “.org” along
with punctuation are removed from the query text.
Heavily cleaned: First, the text is lightly cleaned. Then each white-space delimited
term is removed if it belongs to a short list of blacklisted terms or stemmed1
otherwise, after which all terms are reordered alphabetically.
1

Stemming is the process of reducing a word to its root (or stem).
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The queries in the AOL search log have already been converted to contain all lowercase
and no redundant whitespace, so we do not consider those representations. The effect
of the representations above for queries (both individually and in query-click pairs) on
the number of distinct users that share those representations are shown in the plots
in Figure 3.3.2 The plots are cropped to show the effects up to k = 100 users. Both
light and heavy cleaning make queries and query-click pairs more common, though the
significance is less clear. For some applications, such as query intent classification,3
it may be important to maintain substrings like “www” and “.com” as they suggest
a user has a navigational intent. However, other applications may not require this
information, in which case the improvement in impression coverage is worth the loss of
data. The differences are also more pronounced for larger values of k, which suggests
that these relatively simple representations are most useful in situations where k is
large, as dictated by the privacy policy imposed on the system. The distinct coverage
(the lower two plots) is less affected by the alternative representations.
For query reformulation pairs, which we will refer to as query pairs, we have added
additional features:
Undirected: Query pairs are directed by nature: a pair (a, b) signifies that the query
b was the first query to follow query a. This representation reorders the queries
alphabetically. E.g., the pairs (a, b) and (b, a) resolve to the same pair (a, b).
Feature vector: Features are extracted from a pair of queries and then binned. We
consider three features: the time between the queries (three bins), the Jaccard
coefficient between the query text (three bins), and the number of character
trigrams that overlap between the query text (four bins). We describe the

2

The ‘distinct’ plots report the fraction of the distinct artifacts of each respective representation,
not the fraction of distinct original-form artifacts.
3

For example, predicting if the user is looking for a homepage, like www.facebook.com, rather
than for information.
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Figure 3.3. The impression coverage (top) and distinct coverage (bottom) of various
representations for queries (left) and query-click pairs (right) as a function of the
number of users (k) that share each artifact. Note that the axes are in log space.
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binning methods in detail in Chapter 5. The feature vector representation is
useful when there is no need for text. For example, in search task identification
as described in Chapter 5.
Figure 3.4 shows the portion of query pairs that are shared by different numbers of
users. The graphs on the left are cropped to show the effects for k = 1 to 100 users.
The full graphs are shown on the right and give a clearer picture of the feature vector
representation. The representation to notice right away is the feature vector; its
representation space is sufficiently low—consisting of 3 × 3 × 4 = 36 possibly values—
that k = 1, 222 when the first artifact becomes unsupported. However, no text is
recovered by using a feature vector representation. Of the other representations,
we see that re-ordering the queries to be alphabetical increases impression coverage,
but not as much as lightly cleaning the text. A combination of heavy cleaning and
alphabetizing the pair results in a substantive improvement, especially for larger
values of k. Similar to the query and query-click pair artifacts, the differences are less
pronounced for distinct coverage (lower plots) than for impression coverage (upper
plots).

3.4

Privacy

As we saw in Chapter 1, it is important to consider privacy when aggregating user
data for use in IR applications. The CrowdLogging framework allows virtually any
privacy policy to be integrated into the process. For example, a policy might mandate
that only artifacts that occur in the logs of 100 different users can be published in
the final crowd log. In this section, we first describe several mechanisms that are
used in the information retrieval community to preserve user privacy and can be
used as privacy policies in CrowdLogging. We demonstrate the potential utility of
these mechanism by analyzing the coverage—the proportion of distinct artifacts or
artifact impressions released in the crowd log—for several artifact types. We also
36
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Figure 3.4. The impression coverage (top) and distinct coverage (bottom) of various
representations for query reformulation pairs as a function of the number of users (k)
that share each artifact.

37

explore several issues surrounding these mechanisms. The contributions we introduce
in this section are: 1) a novel privacy mechanism referred to as DPu , 2) an analysis
of attacks on a class of privacy policies called frequency thresholding (F Tu and F Ta ),
3) an examination of the parameters settings required under differential privacy in
order to obtain approximately the same coverage under frequency thresholding for
releasing query artifacts from the AOL data set, and 4) an analysis of the privacy
trade-offs involved with processing a long-running search log.

3.4.1

Privacy Mechanisms

In this work, we consider two classes of privacy policies: artifact frequency thresholding and differential privacy. For consistency with the literature, we refer to the
individual functions as mechanisms, though any privacy mechanisms can be thought
of as a CrowdLogging privacy policy. We have two goals with the privacy mechanisms
we examine: 1) prevent sensitive information from being released and 2) prevent an
individual from being identified. For the first goal, all mechanisms provide some
kind of thresholding, assuming that artifacts that occur frequently or across multiple users will suppress sensitive information. For the second goal, all mechanisms
release artifacts independently, meaning that there is no explicit link between two
artifact impressions indicating whether they were extracted from the same user log.
Our assumption is that if it is impossible to link two or more artifact impressions
together, and only sufficiently supported artifacts are released, then an attacker will
not be able to combine enough information to identify who contributed an artifact.
For example, this would most likely have prevented the method used by the New
York Times reporter that identified a user in the 2006 AOL data set (Barbaro et al.,
2006). We describe both classes of privacy mechanisms below followed by an analysis
of the potential utility both classes allow on the AOL query log.
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3.4.1.1

Frequency thresholding

Frequency thresholding mechanisms are simple, straightforward, and arguably, quite
natural. We define two such mechanisms: artifact frequency thresholding (F Ta ) and
user frequency thresholding (F Tu ).
With the F Ta mechanism, an artifact is sufficiently supported if it occurs k or more
times in a given search log. We call each occurrence an artifact impression. For
example, if a user enters the same query many times, then each counts as one query
artifact impression. A major weakness of this mechanism is that it will release sensitive artifacts if a user has entered them a sufficient number of times.
A mechanism that does not violate privacy as easily as F Ta is F Tu , in which an
artifact is sufficiently supported if it occurs in k or more distinct user logs. This
is very similar to the t-anonymity method described by Adar (2007), except that it
applies to an arbitrary artifact. Its primary advantage over F Ta is that whether a
sensitive artifact occurs only once or many times in a particular user log, it only
increments the user count by one. Thus, a single user in isolation cannot cause an
artifact to be released. However, we will see in the next section that this mechanism
has several issues of its own.
There is no analytical notion of privacy quantification under frequency thresholding.
As such, we allow an unlimited number of crowd logs to be generated from a given
search log. For example, one crowd log for queries, another for query-reformulation
pairs, and another query-click pairs. As we explore a little later, allowing multiple
artifact types to be extracted from the same search log, combined with the lack of
random perturbation of counts, makes it possible for attackers to link some artifacts
to the same user and even infer unsupported artifacts.
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3.4.1.2

Differential privacy

Unlike the frequency thresholding techniques described above, differentially private
mechanisms provide theoretical bounds on the amount of privacy leaked, and thus
can be considered provably private, provided a number of assumptions hold. In
this section, we introduce differential privacy and briefly describe several relaxations
introduced in the information retrieval literature to publish data from search logs
privately. We describe the algorithms of Korolova et al. (2009) and Götz et al. (2011)
in addition to our variation of the Korolova et al. algorithm (Feild et al., 2011). Each
offers a different view of the data and incurs different privacy and utility costs.
Differential privacy, introduced by Dwork (2006, 2008), is a term applied to a randomized privacy mechanism A, meaning A will produce nearly identical output given
two very similar inputs. We can quantify the difference in outputs by a parameter 
and when doing so, we refer to the mechanism as being -differentially private. For
example, if we consider the input to be a data set of query instances extracted from
users and A to be an algorithm that picks which artifacts to publish, the output of
A given a set of queries should be nearly identical to the output given the same set
of queries, but with any single individual’s query instances removed. This means
that an analyst should not be able to tell from the output of A whether or not any
particular user’s queries were included or excluded from the input search log. The
formal definition is as follows:
Definition 3.4.1 (-Differential Privacy (Dwork, 2008)). A randomized mechanism
A is -differentially private if for all data sets D and D0 that differ in one individual’s
data, and all S ⊆ Range(A):

P r[A(D) ∈ S] ≤ exp() · P r[A(D0 ) ∈ S]
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Note that when the privacy parameter  is decreased, the difference in the outputs is
exponentially decreased: the smaller , the less privacy is leaked, but the less accurate
the output. When  = 0, no privacy is leaked, but the output becomes useless.
One consequence of this definition is that if an attacker were to know the contents of
all but one user log, they should not be able to infer with any certainty what the held
out user log’s contents are. However, in order to make this claim, we need to make
a few assumptions about search logs as pointed out by Kifer and Machanavajjhala
(2011). First, we assume that each individual user’s search behavior is independent
of all other users. Second, we assume that we are the only holders of the input data
set and therefore no one else has released information—sanitized or not—from that
data set. Finally, we assume that any information released from earlier search logs
that contain search behavior from one or more of the users contained within our data
set is not correlated. This last assumption is necessary because information derived
from correlated data sets can provide an attacker with enough information to infer
information from the sanitized crowd log of the current data set.
Differential privacy was created with databases in mind and Götz et al. (2011) demonstrated the impracticality of achieving reasonable accuracy from the output of an
-differentially private mechanism on a search log. They analyzed inaccuracy—the
probability of not publishing very frequent items as well as the probability of publishing very infrequent items from the input search log—and showed that publishing
nothing is more accurate than publishing data under -differential privacy.
Two relaxations of differential privacy have been proposed for sanitizing search logs:
indistinguishability (DPa (Korolova et al., 2009), DPu (Feild et al., 2011)) and the less
relaxed probabilistic differential privacy (ZEALOUS (Götz et al., 2011)). We provide
a high level sketch of these here and describe the technical details in Appendix B.
Throughout this work, we will refer to this family of mechanisms as “differentially
private mechanisms” for ease, even though they are relaxations.
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The DPa mechanism (Korolova et al., 2009) is a form of (, δ)-indistinguishability.
This introduces a slack variable δ to allow a limited amount of additional privacy
to be leaked. DPa produces a noisy histogram of artifacts. The algorithm allows
each user to contribute d artifacts to a collection. Noise sampled from a Laplacian
distribution with variance b is added to the impression count of every collected artifact
and checked against a threshold k; if the noisy count surpasses the threshold, the
artifact is added to the crowd log with a new count: its original count plus newly
sampled noise. By setting the , δ, and d parameters, the noise parameter b and k
can be maximized. DPa is the differentially private parallel of F Ta .
Our mechanism, DPu (Feild et al., 2011), is based on DPa , but varies in one substantial way: rather than requiring that artifacts in the crowd log occur at least k times,
we require that they have been contributed by at least k users. This distinction has
ramifications for how k is computed, allowing k to be higher for the same d relative
to DPa . DPu is the differentially private parallel of F Tu .
The final mechanism we explore is ZEALOUS (Götz et al., 2011), which also produces
a noisy histogram, but using a process that is (, δ)-probabalistically differentially
private, a more conservative relaxation of differential privacy than indistinquishability.
ZEALOUS begins by collecting d distinct artifacts per user. Of the collected artifacts,
those that occur less than k 0 times are discarded. Noise is added to those that remain
and if the noisy count exceeds a second threshold k, the corresponding artifact is
added to the published histogram. The required parameters are: , δ, d, and U ,
where U is the number of users in the input data set.
There are many constraints imposed by differential privacy and its relaxations that
can cause issues for search log analysts. First, in order to bound privacy guarantees,
only a limited number of artifacts may be extracted from each user. This potentially
ignores a large percentage of the original search log.
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Second, the privacy that is leaked each time an algorithm is run on the same search
log is additive—if we extract a set of queries Q and query pairs QP from the same
log, then produce CLQ = DPu (Q) and CLQP = DPu (QP ) with the parameters , δ,
and d, then CLQ ∪ CLQP are (2, 2δ)-indistinguishable. That is, we have doubled the
amount of privacy that is leaked than if we had only extracted one set of artifacts.
Third, the number of artifacts that are released under differential privacy is substantially less than for a non-provably private mechanism, such as frequency thresholding.
This property of privacy preserving mechanisms is perhaps the most difficult barrier
in providing reasonable utility for applications, as we will see next.
Despite these issues, differential privacy based mechanisms provide a means of quantifying the amount of privacy leaked during the creation of a crowd log.

3.4.1.3

Coverage of privacy mechanisms

One way to assess the utility of a privacy mechanism is to consider the resulting crowd
log’s coverage of distinct artifacts and artifact impressions from the search log. While
we will evaluate performance for three individual IR applications later in this thesis,
here we consider the coverage for several artifact types.
In Figure 3.5, we show the coverage for queries, query reformulations, and query-click
pairs across different levels of k. The first thing to notices is that the distinct coverage
is extremely low even at very low values of k. This is because the majority of query,
query pair, and query-click pair artifacts are unique, or at least rare. Depending
on the application, low distinct artifact coverage may or may not matter. In cases
where artifacts corresponding to trends are desired, rare artifacts are not necessary to
achieve high performance. We consider the effects of artifact coverage on performance
for three applications in Chapters 5–7.
The two frequency thresholding mechanisms always produce higher coverage on this
dataset for k < 200. We can also see that while F Ta and F Tu are very similar,
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Figure 3.5. The impression coverage (left) and coverage of distinct artifacts (right)
across five privacy mechanisms for query artifacts (top), query reformulation pairs
(middle), and query-click pairs (bottom), extracted from three months of AOL logs.
The y-axis is shown in log scale. For DPa , DPu , and ZEALOUS,  = ln(10) and
δ = 1/657427.
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F Ta generally performs better (releases more data). DPa and DPu also perform
quite similarly to each other. ZEALOUS consistently provides the lowest coverage.
Both frequency thresholding techniques behave similarly on impression versus distinct
artifact coverage: as k increases, coverage falls, quickly at first before tapering off.
The differentially private mechanisms are a bit different; coverage actually increases
with k when considering artifact coverage. This is due to the varying d associated
with any level of k. By holding constant  and δ, we must increase d in order to
achieve higher values of k, allowing more head artifacts with their high impression
counts to be collected. The differentially private mechanisms show the opposite trend
with respect to distinct artifact coverage. While d increases with k, the increase in k
prevents less common artifacts from being released, hampering the distinct coverage.

3.4.2

Exploring privacy mechanisms

Having introduced several privacy mechanisms, we now discuss some of the questions
we have regarding them. We explore three aspects. First, we consider some of the
attacks to which frequency thresholding mechanisms are vulnerable. Second, we approximate the privacy leaked when producing crowd logs with frequency thresholding.
We do this by tuning the  and d parameters of the differential privacy mechanisms
until they produce very similar results to those produced by F Ta and F Tu . Finally,
we consider the trade-offs involved with segmenting a search log, extracting a crowd
log from each segment, and combining the results. We are motivated by the potential
of using a greater number of each user’s artifacts, but as we will see, smaller segments
require stronger privacy restrictions, which results in fewer artifacts being supported.

3.4.2.1

Compromised privacy under frequency thresholding

Frequency thresholding allows more artifacts to be released than differentially private
mechanisms because it neither requires noise to be added nor limits the number of
artifacts any single user can contribute. However, this same advantage results in the
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B
B
B

Artifact
bob
netflix
humane society
westminster, md

Instances
5,000
6,000
10
5,000

Table 3.1. An extreme example of where a power user can be distinguished from
other users, allowing that user’s artifacts (marked by B) to be linked.

inability to theoretically quantify the privacy compromised by frequency thresholding
and leads to several instances of blatant privacy violations. In this section, we look at
several examples of how privacy might be compromised under frequency thresholding.
For these examples, let Count(x, y) be the number of instances of the artifact x in
the data set y.
Example 1 Suppose we have U users contributing search data. Of these users, we
have one user, Bob, who is a power user—he has performed vastly more searches
than any other user. Now suppose we extract all users’ queries Q and we publish
a histogram CLQ of artifacts and their counts: CLQ = F Tu (Q), i.e., each artifact
a ∈ CLQ is supported by at least k distinct users. Of the artifacts in CLQ , some
subset B intersects with the artifacts mined from Bob’s search log. Because Bob
has so many more searches than any other user, we find that the artifacts in B
have significantly higher impression frequencies than the published artifacts not in
B. Although we cannot say for sure, a careful analyst could reasonably suspect that
there exists a user from which those B artifacts were mined, as depicted in Table 3.1.
This allows artifacts to be linked, which could then reveal the user’s identity. F Ta ,
too, falls victim to this attack. The provably private mechanisms discussed before are
not susceptible to this attack, mainly because each user can only contribute a fixed
number of artifacts.
Example 2 A second kind of attack leverages the ability to extract an unlimited
number of crowd logs from a single search log. Let a, b, and c be three distinct queries.
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We extract queries (Q), adjacent query pairs (QP ), and adjacent query triples (QT )
and publish their respective sanitized logs with k = 5: CLQ = F Tu (Q), CLQP =
F Tu (QP ), and CLQT = F Tu (QT ), which is empty. Table 3.2 shows that, because
the queries a, b, and c and the query pairs (a, b) and (b, c) are sufficiently supported
and we know exactly what their frequencies are, we can infer that at least one user
has the insufficiently supported query triple (a, b, c). This has two repercussions:
first, it means that crowd logs generated by F Tu can be used to generate data that
is inconsistent with what F Tu would itself allow to be released, and second, if the
queries a and c are identifying when taken together, this breach compromises the
identity of the affected users. F Ta can be similarly attacked.
To demonstrate an instance of this kind of breach on the AOL query logs, we use
the following algorithm. Any time we see a query qi that occurs in CLQ with k = 5,
we will examine the query pairs in CLQP and verify two conditions: (1) if there
exists a query qi−1 that immediately precedes qi such that Count((qi−1 , qi ), CLQP ) >
Count(qi , CLQ )/2 and (2) if there exists a query qi+1 that immediately follows qi
such that Count((qi , qi+1 ), CLQP ) > Count(qi , Q)/2. If both conditions hold and we
assume that the statistics reported in CLQ and CLQP are accurate, then we can infer
with 100% accuracy that the query triple (qi−1 , qi , qi+1 ) exists in at least one user log.
A breach occurs when at least one of these triples lacks sufficient support for k = 5,
which is what was used to generate CLQ and CLQP .
On the AOL query log, we can infer 40 query triples this way. Of those 40 triples,
33 are sufficiently supported at k = 5, that is, they occur in CLQT with k = 5.
That means that 7 query triples were entered by fewer than 5 distinct users, but
inferable. This is a relatively small fraction of all unsupported triples—there are a
total of 19,402,216 unsupported triples at k = 5—but nonetheless, it demonstrates
the vulnerability of frequency thresholding.
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Artifact Instances
Queries
a
5
b
7
5
c
Query pairs
a, b
5
b, c
5
Query triples
B a, b, c
3
Table 3.2. An example where running multiple experiments on the same data can
reveal information, e.g., the query triple demarcated by B is not sufficiently supported
at k = 5. We can infer that the triple (a, b, c) was contributed by at least one
individual. The user count of each artifact is not shown, but assume all query and
query pair artifacts are sufficiently supported at k = 5.

Example 3 A third example of a breach of frequency thresholding is as follows.
Assume Bob is analyzing a set of logs sanitized with F Tu and knows (1) that his friend
Alice’s user log is part of a given search log and (2) that Alice entered a query qi at
some point in the recent past.4 Assume that qi appears in CLQ with Count(qi , CLQ ) =
n. Now suppose that all possible pairs involving qi appear in the accompanying
sanitized query pair log, CLQP , i.e., Count((·, qi ), CLQP ) + Count((qi , ·), CLQP ) = n.
Furthermore, assume that the query qi is only ever preceded by one query, qi−1 .
Then every user that submitted the query qi also submitted the preceding query qi−1 .
Therefore, Bob now knows that Alice submitted qi−1 .
These examples demonstrate that frequency thresholding is vulnerable to revealing
information that is inconsistent with its policy as well as information that can be
combined with auxiliary information to establish a connection between individuals
and artifacts. These are edge cases and might be rare, but we stress that when privacy
4

This is not an unfair assumption. For instance, office workers can easily see coworkers’ computer screens in many office settings. In addition, people sometimes post search queries on social
networking sites and forums.
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matters, so do the edge cases. It would seem that adding noise to the released counts
and limiting the amount of data a single user can contribute would go a long way
towards addressing these vulnerabilities. However, the concern then becomes how
much noise to add and how much data can each user contribute. This is exactly the
niche that differential privacy and its relaxations attempt fill.

3.4.2.2

Obtaining similar coverage across mechanisms

As we saw earlier in this chapter, frequency thresholding mechanisms substantially
out-perform their differentially private counterparts in terms of coverage on the AOL
data set. Ideally, we would be able to achieve the relatively high coverage rates that
we observed for frequency thresholding and at the same time have the theoretical
understanding that braces differentially private mechanisms such as DPa and DPu .
With this ideal situation in mind, two questions of practical interest are: 1) what
DPa and DPu parameter settings would be necessary to achieve a similar coverage to
F Ta and F Tu , respectively?5 and 2) are those settings reasonable? In this section, we
address these questions specifically for query artifacts released using the AOL search
log. Although the specific conclusions we draw do not necessarily generalize to other
data sets or artifact classes, the process we use and the analysis we conduct can be
applied to other data sets and artifact classes.
DPa and DPu have several parameters: the number of artifacts to sample per user
d, the threshold k, the noise parameter b, the privacy parameter , and the privacy
slack value δ. As we describe in Appendix B, the typical way to use DPa and DPu
is to set k, , and δ, calculate the optimal d, and then compute b (which is based on
 and d). In approximating the coverage produced using frequency thresholding, we
assume that a major factor is the number of artifacts sampled per user. If we only
5

We pair these mechanisms for the sole reason that they share similar thresholding strategies,
namely DPa and F Ta threshold on artifact frequency and DPu and F Tu threshold on user frequency.
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sample a small portion of artifacts per user under differential privacy, then we likely
will not be able to achieve nearly the same coverage as under frequency thresholding.
Given this assumption, we will hold d constant and instead optimize  for a given
value of k in this section.6
The first detail we consider is how to choose d. While frequency thresholding considers
all artifacts per user, we need to bound d when using the DPa and DPu mechanisms.
If we set d = 100 then 92% of users contribute 100% of their query artifacts in the
AOL data set. If we wanted 95% or more of users to contribute 100% of their query
artifacts, we would need to increase d substantially; instead, we use d = 100 and claim
that it covers a sufficient majority of users. We should note that in a realistic setting,
we would not know what value of d would result in the majority of users contributing
all of their artifacts without incurring a privacy cost (even then, it would be a noisy
count).
For these experiments, we set d = 100, and hold δ constant at 1/U = 1/657427 (i.e.,
one over the number of users in the data set). We can then vary k and compute the
optimal , and then calculate b = d/. To see how  fluctuates relative to k, we have
plotted the two in Figure 3.6 for the DPa , DPu , and ZEALOUS mechanisms. ZEALOUS is shown as a comparison point, though we will not use it for our experiments
in this section. We can see that for lower values of k (meaning more data is released),
 is quite high—high enough to be practically meaningless. However, as k increases,
 decreases quickly.
In Table 3.3, we show the optimal value of  under DPa and DPu for a given threshold,
k. Our hypothesis is that using this table, we should be able to establish the 
necessary to achieve a query artifact coverage similar to F Ta and F Tu at a given
value of k on the AOL data set. To put this hypothesis to the test, we compare
6

In actuality,  cannot be analytically solved for under DPa ; rather we must sweep a range of 
values to find the one that produces the desired value of k, or one that is close.
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Figure 3.6. The  required in order for obtain a given level of k for each of the three
differential-privacy mechanisms. Mechanisms use d = 100, U = 657427 (the number
of users in the AOL data set), and δ = 1/U .

DPu
k

DPa


k

1
–
2 1730.81
4 576.94
8 247.26
16 115.39
32
55.83
64
27.47
128
13.63
256
6.79
512
3.39
1024
1.69



–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
101 1730.82
128
61.82
256
11.10
512
4.21
1026
1.87

Table 3.3. The optimal  for a given value of k. We use d = 100, U = 657427 (the
number of users in the AOL data set), and δ = 1/U . Note that under DPa ,  cannot
be determined analytically given a specific k. Rather, we sweep across values of 
with a step size of 0.01 and use the  that yields the closest value of k to the target
(i.e., the value of k listed for DPu ).
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Figure 3.7. The distinct query coverage over the AOL search log using F Ta and
F Tu with all data and DPa and DPu with d = 100, δ = 1/657427, and the value of 
shown in Table 3.3. DPa and DPu coverage is averaged over ten samples with noise
added.

the distinct query artifact coverage obtained under F Ta and F Tu to DPa and DPu ,
respectively. The results are shown in Figure 3.7. We can see that the coverage
between the F T and DP mechanisms is close for query artifacts. This signifies that
our method of setting parameters for DPa and DPu to approximate coverage under
frequency thresholding is effective, at least for extracting query artifacts from the AOL
data set. However, as we noted earlier, the privacy parameter  optimized for lower
values of k under both DPa and DPu is impractically high. Achieving coverage similar
to that produced under frequency thresholding using differential privacy mechanisms
requires unreasonable settings.
Note that the values of  shown in Figure 3.6 and Table 3.3 are dependent on two
parameters: first, the number of artifacts contributed per user, d—we picked a value
that we knew covered a large portion of users. For different artifacts, this number
will need to change if an implementor wants to encapsulate the majority of users.
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While we assumed an oracle value, in a live system, the implementor will either have
to extract the number of artifacts each user has, which will incur a privacy cost, or
an estimate will have to be made, in which case the resulting coverage may not be
as close to frequency thresholding as our experiments demonstrated. Second, we set
U to the number of users in the data set; for a new data set, U should be adjusted
based on that data set’s size.
By considering the parameter settings required to make the coverage of DPa and DPu
approximate that of frequency threshold, we are not drawing any connection between
the underlying mechanisms. It is important to note that the differential privacy
parameters do not apply to the frequency thresholding mechanisms themselves—
they cannot, since frequency thresholding mechanisms do not satisfy the differential
privacy definitions. It would be incorrect to use, e.g., F Ta , and then state that
its corresponding privacy loss at k is a particular value . Rather, the differential
privacy parameters can only be used to quantify privacy loss when used with the
corresponding differentially private mechanism.
As a final note, we emphasize that our results in this section pertain only to query
artifacts extracted from the AOL data set and do not necessarily generalize to other
artifacts or other data sets.

3.4.2.3

Sanitizing search logs more effectively

A live logging system must cope with continually growing user data and how to use
it effectively as soon as possible. For frequency thresholding, there is no issue—it
can be run over data an unlimited number of times, meaning the old and new data
can be concatenated and processed under F Tu or F Ta . This is not the case for the
differentially private mechanisms without leaking additional privacy—if we generate
n crowd logs, each with parameters (, δ), the total privacy leaked is captured by
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(n · , n · δ). In this section, we begin to analyze how differentially private mechanisms
can be more effectively applied to growing search logs.
Our goal is to maintain the privacy parameters  and δ. The variables we can set
are the number of artifacts to sample from each user d, and the set of artifacts from
which the d artifacts are sampled. We can vary the latter without affecting the
privacy parameters because differentially private algorithms are only dependent on
the number of artifacts per user and the total number of users. Consequently, an
input data set D with 300 artifacts is treated exactly the same as a data set D0 with
3 million artifacts. In both cases, we sample d artifacts per user. Provided d remains
the same, |D| − d < |D0 | − d; that is, fewer artifacts are ignored from D than from
D0 . At the same time, however, samples taken from D0 may provide better coverage
due to the possibility of increased artifact diversity.
One way to control the size of the logs is to constrain the time frame—for example,
sanitizing a day’s, week’s, or month’s worth of user logs. Korolova et al. (2009)
explored this by directly comparing the coverage of query artifacts for different time
spans, finding that distinct artifact coverage is not substantially affected by time
span, while artifact impression coverage is dependent on both the timespan and d,
with higher levels of d and longer time spans providing better coverage. However, a
more useful analysis is to compare the utility of one sanitized log (e.g., a month long
log) versus combining n sanitized subsets of that log (e.g., 31 day-long logs).
A complicating factor is that each time span is, under conservative assumptions,
correlated with every other time span. This assumes that a user’s search activity
one day is dependent on their search behavior another day. Because this data is
correlated, the privacy costs must be summed across the time spans. Suppose we
want to maintain  = ln(10) and δ = 1/657427 as the cost for our crowd log and a
month is the longest time span we consider. The crowd log generated from the entire
month would stay at  = ln(10), δ = 1/657427; each of two half-month time spans
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would use  = ln(10)/2, δ = 1/(2 × 657427); and each of 31 day-long logs would use
 = ln(10)/31, δ = 1/(31 × 657427). Since , δ, and d interact to establish k, it may
be that we can only sample so few artifacts per shorter time frame, or k becomes too
large, that nothing is gained.
The trade off, then, is sampling a larger portion of each user’s artifacts versus higher
values of k, limiting the output, especially of tail artifacts. To understand these trade
offs empirically, we conducted an experiment over the March 2006 segment of the AOL
search log. Figures 3.8 and 3.9 show the coverage across query, query pair, and queryclick pair artifacts extracted with the DPa , DPu , and ZEALOUS privacy mechanisms
and various d settings. the trends make it clear that using longer spanning logs provide
greater coverage. However, day-long logs do provide an advantage, if very slight,
when extracting query artifacts when d = 1. For less common artifacts like querypairs, longer spanning logs are essential to reveal anything, especially when using
ZEALOUS—the month-long log is the only log that provided non-zero coverage.
The take away from this analysis is that longer time spans provide greater coverage
than aggregating crowd logs produced from smaller segments of the log. If the assumption that log segments with overlapping users are correlated can be challenged,
then the privacy costs would not need to be summed. Then, perhaps, aggregating
multiple crowd logs would be a better solution.

3.5

Summary

In this chapter, we introduced CrowdLogging, a framework for logging, mining, and
aggregating data in a privacy-aware manner. We demonstrated the impact that artifact representation has on coverage. We also introduced five privacy mechanisms
that can crowd logs within the CrowdLogging framework, including a formalization of
two naı̈ve frequency thresholding mechanisms, F Tu and F Ta as well as a novel (, δ)indistinguishable mechanism, DPu . We evaluated their potential effectiveness using
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Figure 3.8. The impressions coverage of queries (top), query pairs (middle) and
query-click pairs (bottom) achieved by combining 31 1-day sanitized logs (Days), two
half-month sanitized logs (Half-month), and a single month sanitized log (Month) for
March, 2006 in the AOL search log. For each privacy mechanism DPa (left), DPu
(middle), and ZEALOUS (right) we used  = ln(10) and δ = 1/657427. This is
plotted on a log-log scale.
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Figure 3.9. The distinct artifact coverage of queries (top), query pairs (middle) and
query-click pairs (bottom) achieved by combining 31 1-day sanitized logs (Days), two
half-month sanitized logs (Half-month), and a single month sanitized log (Month) for
March, 2006 in the AOL search log. For each privacy mechanism DPa (left), DPu
(middle), and ZEALOUS (right) we used  = ln(10) and δ = 1/657427. This is
plotted on a log-log scale.
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distinct artifact coverage and artifact impression coverage for three artifact types:
queries, query pairs, and query-click pairs. We described several ways in which crowd
logs released using frequency thresholding can be attacked to link artifacts, identify
user participation, and infer insufficiently supported artifact. We empirically measured the frequency with which some insufficiently supported artifacts can be inferred
from AOL crowd logs. We explored parameter settings for DPa and DPu to achieve
approximately the same query artifact coverage produced using frequency thresholding on the AOL search log. We found that  must be set impractically high, especially
for lower values of k, causing us to conclude that it is not possible to produce coverage similar to frequency thresholding using reasonable parameter settings. Finally, we
explored segmenting search logs into smaller sets in order to obtain higher coverage.
However, we found that processing larger logs produces better coverage at the same
privacy loss.
The impact of these analyses is of a practical nature. A query log analyst interested
in privacy must make many decisions when deciding what mechanism to use, how to
process data, and what the consequences of those choices are. Our analyses provide
insights on these fronts with respect to a large search log.
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CHAPTER 4
INTEGRATING LOCAL AND GLOBAL INFORMATION

In this and the following chapters, we explore integrating local user data with globally
aggregated data for use in IR applications, introducing a general template for implementing IR applications that leverage both kinds of data. We look specifically at
three applications: search task identification, context aware query recommendation,
and context aware website suggestion.
We first motivate why IR applications should make use of rich local user search
data in addition to sanitized global data aggregated across many users. We then
present a general local-global data integration template, to which all IR applications
described in the following chapters will adhere. Finally, we end with a brief outline
of the evaluation strategy we use for the IR applications presented in the coming
chapters. In Chapter 8 we will describe CrowdLogger, an open source system we
have constructed to support these types of studies.

4.1

Local and global data

There are several reasons to use local user data in combination with globally aggregated data in a search application. First, let us define global data as the data included
in a crowd log and local data as the data contained within a user log.
We have two motivations for using local data. First, it is extremely rich in detail
and information compared with sanitized global data. If an application requires
information that is not present in the global data due to sanitization, then local
data may provide that information. Second, local data pertains specifically to the
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individual associated with the data. Thus, a user profile can be built from that
data, providing models of a user’s interests and habits. That is, it provides a way
of personalizing an IR application. This information is not conveyed in globally
aggregated data.
Global data also has its benefits. First, it provides a notion of popularity and general
trends—a background model—that cannot be captured by a single individual’s data.
For example, when recommending queries to a user given they have just entered query
q, it may be desirable to offer not only follow up queries the user has entered in the
past for q, but also the popular reformulations of q across all users. Second, global
data becomes most important when local data is sparse. For example, if a user has
no search history, then the recommendations from the global model become the only
recommendations.

4.2

Integrating local and global information

In this section, we present a common set of steps that implementers can specify when
integrating local and global data into IR applications. This template allows us to
describe how an applications collects, aggregates, and uses local data. The template,
shown in Figure 4.1, is appropriate when using either sanitized or un-sanitized global
data.
In following this template for an IR application, an implementer must describe how
to perform these steps. For our purposes, much of the work in Step 1 is taken care of
by the CrowdLogging framework described in Chapter 3, for example, extracting and
aggregating artifacts, as well as sanitizing the data as a preprocessing step. Assuming
we use CrowdLogging, we need only to specify what artifacts will be extracted in Step
1-a and how to preprocess the sanitized data in Step 1-b, if applicable. Examples of
preprocessing include building a global model, such as a query flow graph, a trained
machine learning model, or a maximum likelihood lookup table.
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Local-global integration template
1. Collect and aggregate global data
(a) Extract artifacts from user logs
(b) Perform any necessary preprocessing of aggregated data
2. Perform any preprocessing of the local data
3. Process IR application input using local and global data
(a) Gather required global data
i. Client sends a request to the server
ii. Server processes the client request
iii. Server sends the response to the client
(b) Integrate local and global data given application input
(c) Return output
Figure 4.1. The list of procedures that must be defined for an IR application.

Similar to the global preprocessing, the local data preprocessing in Step 2 is only
performed if applicable. Examples of preprocessing on local data include building
language models of previously searched topics, identifying search tasks, or trained
classifiers, to name a few.
The final step is more complex—it details how the IR application integrates local and
global data to produce output. Given an input, IR applications must consider several
elements, namely: how local data is accessed and used, how global data is accessed
and used, and where computation occurs.
First consider these elements in the context of a non-privacy preserving, centralized
local-global integration model, shown in Figure 4.2a. Under this model, a user submits
a request consisting of the user’s identification (xi in the figure) and the application’s
input to the server. The IR application performs its computation on the server,
accessing both the user’s private information as well as the global information. The
output of the application is then sent back to the client where it is displayed to the
user. Note that his model does not preserve privacy—the server has access to all
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(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

Figure 4.2. Figure (a) shows a centralized integration model, where all data is
stored and processed on the centralized server. The client machine sends requests
and displays the output from the server, e.g., through a web interface. Figure (b)
shows a global only model where sanitized global data is stored on a server, but no
local data is stored. Figure (c) shows a local only model, where local data is stored
on a user’s computer, but no global data is stored. Figure (d) shows the partially
distributed integration model, where global data is sanitized and stored on a server
and local data resides on the user’s machine. Both the client and the server can
perform computations for a given IR application.
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users’ data. However, it does provide an upper bound with which to compare privacy
preserving models.
One model that is privacy preserving stores only sanitized global data on the server,
as shown in Figure 4.2b. However, this model is not personalized because it does
not make use of any local data. A different model that is both privacy preserving
and personalized stores local data on the client side is shown in Figure 4.2c. This is
private because only the user has access to the local data. While personalization is
provided, no global data is used in this model, preventing the implementation of IR
applications that require global data such as common query reformulations.
The model we propose is one where processing is spread across both the client and
the server. We call this the partially distributed local-global integration model, shown
in Figure 4.2d. It is considered partially distributed rather than fully distributed
because some computation still occurs on the centralized server. The client machine
hosts the user’s personal data and the server hosts the sanitized global data. This
protects user privacy and gives users the ability to tightly control their data.
Due to the potential size of the global data in a web setting, we assume it cannot
be copied in full to a user’s computer. Any computation that occurs on the user’s
machine has all of the local data at it disposal, however, this must be weighed against
the limited computational resources available. Any computations that occur on the
server have full access to the global data, but not the user’s local information. Under
this model, we assert that the three steps given an input, shown in Step 3 of Figure 4.1,
must be specified for an application. Step 3-a-i. allows the implementer to specify
what data is included in the request to the server. At the implementers discretion,
and the consent of the user, local information can be sent with this request so that
the server can process it.
To understand each step better, consider a few examples. In Step 3-a, we may have an
IR application that requires a classifier trained on global data. Provided the classifier
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is trained on the server as a preprocessing step (i.e., it is not dependent on the client
request), then the server’s only responsibility is to pass the classifier to the client.
In another example, consider the server building a graph of the global data—such
as a query flow graph, where nodes are queries and directed edges represent that
one query has been rewritten as another—in a preprocessing step. This graph is too
large to download as a whole to the client machine, so instead the client can request
a portion of the graph, e.g., all nodes and edges within three hops of the query q.
Alternatively, the server could perform part of the application’s processing rather
than only fetch data. Using the graph example, the client could send the server a
query and its context and have the server generate a list of query recommendations
using the graph of global data.
This last example introduces an interesting tension: how much local information
should be given to the server. If too much local information is provided, the partially
distributed integration model reduces to the centralized integration model. Providing
the associated search context along with a query may be too much information and
violates privacy to some degree; there is no answer to this as it is a policy decision.
In this work, we will consider applications that send single queries without additional
local information.
To conclude this section, we present a list of questions in Figure 4.3 to which we
provide answers for each IR application we discuss in the coming chapters. These
questions map directly to the local-global data integration template shown in Figure 4.1.

4.3

Evaluating IR applications

In the following chapters, we will describe several IR applications that rely on global
or local data. Our analyses will consider the affects of sanitizing the global data and
incorporating personalization using local data.
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IR application implementation questionnaire
B Preprocessing
1. What artifacts will be extracted?
2. What preprocessing will take place on the global data?
3. What preprocessing will take place on the local data?
B On input
4. What is the input?
5. What request will the client send to the server?
6. What processing will the server perform for the client request?
7. What response will the server send to the client?
8. How will the server data be integrated with the local data?
9. What is the output of the application?
Figure 4.3. The questions that must be answered for each IR application.

The configurations will include global data produced under each of the privacy preservation mechanisms: F Ta , F Tu , DPu , DPa , and ZEALOUS. We will explore performance for various parameter settings. In addition, we consider the special cases where
only global or local data is considered.
We will use several datasets: the 2006 AOL search log, the TREC 2010-11 Session
Track data, and data we collected during a user study in 2009.
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CHAPTER 5
SEARCH TASK IDENTIFICATION

In this chapter, we describe the problem of search task identification (STI), our approach to adding personalization, and an analysis of the effect of personalization and
sanitization on STI performance.
Recall from Chapter 2, STI is the process of grouping a set of user searches into
search tasks. With varying assumptions, this general process has also been referred
to as chain finding (Boldi et al., 2008; Radlinski & Joachims, 2005), query segmentation (Boldi et al., 2008), and task segmentation (Jones & Klinkner, 2008). Identifying
tasks is useful for many applications, such as establishing a focused context for use
with context-aware tools, profiling long term interests, and aiding users in exploring
their search histories.
One approach to STI that has been used in previous work breaks the problem
into two parts: (1) classifying pairs of searches as belonging to the same task or
not (Jones & Klinkner, 2008) and (2) clustering searches into tasks using the classification scores (Boldi et al., 2008; Lucchese et al., 2011). What defines two searches
as sharing a common task is subjective and typically left up to the human assessors
providing the same-task labels (Boldi et al., 2008; Jones & Klinkner, 2008; Lucchese
et al., 2011; Radlinski & Joachims, 2005). Jones and Klinkner (2008) specify two
levels of tasks: search goals and search missions. A search goal consists of one or
more queries issued towards a common, atomic information need. A search mission
is a set of related goals. Beyond these levels, however, no objective definitions are
given.
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Because of the subjectivity involved, we do not provide a strict definition of what it
means for two searches to be a part of the same task.1 Instead, we allow each user
of the system to make that decision. For example, one user may decide that a series
of searchers to find final scores from a set of sporting events held the previous night
should be grouped by the same task, while another may further divide them into
specific sports. Neither of these is wrong, just different, and reflect each individual’s
perspective.
With this to-each-his-own definition of what a search task is, it is natural to ask
two questions: how different are user’s definitions and how can personalization be
incorporated into STI. In addition, we would like to know how sanitization affects
the performance of STI models, including those that integrate global and local information. Formally, we have the following questions:
RQ1. How different are users’ perceptions of what a search task is?
RQ2. How does personalization affect the quality of STI?
RQ3. What impact does sanitizing global data have on the quality of STI?
To address these questions, we consider a large set of labeled AOL data. We consider
the inter-annotator agreement between same-task labels for a subset of the labeled
data—an analysis that no other work has reported to our knowledge. We consider
a number of existing models for STI and consider the ways they can be used in a
personalized setting. We then explore sanitization by using the F Ta , F Tu , DPa ,
DPu , and ZEALOUS privacy mechanisms to produce global models.
Our key contributions are: (1) results using a collection of labeled data consisting
of the entire three-month histories of 503 AOL users; (2) an analysis of agreement
among the seven annotators over labels provided for ten AOL users, demonstrating
that annotators (and therefore users) have different internal views of what constitutes
a search task; (3) random forest classification models consisting of novel features that

1

This is very similar to the definition of relevance in information retrieval.
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significantly out-perform the current state of the art; (4) several local and local-global
integrated models that statistically significantly out-perform global-only models; and
(5) an analysis of the effects of sanitization, in which we observe that the best performing model trained using a single same-task annotation from each of 352 users can
obtain similar performance to using all annotations.
Figure 5.1 outlines the implementation we will follow for personalized STI throughout
this chapter. In Section 5.1 we describe how global data will be mined, collected and
processed. We then describe how local data is used and combined with global data
in Sections 5.2 and 5.3. We present our experimental setup and the data we use
in Section 5.4. We present our findings in Section 5.5 before wrapping up with a
discussion of limitations in Section 5.6 and a summary in Section 5.7.

5.1

Global data

As mentioned, we consider STI to consist of two subproblems: same-task classification and task clustering. In this section, we describe how global data is mined
and aggregated to form global same-task classification models, including the effect of
multiple artifact representations, and how clustering is performed when no data is
provided by the user.

5.1.1

Same-task classification

Three recent approaches to classifying two searches as belonging to the same task
are the following. (1) Jones and Klinkner (2008) trained a logistic regression model
between all pairs of searches in a session. (2) Boldi et al. (2008) created two classifiers: a logistic regression model for use with query pairs that only occurred once in
the training data (this covers roughly 50% of their training data) and a rule-based
classifier for the other instances. In the case of the logistic classifiers used by these
two groups, the important features are generally the time between two queries and
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Personalized search task identification
B Preprocessing
1. What artifacts will be extracted?
 Feature vectors between pairs of queries labeled as belonging to the
same-task or not (see Section 5.1 for details).
2. What preprocessing will take place on the global data?
 A random forest model will be trained on the sanitized feature vectors.
3. What preprocessing will take place on the local data?
 A user-specific random forest model will be trained for each user with
labeled data.
B On input
4. What is the input?
 A set of searches.
5. What request will the client send to the server?
 N/A (the global model will be downloaded from the server as a preprocessing step)
6. What processing will the server perform for the client request?
 N/A
7. What response will the server send to the client?
 N/A
8. How will the server data be integrated with the local data?
 Same-task classification. Same-task labels will be predicted for
all unlabeled query pairs using both the local (if available) and global
classifiers.
 Task clustering. Queries will be grouped by means of single-link clustering using thresholded same-task classification scores as edge weights;
if local data is available, predicted edges that violate the set of mustlink and cannot-link constraints are ignored, prevent clusters from being
merged that contain queries we know should be kept separate (see Section 5.2 for details).
9. What is the output of the tool?
 The input searches, grouped by search task.
Figure 5.1. Implementation specifications for personalized search task identification.
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Feature
time-diff
jaccard
levenshtein
overlap
semantic-wikipedia

semantic-category

semantic-wiktionary

Random
Description
Lucchese
Forest
Time difference in seconds.
3
The Jaccard Coefficient.
3
3
One minus the Levenshtein string
3
3
edit distance.
Jaccard coefficient of character tri3
grams.
Cosine similarity of Wikipeida
3
3
pages, weighted by tf-idf for each
query.
Like semantic-wikipedia, but each
3
page is mapped to its category
(scores for duplicate categories are
summed).
Like semantic-wikipedia, but over
3
3
Wiktionary.

Table 5.1. Features between two queries used in the models.

various syntactic features between the query text, such as the Jaccard coefficient.
Boldi et al. did not specify any details of the rule-based classifier, so we have no way
to replicate their two-classifier approach. (3) The state of the art classification model
was introduced by Lucchese et al. (2011). They built an unsupervised classifier2 that
integrates both the syntactic and semantic distance between two searches’ query text.
They directly compared their method to Boldi et al., finding their model performed
better.
We consider two models: the one introduced by Lucchese et al. (we will refer to this
as the Lucchese model) and a random forest model using the features used by the
Lucchese model and two additional ones: time-diff and semantic-category. All the
features used are listed in Table 5.1, as well as which models use them. We added
time-diff since previous work has shown time to be useful (Boldi et al., 2008; Jones &
Klinkner, 2008), though both Jones and Klinkner and Lucchese et al. demonstrated

2

It does, however, contain a parameter that can be tuned.
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that temporal features alone are not sufficient. We introduce the semantic-category
to be a generalization of the semantic-wikipedia feature used by Lucchese et al.. The
intuition is that some semantically similar terms may not occur in the same document together, but rather in separate documents within the same general category.
Taken together, these features touch on the temporal (time-diff), lexical (jaccard,
levenshtein, and overlap), and semantic (semantic-wikipedia, semantic-category, and
semantic-wiktionary) similarity spaces between searches.
We chose a fully supervised machine learning classifier as our second model (as opposed to the ad-hoc Lucchese model) since it empirically learns the relationships
between features. The choice of a random forest classifier was based on preliminary
experiments with several off-the-shelf classifiers, including: decision trees, support
vector machines, and logistic regression classifiers. Random forest models performed
consistently well and they have a interesting property that made them stick out:
rather than learning one set of weights for features, they instead create several subclassifiers (decision trees), each considering a random sample of features in isolation
and learning a set of weights for them, as well as a meta-classifier that combines
the predictions from each of the sub-classifiers. Ho (1995) demonstrated that a set
of decision trees trained using random subsets of features are able to generalize in
complimentary ways, and that their combined performance is greater then any one
by itself.
In order to train global versions of the Lucchese and random forest models, we rely
on feature vector artifacts aggregated into a crowd log. But first, we must obtain
annotations from the users contributing the artifacts. We ask users to group some
subset of their searches into search tasks. Once grouped, we extract the features for
each pair of queries in the annotated set, applying the label same-task or different-task
based on whether the user grouped the two into the same search task. We know from
Section 3.3 that artifact representation has a significant impact on supportability.
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Bin1:
Time difference (seconds: [0, ∞])

0.00



0.25
bin1(x) =

0.50



1.00

x < 30seconds,
x < 1minute,
x < 1hour,
x ≥ 1hour.

Lexical and semantic features ([0, 1])


0.00 x < 0.025,





0.25 0.025 ≤ x ≤ 0.250,
bin1(x) = 0.50 0.250 < x < 0.750,



0.75 0.750 ≤ x ≤ 0.975,



1.00 x > 0.975.

Figure 5.2. The first of two binning methods we explored (bin1).

With up to seven unconstrained features, every feature vector has the potential to be
unique.
Rather than use continuous feature values, we discretize them into a small number of bins. We considered two methods for binning. The first (bin1) maps each
of the features with ranges [0,1] (all features but time-diff) to one of the values
{0.0,0.25,0.5,0.75,1.0}, and time-diff into {0.0,0.25,0.5,1.0}. The mapping is shown
in Figure 5.2. The second (bin2) binarizes the values: values for all features are either
1 or 0. The mapping is shown in Figure 5.3. Using a large sample of labeled data
(see Section 5.4.2 for details about the full dataset), we found, not surprisingly, that
bin2 releases more distinct artifacts and artifact impression than the other methods
for a given value of k. Figure 5.4 shows the coverage of using the original feature
vectors (truncated to three decimal places) and those produced using the two binning
methods over the training data used in the experiments we describe in Section 5.4. It
is clear that the original, unconstrained feature vectors are not suitable for privacy-
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Bin2:
Time difference (seconds: [0, ∞])
(
0 x < 1minute,
bin2(x) =
1 x ≥ 1minute.
Lexical and semantic features ([0, 1])
(
0 x < 0.5,
bin2(x) =
1 x ≥ 0.5.

Figure 5.3. The second of two binning methods we explored (bin2). This is the
method we used for our final experiments.

aware data aggregation. Based on the increased coverage possible when using bin2,
and the performance gains we found when applying privacy mechanisms to bin2 feature vectors on a development data set, we only consider bin2 for the remainder of
this chapter.

5.1.2

Task clustering

Any clustering technique can be used to group searches into tasks based on the
same-task classification scores. We use the weighted connected components (WCC)
method described by Lucchese et al., who found this method outperforms several
other techniques, including the query chaining approach used by Boldi et al. The
WCC algorithm creates a fully connected graph where each search in a given session
is represented as a node and the edges are the same-task classification scores between
searches. The graph is then pruned of any edges with a weight below a threshold η
and each connected component in the pruned graph is considered a task.
An example of this process is shown for a sample search history in Figure 5.6 (the
ground truth is displayed in Figure 5.5).
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Figure 5.4. The impression coverage of the original feature vectors (up to three
decimal places) and feature vectors binned with the bin1 and bin2 methods as the
impression threshold increases (F Ta ). Both axes are shown in log scale.

Figure 5.5. An example search history with two search tasks.
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Figure 5.6. An example search history with automatically generated clusters using
weighted connected components clustering and predictions from a globally trained
model.

5.2

Local data

Provided a user has manually grouped a subset of their searches into search tasks,
we can use that data to train local models. We consider locally trained equivalents
of the two global models: Lucchese and a random forest classifier. Unlike with global
models, where we need to consider sanitization, local models do not need to be binned,
though doing so is perfectly acceptable. We found that the unbinned features work
better than binned for local data, so we will only consider that case.
When local data is available, we use a more advanced form of clustering. User annotations provide a set of constraints: the label for every pair of annotated queries
is either must-link or cannot-link. We being clustering by first inserting the labeled
edges. We then classify all missing edges, sort them in non-ascending order by weight,
and remove all edges with an edge weight less then a threshold η. For the remaining
edges, we insert them one at a time; any time an edge e causes two clusters to merge,
we first check to ensure that no cannot-link edges span the two clusters. If such an
edge exists, then e is removed, the two clusters are not merged, and we move on to
the next edge.
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Figure 5.7. An example search history with automatically generated clusters using
a set of must-link and cannot-link edges provided by the user’s annotations (derived
from the user clustering at the top) and predictions for the remaining edges (on the
bottom).
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An example of the constrained clustering used when local data is available is shown
in Figure 5.7. Note how the cannot-link edge between amherst parks and movies in
amherst overrides the prediction that the two should be clustered together.

5.3

Integrating local and global data

We consider several variations of local and global data integration. The simplest uses
the global classification scores for same-task prediction, but use local data in the
clustering phase, as described in Section 5.2. We refer to this method of integration
as global score, local clustering (GScoreLCluster).
We also consider several ways of combining the predictions from global and local classifiers: minimum, maximum, product, and mean. In experiments on a development set,
we found the mean integration to perform consistently well, usually out-performing
the global- or local-only models, while the other score integration techniques typically
did not. For the remainder of this chapter, we will only consider the mean, which we
refer to as local-global score mean (LGMean).

5.4

Experimental setup

In this section, we describe several experiments to answer the three research questions
we posed at the beginning of this chapter. Afterwards, we discuss the data set used
for the experiments.

5.4.1

Experiments

Experiment 1. The first of our research questions is aimed at quantifying the differences and users’ perceptions of search tasks. To test this, we turn to inter-annotator
agreement—a measurement of how closely a set of annotators’ responses align with
each other. Specifically, we ask a set of A annotators to group searches into search
tasks for U separate search histories. We decompose each grouping into labeled query
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pairs: same-task or different-task. Agreement is measured on the labeled query pairs.
If two annotators form all the same groups, with the exception of one query, this may
result in many differences among their labeled pairs, and lower their agreement. If
agreement is high, then we can say that users share a similar perception of search
tasks. If we find some degree of disagreement, then we can assume that users’ perceptions differ with respect to search tasks. We measure agreement using Fleiss’
Kappa (Fleiss, 1971), which is a statistical measure of agreement between more than
two annotators supplying categorical values.
Experiment 2. Our second research questions asks how personalization affects the
quality of STI. To evaluate this, we use the following setup. First, we reserve a large
set of data for training the global Lucchese and random forest classifiers. We then
use several sets of user histories for local training and testing. No data from users
in this second set is contained in the first set. For each user history in the second
set, we split the data into three sections: local training, testing, and other. The
testing partition is fixed as the last 30% of the user’s history. We will vary the local
training partition, using labels between n randomly selected queries from the non-test
partitions. Whatever is not used for local training or testing is considered part of the
other partition (this segment must still be labeled in order for clustering to work). For
each value of n, we conduct R randomizations. We consider three local models using
Lucchese and random forests: local only, GScoreLCluster, and LGMean. As baselines,
we use the global only classifiers and a dumb classifier that always predicts that two
queries are from different search tasks. We evaluate success using macro query pair
label accuracy over users. This is a reasonable measure because it gives equal weight to
each user and does not favor either the same-task or different-task labels—clustering
two cannot-link searches separately is just as important as clustering two must-link
searches together. If personalization is helpful, then we should find that the local-only
or integrated models out-perform their global counterparts.
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Experiment 3. Our third and final experiment asks how sanitizing global data affects the performances of global models trained on that data. To answer this, we
use the same global set used in Experiment 2 and apply the F Ta , F Tu , DPa , DPu ,
and ZEALOUS privacy mechanisms on that data. For the frequency thresholding
mechanisms, we use k = {2, 5, 10, 20, 50, 100} and for the differentially private mechanisms, we use d = {1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32}. We re-run the global and integrated models
used in Experiment 2 and evaluate in the same manner. The key areas of interest are
how the global and integrated models perform relative to 1) using no sanitization, 2)
using other sanitization methods, and 3) the local-only models, which are invariant
to global sanitization.

5.4.2

Data

Previous research in STI has relied on search task annotations of subsets of user search
histories extracted from search logs. The annotations are provided by third parties,
e.g., other researchers. Both Jones and Klinkner and Boldi et al. used proprietary
data available only to Yahoo! researchers, while Lucchese et al. labeled data for the
first week of thirteen “power users” in the 2006 AOL search log (comprising 307
sessions, 1,424 queries, and 554 tasks). These previous works considered relatively
small slices of user histories—testing on a few days up to a week of data. While
Lucchese et al. made their data available, we decided that a larger sample of users
spanning a longer time frame would provide more sound results.
To that end, we formed two sets of data using the 2006 AOL search log: one for measuring inter-annotator agreement and another for training and testing STI approaches.
First, let us describe the AOL data set. It spans queries and the domains of clicked
results for 657,426 users over March 1–May 31, 2006. A total of 36,389,567 entries
are contained in the data set, of which 22,125,550 are queries, 21,011,340 are new
queries (adjacent duplicates ignored), 10,154,742 are distinct queries, 7,887,022 are
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All
March
April
May
Queries
22,125,550 8,575,191 7,377,635 6,172,724
Avg. queries/user
33.65
16.49
15.15
15.24
Med. queries/user
12.00
7.00
6.00
6.00
Max queries/user
212200.00
1793.00 212200.00
8218.00
1st Quartile
4.00
3.00
2.00
2.00
3rd Quartile
34.00
18.00
15.00
16.00
IQR
30.00
15.00
13.00
14.00
Upper fence
79.00
40.50
34.50
37.00
Sessions
10,998,729 4,291,816 3,005,875 3,701,038
Avg. sessions/user
16.73
8.26
7.38
7.64
Med. sessions/user
7.00
4.00
4.00
4.00
Max sessions/user
888.00
320.00
384.00
335.00
1st Quartile
3.00
2.00
1.00
2.00
3rd Quartile
19.00
10.00
8.00
9.00
Table 5.2. Queries-per-user and sessions-per-user statistics across the three months
of the 2006 AOL search log. This considers all query instances; i.e., duplicate queries
from the same user are not ignored.

next-page actions, and 19,442,629 are result clicks (so called click-throughs). Query
and session statistics are shown in Table 5.2. Note that we use 26 minutes as the
session timeout, per the findings of Lucchese et al. (2011).
For evaluating STI algorithms, we used the following sampling technique. We first
decided to consider only users with between 12–79 queries. This corresponds to
the median and upper fence (Q3 + 1.5·IQR, where Q3 is the third quartile and
IQR is the inter-quartile range. This segment of users provides us with sample that
submitted enough queries to be interesting, but who are not outliers, as are the users
labeled by Lucchese et al. We then sampled 1,000 users and asked ten annotator
(some overlapping with the group that provided annotations for the inter-annotator
agreement set) to form search tasks for each of the users. We collected annotations
for a total of 503 users, each labeled by one annotator. Statistics of the data set
are described in Table 5.3. We further broke the set into folds by annotator (see
Table 5.4), motivated by the possibility that each annotator has his or her own unique
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Annotators
10
Users
503
Sessions
8,740
Queries
15,779
Tasks
6,448
Interleaved tasks
3,134
Avg. queries/task
2.4
Av. duration/task (minutes)
8
Labeled pairs
310,287
same-task
40,940 (13%)
different-task
269,347 (84%)
Table 5.3. Statistics of the data set used to to evaluate STI algorithms.

Annotator
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Annotated Train/development
users
or Test
50
train/dev
50
train/dev
50
train/dev
3
train/dev
100
train/dev
50
train/dev
50
train/dev
33
test
97
test
21
test

Table 5.4. Statistics the annotator folds and training/testing sets.

perception of a search task. We randomly selected three annotators and restricted
their data to the final evaluation set. Data from the other seven annotators was
designated for training and development. Thus, we cannot learn latent relationships
specific to the annotators in the test set using the training set. Statistics about the
training/development and test sets are listed in Table 5.5.
For measuring inter-annotator agreement, we used a different sampling technique. We
considered only users roughly in the middle 50% relative to session counts. That is,
users with between 4–19 sessions. We chose a lower bound of four rather than three
(the first quartile), because we felt that three was too few. Our motivation for using
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Annotators
AOL users
Queries
Tasks
Labeled pairs
same-task
different-task

Train/dev
Test
7
3
352
151
21,697
8,858
9,122
3,774
224,057
86,506
28,747 (13%) 12,252 (14%)
195,309 (87%) 74,254 (86%)

Table 5.5. Statistics of the train and test sets.
Annotators
AOL users
Sessions
Queries
Avg. Tasks/annotator
Labeled pairs

6
10
92
131
80
939

Table 5.6. Statistics of the inter-annotator agreement data.

sessions counts rather than query counts was based in the belief that more sessions
would correspond to a greater number of tasks, thus providing an interesting data set
for measuring inter-annotator agreement. From this dataset, we randomly sampled
ten users’ data. We asked a group of six graduate students and professors to annotate
the data from the ten AOL users by grouping searches into tasks with shared topics
or search goals. Summary statistics are shown in Table 5.6.

5.5

Results and analysis

Experiment 1. Considering the set of pair-wise annotations provided for queries
from ten AOL users, we found a Fliess inter-annotator agreement of κ = 0.78. We
consider this high agreement. However, most of this agreement comes from the majority of queries being placed in different search tasks, which is rather uninteresting—one
would expect the majority of queries to be placed in different search tasks regardless
of an individual’s perception of a search task.
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When we ignore instances where everyone agrees that two queries are from different
tasks, the agreement drops to κ = 0.53. Said differently, for all the annotations where
at least one annotator provided a same-task label (there were 196 such labels out of
a total of 939), agreement is moderate. At least one disagreement was found for 118
of the labels. One pair of searches for which annotators disagreed was “zip codes”
and “driving directions”, issued sequentially by the corresponding AOL user. Two of
the six annotators placed this pair of searches in the same task.
Experiment 2. For personalized models—those using only local data or an integration of global and local data—we found that personalization is helpful. A plot
of performance is shown at the top of Figure 5.8 and a table with the numbers is
shown at the top of Table 5.7 when all local training data is used (70% of a user’s
data). Every model was run with 50 randomly sampled local data subsets; the mean
is plotted with 95% confidence intervals shown in dotted lines (these are tight bounds
in most cases, and are therefore covered by the line representing the mean). The
global and integrated random forest models (LGAvgRF, GScoreLClustRF and GlobalRF) performed best. The two integrated models performed significantly (p < 0.001;
two-sided t-test) though not substantially better than the GlobalRF model. The differences are in the thousandths place: 0.945 vs. 0.942 vs. 0.940. The Lucchese models
were not far behind. The local-only random forest model (LocalRF) was the poorest
performing model outside of the DiffTask baseline. As a general trend, smaller local
training set sizes (with fewer than 10 or 15 searches) do not seem to generate enough
data for the local-only or LGAvg models to outperform their global or GScoreLClust
counterparts. Our conclusions are that personalization helps, but it is not required
to achieve high performance. If a user has labeled no or a small number of queries,
then GScoreLClustRF is the best choice; if more local data is available for training,
then LGAvgRF is appropriate.
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Figure 5.8. The performance when global data is not sanitized (top) and for the
extreme settings of k for the two frequency thresholding privacy mechanisms we
considered. The random forest models are denoted by RF, while the Lucchese models
are denoted by Luc.
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Experiment 3. In the third experiment, we considered sanitizing global data. The
effects of sanitization on the performance of global and integrated models is shown
in part in Figures 5.8 (for the frequency thresholding mechanisms) and 5.9 (for the
differential privacy mechanisms). We only show plots of the extreme parameters
we explored, i.e., k = {2, 100} for frequency thresholding and d = {1, 32} for the
differential privacy mechanisms. We report the macro accuracy when all local training
data (70% of a user’s data) is available for the integrated model in Table 5.7. Using
F Ta for sanitization does not affect performance. F Tu with k = 2 resembles F Ta ,
but when k is increased to above 20, we find that the performance of the GlobalRF
and GScoreLClustRF goes up to the highest of any models under any conditions. A
possible explanation for this is that F Tu at k = 100 is revealing the most general
(across users) and frequent feature vectors, preventing the classifiers from over fitting
the training data.
For the differentially private mechanisms, we used U = 500, δ = 1/500, and  =
lg(10). In addition, since they all require sampling artifacts from users, we re-sampled
global data in parallel with the random sampling for local training data. We generally saw drops in the performance of global and integrated models. The various
mechanisms behave very differently, however. For example, DPa is relatively stable
between the extremes of d = 1 and d = 32. DPu shows similar performance to DPa
at d = 1, though with greater variance (the confidence intervals are wider than under other conditions). When d is increased to 32, however, performance plummets:
models trained with global data are not much better than the DiffTask baseline. The
reason for this difference in performance is evident from the feature vector impression
and distinct coverage, shown in Figure 5.10. While impression coverage is high for
F Tu at d = 32 distinct coverage is almost zero, preventing useful learning.
The ZEALOUS mechanism exhibits the opposite behavior—it shows very poor performance for d = 1, but very reasonable performance at d = 32. While the distinct

85

coverage under ZEALOUS does decrease with higher levels of d, it seems that at
d = 32, it manages to release the distinct vectors that help classifiers discriminate
between the same- and different-task classes.
Based on these results, we recommend the F Tu mechanism with k = 100 for implementers and users comfortable with frequency thresholding. For differential privacy,
DPa and DPu should both be used with lower values of d, whereas ZEALOUS should
use higher levels of d (though higher levels may be detrimental as distinct coverage
will continue to fall).

5.6

Limitations

One drawback of this study is in its reliance on third-party annotators. While this is
common in the STI literature, it would be useful to conduct a user study into how
users group their own searches into tasks.
Another limitation is that we only consider the case when users in the training set
annotate all of their tasks, not just a handful. An interesting analysis would be the
effect of users only contributing annotations for a handful of queries.
Finally, we examined personalized STI techniques that used annotations for a random
sample of local user queries. A fuller personalized experience may achievable through
the use of, e.g., active learning, where users are asked to annotate query pairs for
which an algorithm has low confidence in its prediction.

5.7

Summary

In this chapter, we explored search task identification (STI). We measured the degree
to which a set of annotators agree on a search task clustering, finding that users
perceive tasks differently—we found an agreement of κ = 0.53 when at least one of
six annotators labeled a pair of searches as belonging to the same task. This is the
first such experiment that we know of in the STI literature.
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LGAvgRF
GScoreLClustRF
GlobalRF
LocalLuc
LGAvgLuc
GScoreLClustLuc
GlobalLuc
LocalRF
DiffTask

All
Data
0.945
0.942
0.940
0.933
0.926
0.927
0.925
0.920
0.872

LGAvgRF
GScoreLClustRF
GlobalRF
LGAvgLuc
GScoreLClustLuc
GlobalLuc

k2
0.945
0.942
0.940
0.926
0.927
0.925

k5
0.945
0.942
0.941
0.926
0.927
0.925

LGAvgRF
GScoreLClustRF
GlobalRF
LGAvgLuc
GScoreLClustLuc
GlobalLuc

k2
0.945
0.942
0.941
0.926
0.927
0.925

k5
0.945
0.942
0.941
0.926
0.927
0.925

LGAvgRF
GScoreLClustRF
GlobalRF
LGAvgLuc
GScoreLClustLuc
GlobalLuc

d1
0.939
0.931
0.928
0.920
0.919
0.917

d2
0.938
0.929
0.926
0.919
0.918
0.917

LGAvgRF
GScoreLClustRF
GlobalRF
LGAvgLuc
GScoreLClustLuc
GlobalLuc

d1
0.937
0.930
0.927
0.920
0.919
0.917

d2
0.938
0.931
0.928
0.919
0.918
0.917

LGAvgRF
GScoreLClustRF
GlobalRF
LGAvgLuc
GScoreLClustLuc
GlobalLuc

d1
0.855
0.439
0.129
0.917
0.915
0.914

d2
0.881
0.460
0.129
0.926
0.927
0.925

F Ta
k10
k20
0.945 0.945
0.942 0.942
0.941 0.940
0.926 0.926
0.927 0.927
0.925 0.925
F Tu
k10
k20
0.945 0.945
0.942 0.947
0.941 0.945
0.926 0.926
0.927 0.927
0.925 0.925
DPa
d4
d8
0.938 0.939
0.931 0.927
0.928 0.925
0.917 0.915
0.916 0.914
0.915 0.912
DPu
d4
d8
0.939 0.939
0.932 0.927
0.929 0.925
0.918 0.916
0.917 0.914
0.915 0.913
ZEALOUS
d4
d8
0.908 0.914
0.464 0.464
0.129 0.129
0.926 0.926
0.927 0.927
0.925 0.925

k50
0.945
0.942
0.940
0.926
0.927
0.925

k100
0.945
0.942
0.940
0.926
0.927
0.925

k50
0.945
0.947
0.945
0.926
0.927
0.925

k100
0.945
0.947
0.945
0.926
0.927
0.925

d16
0.938
0.925
0.923
0.915
0.914
0.912

d32
0.939
0.927
0.925
0.915
0.914
0.912

d16
0.939
0.924
0.922
0.915
0.914
0.912

d32
0.929
0.877
0.877
0.881
0.875
0.875

d16
0.923
0.940
0.936
0.926
0.927
0.925

d32
0.923
0.932
0.929
0.915
0.914
0.912

Table 5.7. Macro accuracy over users. The random forest models are denoted by
RF, while the Lucchese models are denoted by Luc.
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Figure 5.10. Impression (left) and distinct (right) coverage of feature vectors from
the training/development set consisting of all seven features described in Table 5.1,
discretized with bin2, along with the same-task label. The coverage using only the
subset of features required by the Lucchese classifier is very similar.

We presented six personalized models, three based on the current state-of-the-art
STI system by Lucchese et al. (2011), and three using a random forest classifier. We
found the random forest models to perform best with respect to macro accuracy, and
that personalization using both local and global information produces statistically
significant gains when users annotate ten or more queries. However, a global random
forest model does very well on its own. We also measured the effects of sanitization
on STI performance, finding that the effects are minimal, though both ZEALOUS
and DPu exhibited poor performance with certain values of d. In fact, with F Tu at
k = 100, we actually saw improvements in performance.
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CHAPTER 6
TASK-AWARE QUERY RECOMMENDATION

Query recommendation is a common tool used by search engines to assist users in
reformulating queries. When a search task requires multiple searches, the sequence of
queries form a context around which new queries can be recommended. This context
constitutes local data and utilizing it for recommendation provides a personalized
experience. Figure 6.1 illustrates a series of queries issued by a user consisting of two
search tasks: 1) finding information about the history of black powder firearms and
2) preparing for the GMAT standardized test. Given this sequence, our goal is to
generate a list of query suggestions with respect to the most recently submitted query,
or reference query, which is “black powder inventor” in this example. Notice, however,
that the user has interleaved the two tasks such that no two adjacent queries are part
of the same task. If we use the entire context to generate recommendations, two of
the queries will be off-task with respect to the reference query and three (including
the reference query) will be on-task. This chapter explores the effects that on- and
off-task contexts have on query recommendation. We also consider the effects that
sanitization of query reformulations has on recommendation quality. While previous
work has considered task-aware query recommendation over logged user data, we are
not aware of any work that has systematically explored the effects of on-task, off-task,
and mixed contexts or sanitization on recommendation performance.
Though the example in Figure 6.1 may seem an extreme case, consider that Lucchese
et al. (2011) found 74% of web queries were part of multi-tasking search sessions in a
three-month sample of AOL search logs; Jones and Klinkner (2008) observed that 17%
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Figure 6.1. A search context with interleaved tasks.

of tasks were interleaved in a 3-day sample of Yahoo! web searches; and Liao et al.
(2012) found 30% of sessions contained multiple tasks and 5% of sessions contained
interleaved tasks in a sample of half a billion sessions extracted from Bing search
logs. In addition, in a labeled sample of 503 AOL user search histories spanning
three months, we found 57% of search tasks consisted of two or more queries (see
Figure 6.2), but there was only a 45% chance that any two adjacent queries were part
of the same task (see Figure 6.3). Figure 6.3 shows the likelihood of seeing n tasks
in any sequence of x queries, e.g., 10-query sequences typically consist of 3–7 search
tasks. This means that a context consisting of the most recent n queries is very likely
to consist of sub-contexts for several disjoint tasks, none of which may be a part of
the same task as the reference query.
The goal of this chapter is to better understand the effects of on-task, off-task, and
mixed contexts as well as privacy on query recommendation quality. We also present
and analyze several methods for handling mixed contexts. We address five questions
concerning query recommendation:1
RQ1. How does on-task context affect query recommendation performance?
RQ2. How does off-task context affect query recommendation performance?
1

Experiments and analysis for the first four questions were presented in a SIGIR 2013 paper (Feild
& Allan, 2013).
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Figure 6.2. Distribution of tasks lengths observed in a labeled sample of the AOL
query log.

RQ3. How does mixed context (on- and off-task queries) affect query recommendation performance?
RQ4. How do the following three methods affect query recommendation
performance in a mixed context? (a.) using only the reference query,
(b.) using the most recent m queries, or (c.) using the most recent
m queries with same-task classification scores to weight the influence
of each query.
RQ5. How does the sanitization method used to produce the crowd log of
query reformulations effect recommendation performance?
To answer these questions, we perform a number of experiments using simulated
search sequences derived from the TREC Session Track (Kanoulas et al., 2010, 2011).
For recommendation, we rely on random walks over a query flow graph formed from a
subset of the 2006 AOL query log. We measure query recommendation performance
by the quality of the results returned for a recommendation, focusing primarily on
mean reciprocal rank (MRR). Our results show that on-task context is usually helpful,
while off-task and mixed contexts are extremely harmful. However, automatic search
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Figure 6.3. The distribution of seeing n tasks in a sequence of x queries as observed
in a labeled sample of the AOL query log.

task identification (Chapter 5) is a reliable way of detecting and discarding off-task
queries.
There are four primary contributions that stem from this chapter: (1) an analysis
of task-aware query recommendation demonstrating the usefulness of on-task query
context, (2) an analysis of the impact of automatic search task identification on taskaware recommendation, in which we show the state of the art works very well, (3)
an analysis of the effect of sanitized global data on recommendation performance,
and (4) a generalized model of combining recommendations across a search context,
regardless of the recommendation algorithm.
Figure 6.4 outlines the implementation that we will follow throughout this chapter.
We describe how global data is aggregated, preprocessed, and used to provide query
recommendations in Section 6.1. In Section 6.2, we outline how local data will be
utilized to form search contexts relative to a reference query. We describe several
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Task-aware query recommendation
B Preprocessing
1. What artifacts will be extracted?
 Ordered pairs of queries that co-occur in the same session (see Section 6.1 for details).
2. What preprocessing will take place on the global data?
 A Term-Query Graph will be created (see Section 6.1 for details).
3. What preprocessing will take place on the local data?
 A search context will be generated consisting of the reference query
and other queries from the user’s search history that are classified as
belonging to the same task as the reference query (see Section 6.2 for
details).
B On input
4. What is the input?
 A search context consisting of a reference query and zero or more
on-task queries.
5. What request will the client send to the server?
 A request will be made for each query in the context individually.
6. What processing will the server perform for the client request?
 The server will generate a list of query recommendations with scores
for a given query.
7. What response will the server send to the client?
 The list of scored query recommendations.
8. How will the server data be integrated with the local data?
 The recommendations generated for each query in the search context
will be merged together (see Section 6.3 for details).
9. What is the output of the application?
 A list of query recommendations for the reference query.
Figure 6.4. Specifications for task-aware query recommendation.
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client-side integration models in Section 6.3. Finally, in Sections 6.4 and 6.5, we
outline our experiments and analyze the results.

6.1

Global data

The query recommendation algorithm we use is based largely on the query flow graph
(QFG) work of Boldi et al. (2008) and the term-query graph (TQGraph) work of
Bonchi et al. (2012). We use a query flow graph G in which the vertices V are queries
from a query log L and the edges E represent reformulation probabilities. For any
vertex v ∈ V , the weights of all outgoing edges must sum to 1. A reformulation is
defined as an ordered pair of queries (qi , qj ) such that the pair occurs in a user search
session in that order, though not necessarily adjacent. A session is defined to be
the maximal sequence of queries and result clicks such that no more than t seconds
separate any two adjacent events. The outgoing edges of v are normalized across all
sessions and users in L.
While we do not require reformulations to be adjacent, Boldi et al. did. By considering all reformulations—adjacent and otherwise—within a session, we expand the
coverage of G beyond using only adjacent query reformulations. We assume that for
reformulations in which qi and qj are from different tasks, qj will be an infrequent
follower of qi , and therefore statistically insignificant among qi ’s outgoing edges. Boldi
et al. used a thresholded and normalized chaining probability for the edge weights,
but we do not due to the sparseness of our data (the AOL query logs).
To generate recommendations, we rely on a slight adaptation of the query flow graph,
called the term-query graph (Bonchi et al., 2012). This adds a layer to the QFG
that consists of all terms that occur in queries in the QFG, each of which points to
the queries in which it occurs. Given a query q, we find recommendations by first
producing random walk scores over all queries in Q for each term t ∈ q.

95

To compute the random walk with restart for a given term t, we must first create a
vector v of length |V | (i.e., with one element per node in Q). Each element corresponding to a query that contains t is set to 1 and all others are set to 0. This is our
initialization vector. Next, we must select the probability, c, of restarting our random
walk to one of the queries in our initialization vector. Given the adjacency matrix of
G, A, and a vector u that is initially set to v, we then compute the following until
convergence:
ui+1 = (1 − c)Aui + cv.

(6.1)

After convergence, the values in u are the random walk scores of each corresponding
query q 0 for t. We denote this as the term-level recommendation score b
rterm (q 0 |t).
One issue with using the random walk score for a query is that it favors frequent
queries. To address this, Boldi et al. use the geometric mean rterm of the random
walk score b
rterm and its normalized score rterm . Given an initial query q, the scores
for an arbitrary query q 0 can be computed by:
b
rterm (q 0 |q)
,
b
runiform (q 0 )
p
b
rterm (q 0 |q) =
rterm (q 0 |q) · rterm (q 0 |q)
rterm (q 0 |q) =

b
rterm (q 0 |q)
= p
,
b
runiform (q 0 )

(6.2)

(6.3)

where b
runiform (q 0 ) is the random walk score produced for q 0 when the initialization
vector v is uniform.
The final query recommendation vector is computed using a component-wise product
of the random walk vectors for each term in the query. Specifically, for each query
q 0 ∈ V , we compute the query-level recommendation score rquery (q 0 |q) as follows:

rquery (q 0 |q) =

Y
t∈q
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rterm (q 0 |t).

(6.4)

In the implementation we outlined in Figure 6.4, the TQGraph sits on the server. The
client anonymously requests recommendations for individual queries. The server then
generates the recommendations for a query and sends the scored recommendations
back to the client.

6.2

Local data

As stated in the implementation we outlined in Figure 6.4, local processing involves
generating a search context C of queries prior to a given reference query, where
|C| = m and C[m] is the reference query. While there are many ways to construct a
search context, for the purpose of task-aware query recommendation, we will consider
task contexts, where all queries in C are part of the same task as the reference query
C[m].
To decide what queries to include in a task context, we first define a function sametask(i, m, C)
that outputs a prediction in the range [0,1] as to how likely the queries C[i] and C[m]
are to be part of the same search task given the context C. For all queries C[i],
sametask(i, m, C) > τ , where τ is a threshold. We use the Lucchese search task
identification heuristic described in Chapter 5 (Lucchese et al., 2011).2 In deciding if
two queries qi and qj are part of the same task, we calculate two similarity measures:
a lexical and a semantic score, defined as follows.
The lexical scoring function slexical is the average of the Jaccard coefficient between
term trigrams extracted from the two queries and one minus the Levenshtein edit
distance of the two queries. The score is in the range [0,1]. Two queries that are lexically very similar—ones where a single term has been added, removed, or reordered,
or queries that have been spell corrected—should have an slexical score close to one.
2

Our experiments were performed prior to our analysis of search task identification described in
Chapter 5, which is why we use the Lucchese classifier and not a random forest model.
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The semantic scoring function ssemantic is made of up two components. The first,
swikipedia (qi , qj ), creates the vectors vi and vj consisting of the tf·idf scores of every
Wikipedia document relative to qi and qj , respectively. The function then returns the
cosine similarity between these two vectors. The second component, swiktionary (qi , qj )
is similarly computed, but over Wiktionary entries. We then set ssemantic (qi , qj ) =

max swikipedia (qi , qj ), swiktionary (qi , qj ) . As with the lexical score, the range of the
semantic score is [0,1].
The combined similarity score, s, is defined as follows:

s(qi , qj ) = α · slexical (qi , qj ) + (1 − α) · ssemantic (qi , qj ).

We can define a same-task scoring function to use s directly, as follows:

sametask1 (i, j, C) = s(C[i], C[j]).

(6.5)

Alternatively, we can run one extra step: single-link clustering over the context C
using s as the similarity measure. Clustering allows us to boost the similarity score
between two queries that are only indirectly related. Similar to Liao et al. (2012),
our choice of clustering follows the results of Lucchese et al. (2011), who describe a
weighted connected components algorithm that is equivalent to single-link clustering
with a cutoff of η. After clustering, we use the notation KC [q] to represent the cluster
or task associated with query q in context C; if two queries q, q 0 ∈ C are part of the
same task, then KC [q] = KC [q 0 ], otherwise KC [q] 6= KC [q 0 ]. A scoring function that
uses task clustering is the following:

sametask2 (i, j, C) =

max
k ∈ [1,|C|] :
k 6=i∧
KC [C[k]] =KC [C[j]]
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s(C[i], C[k]).

(6.6)

Figure 6.5. Examples of on-task/off-task segmentations using sametask1 and
sametask2 scoring. The reference query, q5 , sits in the bolded center node. Note
that the edge (q1 , q5 ) goes from 0.2 using sametask1 to 0.6 under sametask2 due to
q1 ’s strong similarity to q3 , which has a similarity score of 0.6 with q5 .

Note that sametask2 will return the highest similarity between C[i] and any member
of C[j]’s tasks, excluding C[i]. Figure 6.5 illustrates a case in which sametask2
improves over sametask1 ; note, however, that sametask2 can also be harmful when
an off-task query is found to be similar to an on-task query.

6.3

Integrating local and global data

In this section, we introduce formal definitions of general and task-based contexts. We
explore several method of integrating local context information with recommendations
produced from a global model.

6.3.1

Generalized context model

The recommendation models described earlier, and recommendation algorithms in
general, that generate suggestions with respect to a single query can be easily extended to handle additional contextual information. The basic idea is simple: when
generating recommendations for a query, consider the search context consisting of
the m most recently submitted queries from the user, weighting the influence of each
according to some measure of importance. Many functions can be used to measure
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the importance of a context query. The two we consider in this paper are how far
back in a user’s search history a query occurs and whether the query appears to be
related to a user’s current task. Others may include whether a context query was
quickly abandoned or spell corrected, how many results the user visited, the time of
day they were visited, and other behavioral aspects. In this section, we introduce a
generalized model that makes it easier for us to talk about the various importance
functions we are interested in and how they can be used with additional functions in
future work.
Assume that we have a search context C that contains all the information about a
user’s search behavior related to a sequence of m queries, with the mth query, C[m],
being the most recently submitted query. Also assume that we have a set of n importance functions, θ 1 , θ 2 , . . . , θ n and corresponding weights λ1 , λ2 , . . . , λn that tell us
how much weight to give to each of the importance functions. We will represent corresponding functions and weights as tuples in a set F = {hλ1 , θ 1 i hλ2 , θ 2 i . . . , hλn , θ n i}.
We compute the context-aware recommendation score for a query suggestion q 0 as follows:
rcontext (q 0 |C, F ) =

m
X





rquery (q 0 |C[i])

i=1

X

λ · θ(i, m, C) .

(6.7)

hλ,θi∈F

Each importance function θ, takes three parameters: i, m, C, where i is the position
of the query within context C for which importance is being measured and m is the
position of the reference query. In this work, the reference query is always the last
query of C, but the model does not require that assumption. The rcontext recommendation scoring function scores q 0 with respect to each query in the context (C[i]) and
adds that score to the overall score with some weight that is computed as the linear
combination of the importance function values for that query.

100

6.3.2

Decaying context model

One of the importance functions we consider in this paper is a decaying function,
where queries earlier in a user’s context are considered less important than more
recent queries. As such, queries submitted more recently have a greater influence
on recommendation scores. This has the intuitive interpretation that users are less
interested in older queries, otherwise they would not have moved on to new queries.
Boldi et al. (2008) discussed a decay weighting method for entries in the random walk
initialization vector (v in Eq. 6.1). They proposed that each query in a search context
receive a weight proportional to β d , where d is the distance in query count from the
current query. For example, the second most recent query would get a weight of β 1 ,
because it’s one query away from the most recent query.
While the Boldi et al. method is specific to recommendations using random walks,
we can transfer their exponential decay function to our model as follows:

decay(i, j, C) = β j−i
rdecay (q 0 |C) = rcontext (q 0 |C, {h1.0, decayi}).

6.3.3

(6.8)
(6.9)

Task context model

While decaying the influence of queries earlier in a search context is a natural importance function, we are also interested in functions that incorporate the degree to
which a query is on the same task as the reference query. It is reasonable to assume
(an assumption we test) that queries from a search context that are part of the same
task should be more helpful in the recommendation process than queries that are not.
As we have stated earlier, Lucchese et al. observed that 74% of web queries are part
of multi-task search sessions (Lucchese et al., 2011) while Jones and Klinkner found
that 17% of tasks are interleaved in web search (Jones & Klinkner, 2008).Using a
labeled sample of the AOL query log, we observed an exponential decrease in the
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likelihood that the previous m queries are part of the same task as m increases (see
Figure 6.3). This suggests that using the m most recent queries as the the search
context for generating recommendations will likely introduce off-topic information,
causing recommendations that seem out of place. Therefore, it may be beneficial to
identify which queries from that context share the same task as the reference query.
Formally, given a search context C with m queries, we define a task context T to be
the maximal subset of queries in C that share a task common to C[m]:
T ⊆ C | ∀ i ∈ [1, m], C[i] ∈ T ⇐⇒ sametask(i, m, C) > τ,

(6.10)

where sametask(i, m, C) follows one of the definitions given in Section 6.2.
Once we have T , the natural question to pose is how do we use it? One method would
be to treat T just as C and use it with the rdecay function, i.e., rdecay (q 0 |T ). However,
it may be that the off-task context is still useful, just not as useful as T . To support
both of these points of view, we can use the following hard task recommendation
scoring functions:
taskdecay(i, j, C) = β taskdist(i,j,C) ,



taskdecay if sametask > τ,
hardtask(i, j, C) =


0
otherwise,
rhardtask (q 0 |C) = rcontext (q 0 |C, {hλ, hardtaski, h1 − λ, decayi}),

(6.11)

(6.12)

(6.13)

where λ can be used to give more or less weight to the task context and taskdist is
the number of on-task queries between C[i] and C[j]. If we set λ = 1, we only use the
task context, whereas with λ = 0, we ignore the task context altogether. If we use
λ = 0.5, we use some of the task information, but still allow the greater context to
have a presence. Note that we have left off the parameters to decay and sametask
in Eq. 6.13 for readability.
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This approach may work well if one is comfortable with setting a hard threshold τ on
the output of the sametask function. If, however, we want to provide a mechanism
by which we use the output of sametask as a confidence, we can use the following
soft task recommendation scoring functions:

softtask(i, j, C) = sametask · decay,

(6.14)

rsofttask (q 0 |C) = rcontext (q 0 |C, {hλ, softtaski, h1 − λ, decayi}).

(6.15)

Here, λ smooths between using and not using the same-task scores to dampen the
decay weights. We have left off the parameters to sametask and decay in Eqs. 6.14
and 6.15.
Two additional models we consider are both variations of what we call firm task
recommendation, as they combine aspects of both the hard and soft task models.
The first, called firmtask1, behaves similarly to the soft task model, except that
we give a the weight of zero to any queries with a same task score at or below the
threshold τ . The second, called firmtask2, is identical to the hard task model,
except that the task classification score is used in addition to the taskdecay weight.
Mathematically, the firm task recommendation models are described by:

firmtask1(i, j, C) =




sametask × decay if sametask > τ,


0

(6.16)

otherwise,

rfirmtask1 (q 0 |C) = rcontext (q 0 |C, {hλ, firmtask1i, h1 − λ, decayi}),


sametask × taskdecay if sametask > τ,

firmtask2(i, j, C) =


0
otherwise,

(6.17)

rfirmtask2 (q 0 |C) = rcontext (q 0 |C, {hλ, firmtask2i, h1 − λ, decayi}).

(6.19)
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(6.18)

sametask = [.8, .2, .1,
a. rdecay
≈ [.4, .5, .6,
b. rsofttask
≈ [.3, .1, .1,
c. rfirmtask1 = [.3, .0, .0,
d. rfirmtask2 = [.5, .0, .0,
e. rhardtask ≈ [.6, .0, .0,

.9,
.8,
.7,
.7,
.7,
.8,

1.0]
1.0]
1.0]
1.0]
1.0]
1.0]

Figure 6.6. An example of the degree to which each query in a context contributes
(right column) given its predicted same-task score (top row) for: (a.) decay only, (b.)
soft task, (c.) firm task-1, (d.) firm task-2, and (e.) hard task recommendation. We
set β = 0.8 for all, and λ = 1, τ = 0.2 for b.–e.
Note that unlike the hard task model, the decay component of the firmtask1 model
is affected by every query, not just those above the threshold.
For example, suppose we have a context C with five queries, q1 , . . . , q5 . Relative
to the reference query, q5 , suppose applying sametask to each query produces the
same-task scores [0.4, 0.2, 0.1, 0.95, 1.0]. If we set τ = 0.2, then T = [q1 , q4 , q5 ].
Using β = 0.8, notice in Figure 6.6 how the importance weight of each query in the
context changes between using only the decay function (a.) and setting λ = 1 for the
task-aware recommendations (b.–e.). Note that when λ = 0, the hard, firm, and soft
task recommendation scores are equivalent (they all reduce to using the decay-only
scoring function).
There are two primary differences between using hard- and soft task recommendation.
First, hard task recommendation does not penalize on-task queries that occur prior
to a sequence of off-task queries, e.g. in Figure 6.6, we see that q1 is on-task and
hardtask treats it as the first query in a sequence of three: β n−1 = 0.82 . Conversely,
the soft task recommendation model treats q1 as the first in a sequence of five: β m−1 =
0.84 .
Second, soft task recommendation can only down-weight a query’s importance weight,
unlike hard task recommendation, which can significantly increase the weight of an ontask query further back in the context (e.g., the far left value for rhardtask in Figure 6.6).
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At the same time, however, soft task recommendation only allows a query to be given
a zero weight if its same-task score is zero. The two firm task models balance these
aspects in different ways.

6.4

Experimental setup

In this section, we describe the data, settings, and methodology used for the experiments.

6.4.1

Constructing a query flow graph

We extracted query reformulations from the 2006 AOL query log, which includes
more than 10 million unique queries making up 21 million query instances submitted by 657,426 users between March–April 2006. Considering all ordered pairs
from a 30-query sliding window across sessions with a maximum timeout of 26 minutes, we extracted 33,218,915 distinct query reformulations to construct a query flow
graph (compared to 18,271,486 if we used only adjacent pairs), ignoring all dash (“-”)
queries, which correspond to queries that AOL scrubbed or randomly replaced. The
inlink and outlink counts of the nodes in the graph both have a median of 2 and a
mean of about 5. If we were to use only adjacent reformulations from the logs, the
median would be 1 and the mean just under 2.

6.4.2

Task data

We used the 2010 and 2011 TREC Session Track (Kanoulas et al., 2010, 2011) data to
generate task contexts. The 2010 track data contains 136 judged sessions, each with
two queries (totaling 272 queries), covering three reformulation types: drift, specialization, and generalization relative to the first search. We ignore the reformulation
type. The 2011 track data consists of 76 variable length sessions, 280 queries (average of 3.7 queries per session), and 62 judged topics. Several topics have multiple
corresponding sessions. In total, we use all 212 judged sessions from both years. The
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relevance judgments in both cases are over the ClueWeb09 collection. Our goal is
to provide recommendations to retrieve documents relevant to the last query in each
session, thus we mark the last query as the reference query.
Each session constitutes a single task, and henceforth we refer to the sessions as tasks.
Since the TREC data consists of single tasks, we need some way of simulating the
case that multiple tasks are interleaved. We describe our approach for this next.

6.4.3

Experiments

To answer our four research questions, we use the following set of experiments.
Throughout all of these experiments, the baseline is to use only the reference query
for generating query recommendations.
Experiment 1. For RQ1, which seeks to understand the effect of including relevant
context on recommendation performance, we use each task T from the TREC Session
Track and recommend suggestions using the most recent m queries for m = [1, |T |]. If
incorporating context is helpful, then we should see an improvement as m increases.
Note that m = 1 is the case in which only the reference query is used.
Experiment 2. To address RQ2, which asks how off-task context affects recommendation performance, we modify the experiment described above to consider a context
of m = [1, |T |] queries such that queries 2 through |T | are off-task. To capture the
randomness of off-task queries, we evaluate over R random samples of off-task contexts (each query is independently sampled from other tasks, excluding those with
the same TREC Session Track topic) for each task T and each value of m > 1. If
off-task context is harmful, we should see a worsening trend in performance as m
increases.
Experiment 3. To address RQ3, which asks how query recommendation performance is affected by a context that is a mix of on- and off-task queries, we rely on
a simulation of mixed contexts. As we saw in Figure 6.3, the probability that a
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sequence of m queries share the same task decreases exponentially as m increases,
and so the mixed context assumed in RQ3 is realistic if not typical. We simulate
mixed contexts by taking each task T of length n and considering a context window
of length m = [1, n + R], where R is the number of off-task queries to add into the
context. The last query in the context qm always corresponds to the last query qn in
T . Queries q1 , . . . , qm−1 consist of a mix of the queries from T and other tasks from
the TREC Session Track. The queries from T will always appear in the same order,
but not necessarily adjacent.
To incorporate noise, we initially set C = []. We select R off-task queries as follows:
first, we randomly select an off-topic task, O, from the TREC Session Track and take
the first R queries from that task. If |O| < R, we randomly selected an addition
off-topic task and concatenate its first R − |O| queries to O. We continue the process
until |O| = |R|. We now randomly interleave T and O, the only rule being that
Tn —the reference query—must be the last query in C. For a given value of R, we can
perform many randomizations and graph the effect of using the most recent n + R
queries to perform query recommendation.
Experiment 4. The fourth research question, RQ4, asks how mixed contexts should
be used in the query recommendation process. We have limited ourselves to consider
three possibilities: (a.) using only the reference query (i.e., our baseline throughout
these experiments), (b.) using the most recent n + R queries (i.e., the results from
Experiment 3), or (c.) incorporating same-task classification scores. Experiment 4
concentrates on (c.) and analyzes the effect of incorporating same-task classification
scores during the search context integration process. This is where we will compare
the task-aware recommendation models described in the previous section.
Experiment 5. The final research question, RQ5, questions the impact of privacy
on recommendation performance. Given each of the sanitized crowd logs, we re-
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run Experiments 1–4, allowing us to understand the effect on query recommendation
performance.

6.4.4

Technical details

For the query recommendation using the TQGraph, we used a restart probability of
c = 0.1, as was found to be optimal by Bonchi et al. (2012).3 To increase the speed of
our recommendation, we only stored the 100,000 top scoring random walk results for
each term. Bonchi et al. found this to have no or very limited effects on performance
when used with c = 0.1.
For task classification, we used the parameters found optimal by Lucchese et al.
(2011): η = 0.2 (used during task clustering) and α = 0.5 (used to weight the
semantic and lexical features). We also set τ = η since τ is used in much the same
way in the task-aware recommendation models.
To evaluate recommendations, we retrieved documents from ClueWeb09 using the
default query likelihood model implemented in Indri 5.3 (Metzler & Croft, 2004).4
We removed spam by using the Fusion spam score dataset (Cormack et al., 2011) at
a 75th percentile, meaning we only kept the least spammy 25% of documents.5
To address Experiment 5, we consider several values of d, d ∈ {1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32}, for
the differential privacy mechanisms DPa , DPu , and ZEALOUS. We set  = 10, which
is very high, but necessary in order to generate non-empty crowd logs (and even
then, we encountered a few empty crowd logs). We set δ = 1/657427. We took
10 samples for each value of d and average performance across those samples. We
considered several values of k for the frequency thresholding mechanisms F Ta and
3

Note that they refer to the restart value α, where c = 1 − α.

4

http://www.lemurproject.org/indri/

5

http://plg.uwaterloo.ca/~gvcormac/clueweb09spam/
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F Tu : k ∈ {2, 5, 10, 50}. All crowd logs were generated over the full three months of
the AOL query log.

6.5

Results and analysis

In this section, we cover the results of each of the experiments described in Section 6.4.3. We then discuss the meaning of our findings as well as their broader
implications.

6.5.1

Experimental results

In all experiments, we measured recommendation performance using the mean reciprocal rank (MRR) of ClueWeb09 document retrieved for the top scored recommendation averaged over the 212 TREC Session Track tasks. There are several ways
one can calculate relevance over the document sets retrieved for recommendations,
such as count any document retrieved in the top ten for any of the context queries
as non-relevant (rather harsh), indifferently (resulting in duplicate documents), or by
removing all such documents from the result lists of recommendations. We elected to
go with the last as it is a reasonable behavior to expect from a context-aware system.
We removed documents retrieved for any query in the context, not just those that are
on-task. This is a very conservative evaluation and is reflected in the performance
metrics.
Experiment 1. With this experiment, our aim was to quantify the effect of on-task
query context on recommendation quality. Focusing on the top line with circles in
Figure 6.7, the MRR of the top scored recommendation averaged over the 212 tasks
performs better than using only the reference query (middle line with squares). To
generate these scores, we used the rdecay model with β = 0.8, as set by Boldi et al.
(2008) in their decay function. For each value of m, if a particular task T has fewer
than m queries, the value at |T | is used. The MRR scores are low because for a
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Figure 6.7. The effect of adding on-task (blue circles) and off-task (red triangles)
queries versus only the reference query on recommendation MRR (black squares).
MRR is calculated on the top scoring recommendation.

large number of tasks, none of the methods provide any useful recommendations. We
performed evaluations where such tasks were ignored and found that the MRR does
indeed increase and the relationship between the methods plotted stays the same. To
ensure comparability with future work, we report on all tasks.
While performance is better on average in Figure 6.7, the top bar chart in Figure 6.8
breaks the performance down by the TREC search tasks and we can see that there
are many tasks for which on-task context is very helpful, as well as several where it
hurts. Note that some of the tasks are not displayed for readability.
Experiment 2. The goal of the second experiment was to ascertain the effect of offtask context on query recommendation. We generated 50 random off-task contexts
for each task and report the micro-average across all trials. The bottom line with
triangles in Figure 6.7 shows that adding off-task queries under the rdecay model
with β = 0.8 rapidly decreases recommendation performance for low values of m
before more or less leveling off around m = 5 (it still decreases, but much slower).
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Effect of off−task context per task
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MRR difference
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Effect of on−task context per task

Figure 6.8. The per-session effect of on- and off-task context on the change in MRR
of the top scoring recommendation. The y-axis shows the difference between the
MRR of using context and using only the reference query. A higher value means
context improved MRR. Note that 145 tasks were removed as neither on- nor off-task
context had an effect. The tasks are not aligned between the two plots and cannot
be compared at the task level.

Its performance is well below that of the baseline of using only the reference query,
making it clear that off task context is extremely detrimental.
Turning to the bottom plot in Figure 6.8, we see that off-task context has an almost
entirely negative effect (there is an ever so slight increase in performance for the task
represented by the far left bar). Interestingly, for the severely compromised tasks on
the far right, the effect is not as negative as when on-task context hurts. We have
not conducted a full analysis to understand this phenomena, but one possible cause
is the averaging over 50 trials that takes place for the off-task contexts. We leave
investigations into this issue for future work.
Experiment 3. With Experiment 3, we wanted to understand the effect of mixed
contexts—consisting of both on- and off-task queries—on query recommendation performance. As explained earlier, the experiment explores the performance of tasks
when R noisy queries are added to the entire set of on-task queries. The bottom line
with triangles in Figure 6.9 shows just this, using rdecay with β = 0.8. The far left
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point, where R = 0, lines up with the far right point of the on-task line in Figure 6.7.
We randomly generated 50 noisy contexts per task for each value of R. The solid line
shows the micro-averaged MRR over all tasks’ samples. The dotted lines on either
side show the minimum and maximum values for the micro-average MRR on a set of
1,000 sub-samples (with replacement) of the original 50. As you can see, the bounds
indicate relatively low variance of the micro-average across the 212 tasks. There are
still certain tasks for which performance is very high or very low (that is, the bounds
on the micro-average do not inform us of the variance among tasks).
An important observation from this experiment is that performance dips below that
of the baseline when even a single off-task query is mixed in. This is quite startling
when you consider that the chances of three queries (at R = 1, all contexts are of at
least length three) in a row belonging to a single task are below 30% (see Figure 6.3)
and that roughly 40% of tasks in the wild are of length three or more (see Figure 6.2).
These results clearly show that blindly incorporating mixed context is a poor method
of incorporating context.
Experiment 4. In the fourth experiment, we hoped to determine the effects of using
recommendation models that consider the reference query only, the entire context,
or the entire context, but in a task-aware manner. The first two were addressed in
the previous experiments, where we learned that using the reference query is more
effective than blindly using the entire context. Figure 6.9 shows the results of using
the models we introduced in Section 6.3.3. We used the same randomizations as in
Experiment 3 and likewise generated the minimum and maximum bounds around
each model’s performance line. For these experiments, sametask1 scores were used
to produce same-task scores. We also performed the experiment using sametask2
and found it was comparable. We used λ = 1 for all task-aware models; setting it to
anything less resulted in an extreme degradation of performance.
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Figure 6.9. The effect of adding off-task queries to a task context on MRR when
same task classification is used and is not used versus only using the reference query
(black squares). The sametask1 scoring method is used for all task-aware recommendation models. MRR is calculated on the top scoring recommendation.

There are several interesting observations. First, the firm-task models performed best,
though it is likely that the performance of the rfirmtask1 model (the top line with x’s)
would decrease with larger amounts of noise because the decay function depends on
the length of the context, not the number of queries predicted to be on-task. Thus, for
on-task queries occurring early in very large contexts, the decay weight will effectively
be 0. You may notice that this model also increases for a bit starting at R = 2. This
is likely due to the decay function used: since every query in the context, and not
just the on-task queries, counts toward the distances between an on-task query and
the reference query under rfirmtask1 , on-task queries are actually down-weighted to a
greater degree than in the rfirmtask2 and rhardtask models. The graph indicates that
this change in weighting is helpful. This also suggests that setting β differently may
improve the performance of the other models.
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The rfirmtask2 model (diamonds) comes in at a close second and narrowly outperforms
rhardtask (circles). All three models outperform the baselines—using only the reference
query (squares) and rdecay over the entire context (triangles).
The rsofttask model, however, performs rather poorly. While it can offer some improvement over using just the reference query for a small amount of noise, once the noise
level reaches four off-task queries, it is not longer viable. It does, however, outperform
the decay model applied in a task-unaware manner.
Another interesting point is that the performance of the task-aware models is actually
better at R = 0 than if the known tasks are used. The likely explanation is that the
same-task scores prevent on-task queries that are quite different from the reference
query from affecting the final recommendation. These kinds of queries may introduce
more noise since their only recommendation overlap with the reference query may be
generic queries, such as “google”. This is not always the case, however. For example,
one task consists of the queries [“alan greenspan”, “longest serving Federal Reserve
Chairman”]. The first query is detected to be off-task, however, it is needed to
generate decent recommendations since the reference query generates generic Federal
Reserve-related queries and not ones focused on Alan Greenspan.
Overall, though, the same-task classification with a threshold τ = 0.2 worked well.
The same-task classification precision relative to the positive class was on average
80%. The precision relative to the negative class varied across each noise level, but was
on average 99%. The average accuracy was 93%. The decent same-task classification
is why the three models at the top of Figure 6.9 are so flat.
Experiment 5. For Experiment 5, we looked at the effect of sanitization on query
recommendation performance. We re-ran each of the earlier experiments, but using
a TQGraph made from sanitized crowd logs. For Experiments 1 and 2, we found
the same relationship held in most cases, on-task context producing a boost in performance over using only the reference query, and off-task context hampering per-
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formance. The exceptions were when all values of MRR were zero, which was the
case for all of the ZEALOUS sanitizations, for DPa and DPu with d ≥ 8, and for
F Tu at k = 50. For the other values of d for DPa and DPu , the average performance never peaked greater than 0.0005, making the findings practically useless.
Sanitization under frequency thresholding proved to be more useful. With DPa at
k = 2, performance dropped to under MRR= 0.06 and under MRR= 0.05 for DPu .
However, by k = 5—the value of k for which we have approval from the University
of Massachusetts Institutional Review Board to use when releasing data—maximum
performance of on-task context drops to MRR= 0.01. As with the differential privacy
mechanisms, this is not practically useful performance. Figure 6.10 show the degredation in performance under the frequency thresholding mechanisms as k increases.
One very interesting observation is that performance actually increases under DPa
going from k = 5 to k = 10. One speculative explanation for this is that k = 10
causes less frequent, noisy queries to be eliminated from the TQGraph. Perhaps the
same is not seen under F Tu because noise is more likely to affect F Ta in the sense
that a single user entering a query many times can cause it to appear in a TQGraph
sanitized under F Ta .
For Experiments 3 and 4, we found a similar tend: the relationships are similar to
those found when an unsanitized TQGraph is used, but the MRR is so low as to
be practically useless. We did find that at higher values of d, the importance of
context improved over using just the reference query. For example, Figure 6.11 shows
that using context information triples the performance; however, effectively it doesn’t
matter because MRR does not exceed 0.0013. Under F Ta and F Tu , performance is
slightly more practical, as we saw before. Figure 6.12 shows performance under these
models for k = {2, 5, 10}. Again, we see the same jump in performance under F Ta
going from k = 5 to k = 10.
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Figure 6.10. Query recommendation MRR when using on- and off-task context and
using only the reference query. On the left, the TQGraph was sanitized using F Ta ,
and on the right with F Tu .
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Figure 6.11. Query recommendation MRR in a mixed-context situation when the
TQGraph is sanitized using DPu with d = 4.

6.5.2

Discussion

The results of our experiments demonstrate not only the usefulness of on-task context,
but also the extreme impact of off-task and mixed contexts. The results from Experiment 4 suggest that the appropriate model is one that balances a hard threshold to
remove any influence from context queries predicted to be off-task, and to weight the
importance of the remaining queries by both their distance to the reference query and
by the confidence of the same-task classification. Based on the results, we recommend
the rfirmtask2 model, since its performance will be consistent regardless of how far back
in a user’s history we go, unlike rfirmtask1 .
We did not see any substantial effects from using task clustering, as Liao et al. (2012)
used. However, other task identification schemes may perform differently; after all,
as we saw in Experiment 4, our task identification method actually caused slight
improvements over using the true tasks.
To get a feel for the quality of the recommendations produced generally with the
AOL query logs and specifically by different models, consider the randomly generated
mixed context in Figure 6.13 (also Figure 6.1). The top five recommendations from
three methods for this context are shown in Figure 6.14. Notice that using only the
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Figure 6.12. Query recommendation MRR when using mixed-context and using
only the reference query. On the left, the TQGraph was sanitized using F Ta , and on
the right with F Tu .
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No.
5.
4.
3.
2.
1.

Query context
sametask1
satellite internet providers
1.00
hughes internet
0.44
ocd beckham
0.02
reviews xc90
0.04
buy volvo semi trucks
0.04

Figure 6.13. An example of a randomly generated mixed context along with the
same-task scores. The top query (No. 5) is the reference query. The bolded queries
are on-task.
Rank
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Reference
query
alabama satellite
internet providers
sattelite internet
satellite internet
providers
satelite internet
for 30.00
satellite internet
providers northern
california

RR
0.08
0.25
1.00
0.02
0.06

Decay
2006 volvo xc90
reviews
volvo xc90
reviews
hughes internet.com
hughes satelite
internet
alabama satellite
internet providers

RR

1.00
1.00
0.08

Hard task (λ = 1)
hughes internet.com

RR
1.00

hughes satelite
internet
alabama satellite
internet providers
satellite high
speed internet
sattelite internet

1.00
0.08
0.17
0.25

Figure 6.14. The top five suggestions generated from three of the models for the
randomly generated context shown in Figure 6.13. Reciprocal rank (RR) values of 0
are left blank.
reference query produces suggestions with non-zero MRR, though the suggestion with
the highest MRR is acutally the same as the reference query. Meanwhile, blindly using
the context produces suggestions at the top that are swamped by the off-task queries,
even though they occur much earlier in the context, and therefore are significantly
down-weighted. A couple high-MRR queries are suggested, but not until the third
rank. This is in stark contrast to using the hard task model, which recommends
queries similar in nature to the reference query, but with higher MRR, and ranks the
suggestions with the highest MRR at the top.
Many of the tasks for which task-aware recommendation performed well involved
specialization reformulations. Some examples include: heart rate→slow fast heart
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rate, bobcat tractor →bobcat tractor attachment, disneyland hotel →disneyland hotel
reviews, and elliptical trainer →elliptical trainer benefits. One possible reason for this
is that incorporating recommendations for a context query that is a subset of the
reference query focuses the final recommendations on the most important concepts.
None of the experiments used notions of temporal sessions or complete user histories.
We did this mainly because the mixed contexts were generated and not from actual
user logs where context windows could be tied to temporal boundaries, e.g., two-day
windows. We believe that by focusing on factors such as on- and off-task queries, we
struck at the core questions in this space. We leave testing whether the results from
these experiments apply equally to real user data as future work, but we believe they
will, especially given the results of related studies, such as those conducted by Liao
et al. (2012) and Filali et al. (2010).
Finally, it appears that sanitization using differentially private mechanisms is not
practical for this application with these numbers of users. Using F Ta and F Tu with
low values of k can provide performance that is more on par with that of using an
unsanitized data set, however, performance is still low. It seems that more users
would improve the results. An alternative artifact representation, one that makes
more artifacts publishable and is still useful (e.g., contains query text) may also help.
For example, query templating, where specific nouns are replaced with temples, e.g.,
bars in boston would be templated as bars in hcityi.

6.6

Summary

We investigated several research questions concerning the effects of personalization
and sanitization on query recommendation. We introduced a model for integrating
query recommendations across on-task searches and found that on-task context is
more helpful than using the reference query or blindly using context that contains
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noisy queries for several test sessions. We also used an off-the-shelf same-task classifier
which helped us effectively detect and use on-task searches automatically.
We found that the relative improvements of on-task context are still present when the
global data is sanitized under most models, but that the absolute performance is quite
low. With the exception of k = 2 for F Ta and F Tu , sanitization appears to render
global data useless. A larger user base and perhaps a different artifact representation
may lead to more fruitful results.
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CHAPTER 7
SEARCHER FRUSTRATION DETECTION

In this chapter, we investigate detecting searcher frustration. In Chapter 1 we defined
searcher frustration as the self-reported level of frustration a user experiences while
engaged in a search. There are many reasons why one would like to have a model able
to detect how frustrated a user is. For example, a retrospective frustration classification is useful as a system effectiveness measure. In a real-time setting, automatic
detection could be used to trigger system interventions to help frustrated searchers,
hopefully preventing users from leaving for another search engine or abandoning the
search altogether. Depending on the level of frustration, we may wish to change the
underlying retrieval algorithm or user interface. For example, one source of difficulty
that could cause frustration in retrieval is a user’s inability to sift through the results
presented for a query (Lawrie, 2003; Xie & Cool, 2009; Kong & Allan, 2013). If the
system can detect that the user is frustrated, it could offer an alternative interface,
such as on that shows a conceptual breakdown of the results: rather than listing
all results, group them based on the key concepts that best represent them (Lawrie,
2003) or attempt to diversify by other attributes (Aktolga & Allan, 2013). Using a
well worn example, if a user enters ‘java’, they can see the results based on ‘islands’,
‘programming languages’, ‘coffee’, etc. Adaptive systems based on user models have
been used elsewhere in IR. For example, White et al. (2006) used implicit relevance
feedback to detect changes in users’ information needs and alter the retrieval strategy
based on the degree of change.
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Our goal is to detect whether a user is frustrated at the end of each search. Recall
that we define a search as a query and all of the search behavior occurring afterwards
until either the next query or the end of the session is encountered. At the end of a
search, we ask, “Is the user frustrated at this point of the search task?” To detect
frustration, we derive features from the search just completed as well as other searches
conducted in the task so far. We refer to these feature sets as search and task features,
respectively. We compute additional features from a user’s other tasks, which we call
user features.
In this chapter, we consider frustration detection a binary task. However, multi-class
detection may be useful, such as the intensity or type of frustration, e.g., detecting
each of the fifteen types of frustration outlined by Xie and Cool (2009). We leave
multi-class detection for future work.
In our previous work (Feild, Allan, & Jones, 2010), we found the most effective
model for detecting searcher frustration was one based on the features that White
and Dumais (2009) found were useful for predicting when users would switch search
engines. The features in the model are: the most recent query’s length in characters,
the average token length of the most recent query, the duration of the task in seconds,
the number of user actions in the task, and the average number of URLs visited per
task for the current user.
In this chapter, we extend our previous work to consider the effects of personalization
and privacy on detection quality. We pose the following questions regarding searcher
frustration:
RQ1. How does personalization affect the quality of detection?
RQ2. What impact does sanitizing global data have on the quality of detection?
To address these questions, we use the best performing model from our previous work
and extend it to include personalization. We also consider the baselines of always or
never considering the user frustrated. We then explore sanitization by using the
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F Ta , F Tu , DPa , DPu , and ZEALOUS privacy mechanisms to produce global models
of searcher frustration. We use a data set collected during a user study with 30
participants (also used in our previous work).
Our key contributions are (1) an analysis of personalized searcher frustration detection and (2) an analysis of the effect of sanitized global data on searcher frustration
detection.
Figure 7.1 outlines the implementation we will follow for personalized frustration
detection throughout this chapter. In Section 7.1 we describe how global data will
be mined, collected and processed. We then describe how local data is used and
combined with global data in Sections 7.2 and 7.3. We present our experimental setup
and describe the data we use in Section 7.4. We present our findings in Section 7.5
before wrapping up with a discussion of limitations in Section 7.6 and a summary in
Section 7.7.

7.1

Global data

To extract global data, we must first ask users to explicitly inform us when they are
frustrated. When we detect that a user is ending a search (i.e., they have moved on to
a new search), we ask them if they were frustrated with the search. This annotation
is then coupled with a feature vector for the search. As mentioned previously, the
feature vector includes the most recent query’s length in characters, the average token
length of the most recent query, the duration of the task in seconds, the number of
user actions in the task, and the average number of URLs visited per task for the
current user. The last feature can be calculated at the time of the annotation or
computed just prior to uploading the data, giving a better estimate of the user’s
behavior.
Because all of these features are continuous, it would be very difficult to create a
sanitized data set. To overcome this issue, we binarize the features. One way to do
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Personalized frustration detection
B Preprocessing
1. What artifacts will be extracted?
 Feature vectors generated from a user’s search history, each corresponding to a search conducted by the user; features are binary and each vector
is annotated as frustrated or not-frustrated by the user (see Section 7.1
for details).
2. What preprocessing will take place on the global data?
 A logistic regression model will be trained (see Section 7.1 for details).
3. What preprocessing will take place on the local data?
 A logistic regression model will be trained on the raw feature vectors
for any instances that have been annotated by the user (see Section 7.2
for details).
B On input
4. What is the input?
 A feature vector for an un-annotated search.
5. What request will the client send to the server?
 A request for the globally-trained logistic regression model (no data is
sent).
6. What processing will the server perform for the client request?
 None.
7. What response will the server send to the client?
 The trained logistic regression model.
8. How will the server data be integrated with the local data?
 The score produced from the local logistic regression classifier will be
multiplied with the score produced from the global logistic regression
classifier (see Section 7.3 for details).
9. What is the output of the application?
 A boolean: frustrated or not-frustrated.
Figure 7.1. Specifications for personalized frustration detection.
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this is to find the mean of a feature across either a user or a group of users and use
that as the threshold. User-based means are more private since no data has to be
aggregated across users, and moreover, as we will show, it actually out-performs using
a group-level mean.
To train a detection model, we rely on logistic regression. This is appropriate since
we have a binary classification problem: frustrated/not-frustrated. Other methods
would likely work as well, such as decision trees or random forests.

7.2

Local data

We treat local data very similarly to global data. First, it is collected in the same way,
i.e., we ask users to explicitly provide frustration labels to search instances. However,
we do not binarize the feature values. In experiments on a development set, we found
that raw features provide more useful detection than binarized ones.
Just as in the global model, we train a logistic regression model. This is easily
implemented via JavaScript and so can be included in a platform such as CrowdLogger
to be trained client-side.

7.3

Integrating local and global data

There are many ways to combine local and global data for classification models, as
we saw in Chapter 5. For a particular test instance and a global and local score, we
consider four integration methods: maximum, minimum, mean, and product. Using a
development set, we found the product to give the best results when smaller amounts
of local data were used, while performing similarly to other models when higher levels
of local data were used. For that reason, we concentrate on the product. The variant
of logistic regression we use outputs scores in the range [0,1], and so the product of
any two scores also falls within that range. We use a threshold of 0.5, which means
that for an instance to be classified as frustrated, at least one the local or global scores
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must be high (e.g., both equal to

√

0.5 = 0.71 or one score equal to 1 and the other

0.5).

7.4

Experimental setup

In this section, we outline our experiments, the data we use, and our method of
evaluation.

7.4.1

Experiments

To answer our two research questions, we consider three experiments.
Experiment 1. Our first research question asks how personalization affects frustration detection. To answer this, we look at the performance of using a local model
built from n user instances and then testing on several other instances from that user.
We vary n from 1 to the maximum possible number. For our experiments, we will
randomly sample n labeled user instances and perform r trials per value of n. The
models to compare against are: always assume the user is frustrated, never assume
the user is frustrated, and a global model. If personalization helps, we expect the
local model to out-perform the others.
Experiment 2. Our second experiment extends the first and evaluates the effect of
integrating local and global data. We look at several methods of combining the two
sources of data, varying n just as in Experiment 1. As we mentioned in Section 7.3,
our analysis focuses on the product of the local and global scores for a given instance,
but we also considered taking the maximum, minimum, and mean of the two scores. If
integrating local and global information is beneficial, we expect the integrated model
to outperform the models examined in Experiment 1.
Experiment 3. Our final experiment explores the effect of sanitization on frustration detection. We consider all privacy mechanisms: F Ta , F Tu , DPa , DPu , and
ZEALOUS. We then show the performance of the sanitized global and integrated
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models applying the same procedures used in Experiments 1 and 2. One issue we
must address has to do with our data size: there are too few users for the sanitization
methods to work well. To overcome this, we created a synthetic pool of data using the
following procedure, varying i from 1 to N : 1) randomly select a user; 2) randomly
sample with replacement m = [1, 50] instances from that user to create a new pseudo
user ui ; 3) add ui to the set of pseudo users U . The instances added in step 2 are
raw, meaning that the average required for binarization is computed over the pseudo
user, not the original user. If sanitization is harmful, the performance of the global
and integrated models should drop compared to the unsanitized global models used
in the previous experiments.

7.4.2

Data

In Fall 2009, we conducted a user study with thirty participants from the University
of Massachusetts Amherst. The mean age of participants was 26. Most participants
were computer science or engineering graduates, others were from English, kinesiology,
physics, chemical engineering, and operation management. Two participants were
undergraduates. Twenty-seven users reported a ‘5’ (the highest) on a five-point search
experience scale; one reported a ‘4’ and two a ‘3’. There were seven females and
twenty-three males.
Each participant was asked to complete seven1 tasks from a pool of twelve (several
with multiple versions) and to spend no more than seven minutes on each, though
this was not strictly enforced. The order of the tasks was determined by four 12 × 12
Latin squares, which removed ordering effects from the study. Users were given tasks
one at a time, so they were unaware of the tasks later in the order. Most of the tasks
1

The first two participants completed eight tasks, but it took longer than expected, so seven
tasks were used from then on.
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1.

What is the average temperature in [Dallas, SD/Albany, GA/Springfield,
IL] for winter? Summer?
2. Name three bridges that collapsed in the USA since 2007.
3. In what year did the USA experience its worst drought? What was the
average precipitation in the country that year?
4. How many pixels must be dead on a MacBook before Apple will replace
the laptop? Assume the laptop is still under warranty.
5. Is the band [Snow Patrol/Greenday/State Radio/Goo Goo Dolls/Counting
Crows] coming to Amherst, MA within the next year? If not, when and
where will they be playing closest?
6. What was the best selling television (brand & model) of 2008?
7. Find the hours of the PetsMart nearest [Wichita, KS/Thorndale, TX/Nitro, WV].
8. How much did the Dow Jones Industrial Average increase/decrease at the
end of yesterday?
9. Find three coffee shops with WI-FI in [Staunton, VA/Canton, OH/Metairie, LA].
10. Where is the nearest Chipotle restaurant with respect to [Manchester, MD/Brownsville, OR/Morey, CO]?
11. What’s the helpline phone number for Verizon Wireless in MA?
12. Name four places to get a car inspection for a normal passenger car in
[Hanover, PA/Collinwood, TN/Salem, NC].
Table 7.1. The information seeking tasks given to users in the user study. Variations
are included in brackets.
were designed to be difficult to solve with a search engine since the answer was not
easily found on a single page. The complete list of tasks is shown in Table 7.1.
The study relied on a modified version of the Lemur Query Log Toolbar2 for Firefox.3
To begin a task, participants had to click a ‘Start Task’ button. This prompted them
with the task and a brief questionnaire about how well they understood the task and
the degree to which they felt they knew the answer. They were asked to use any of
four search engines: Bing, Google, Yahoo!, or Ask.com and were allowed to switch at
any time. Links to these appeared on the toolbar and were randomly reordered at
the start of each task. Users were allowed to use tabs within Firefox.
2

http://www.lemurproject.org/querylogtoolbar/

3

http://www.mozilla.com/en-US/firefox/firefox.html
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Query Frustration
Feedback value:
Frequency:
Percentage:

None
1
235
51%

2
128
28%

3
68
15%

Extreme
4
5
25
7
5%
1%

Table 7.2. Distribution of user-reported frustration for searches.

For every query entered, users were prompted to describe their expectations for the
query. Each time they navigated away from a non-search page, they were asked the
degree to which the page satisfied the task on a five point scale, with an option to
evaluate later. At the end of a search (determined by the user entering a new query
or clicking ‘End Task’), users were asked what the search actually provided relative
to their expectations, how well the search satisfied their task (on a five point scale),
how frustrated they were with the task so far (on a five point scale), and, if they
indicated at least slight frustration (2–5 on the five-point scale), we asked them to
describe their frustration.
When users finished the task by clicking ‘End Task’, they were asked to evaluate, on
a five point scale, how successful the session was, what their most useful query was,
how they would suggest a search engine be changed to better address the task, and
what other resources they would have sought to respond to the task.
A total of 211 tasks were completed (one participant completed one fewer task because
of computer problems), feedback was provided for 463 queries, and 711 pages were
visited. On the frustration feedback scale, ‘1’ is not frustrated at all and ‘5’ is extremely
frustrated. In Table 7.2 we see that users collectively reported some level of frustration
for about half of their queries. The most common reasons given for being frustrated
were: (1) off-topic results, (2) more effort than expected, (3) results that were too
general, (4) un-corroborated answers, and (5) seemingly non-existent answers.
For our experiments, we selected 20 users for training and development and the
remaining 10 users for final testing—these are the same training and test sets used
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Exploratory phase on development set
Training users
19
Training instances
287–313
(labeled frustrated )
151–165 (49–53%)
Total local training instances
184
(labeled frustrated )
108 (59%)
Evaluation users
20
Evaluation instances
139
(labeled frustrated )
57 (41%)
Final evaluation
Global training users
Global training instances
(labeled frustrated )
Total Local training instances
(labeled frustrated )
Evaluation users
Evaluation instances
(labeled frustrated )

20
324
165 (51%)
77
33 (43%)
10
62
29 (47%)

Table 7.3. Statistics about the data used in the exploratory phase over the 20
training/development users (top) and for the final training and evaluation (bottom).

in our previous work. We split each user’s data into two parts: testing and local
training. The local training partition consists of search instances for the first four
tasks the user performed. The testing partition contains the other three tasks. One
of the factors we vary is the number of instances used from the local training partition.
To binarize the frustration levels, we map the frustration level of 1 to not-frustrated
and all other levels to frustrated.
Before building the final models, we conducted an exploratory analysis on the training
and development set using a leave-one-user-out approach, training global models over
19 users and testing on the remaining user. This allowed us to settle on parameters
for the models we ultimately tested. When a user is part of the global training set,
data from both the local training and testing partitions are used. The final models
were trained over the entire training set and evaluated on the 10-user test set.
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The statistics for the exploratory and final evaluation phases of our experiments are
shown in 7.3. In the final evaluation, the maximum number of instances within any
of the ten local training sets is twelve.

7.4.3

Evaluation

In this section, we describe the metrics that we use to evaluate frustration models. Our
ultimate goal is to use frustration models to decide when to intervene to help the user
during the search process. Since many interaction methods with which we would like
to intervene are not typically used because of their undesirable, frustration-causing
attributes (i.e., interaction and latency), we are interested in minimizing our falsepositives (non-frustrated searchers that our models say are frustrated), potentially
at the cost of recall. For that reason, our predominant evaluation metric is a macro
(across users) F-score with β = 0.5, which gives increased weight to precision over
recall. Specifically, we calculate F0.5 using the average over the precision and recall
values calculated for each user, rather than using the average F0.5 calculated per user.
Using a macro rather than a micro approach avoids one frustrated searcher with many
search instances in the test data skewing the results. Un-weighted macro-averaging
treats all users equally. A desirable model is one that performs well across all users,
not just on one specific user.
Formally, precision, recall, and F0.5 are defined as follows. First, assume that we
have four counters that keep track of the number of instances we: correctly classify as
frustrated (true positives, T P ); incorrectly classify as frustrated (false positives, F P );
correctly classify as not-frustrated (true negatives, T N ); and incorrectly classify as
not-frustrated (false negatives, T N ). Then,
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Precision =T P/(T P + F P ),

(7.1)

Recall =T P/(T P + F N ),

(7.2)

(1 + β 2 ) × Precision × Recall
Fβ =
.
(β 2 × Precision) + Recall

(7.3)

In the cases where a user has no instances of frustration, we set recall to 1.0; if a
model classifies all of a user’s instances as not-frustrated, we set precision to 1.0.
These defaults avoid edge cases in which undefined values are possible, and do so in
a practical manner.
Our evaluation is off-line. When calculating features such as the average number of
URLs visited per task for a given user, we average over all tasks, including those
in the test partition. If this were an on-line evaluation, then user features could be
calculated up until the searching being tested. We chose the off-line option due to the
limited data—only seven or eight tasks per user. Given more user data (unlabeled,
even), we believe that the two evaluations would be nearly equivalent.

7.5

Results and analysis

For Experiments 1 and 2, we first turn to Figure 7.2. In this figure, we show the performance of various models as a function of the number of local training instances on the
training and development set of 20 users. For the local and integrated (local×global)
models, 10 samples are shown for each level of training instances used. We can see
that as more instances are used for local training, performance becomes less variable,
though part of this is that there are only so many instances contributed by each user.
While the local model by itself is not very stable, especially at lower levels of local
training data, it on average out-performs the global model. Integrating local and
global scores appears to provide greater, though not statistically significant, improvements over using either local (for small levels of local training data) or global data
by itself.
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Figure 7.2. The performance of various models as a function of the number of local
training instances used on the training set of 20 users. On the left, we use a globally
calculated mean to binarize the global feature vectors; on the left, we rely on userlevel means. The local and integrated model lines are an average over 10 samples per
x value, with dashed lines representing the 95% confidence intervals for the mean.

Figure 7.2 demonstrates the effect that using means of global-level features for binarization has on the performance of the global only model. We had originally assumed
that global-level means (left graph) would increase performance. However, it turns
out that user-level means (right graph) perform substantially better. This is useful
to know as collecting a global mean is more challenging when privacy is taken into
account
In Figure 7.3, we show the performance of the various models on the test set of 10
users. Performance is quite different from that seen with the training and development
set. For instance, the macro F0.5 substantially jumped for all models. Also, the
advantage of local data over global is missing for lower levels of local training data
and is much less pronounced for higher values. We see an upward trend rather than
a downward trend for the local and integrated models. Finally, the integrated model
always out-performs the local model, not just when there is less local training data
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Figure 7.3. The performance of various models as a function of the number of local
training instances used on the test set of 10 users. The global model was trained on
the 20 training users and feature binarization relied on user-level means. The local
and integrated model performance lines are an average over 100 samples per x value,
and the dotted lines indicate the 95% confidence interval of the mean.

as was the case in Figure 7.2. It seems that, even with small amounts of local
training data—four or more training instances—it is advantageous to integrate local
and global score to achieve the highest performance. When all the local training
data is used, the integrated model achieved a macro F score of 0.86—an almost
9% relative improvement over the local-only model (F= 0.79) and a 12% relative
improvement over the global-only model (F= 0.77). The differences between the
mean performance of models is statistically significant (t-test, p < 0.001). However, a
Fisher’s Randomization test only showed significant differences in macro F0.5 between
each model and the baselines (always frustrated and never frustrated) when all local
training data was used (the performance reported at the far right of the plot). This
may be due to in part to the small scale of the test set.
For Experiment 3, we constructed a large pseudo user collection following the procedure outlined in Section 7.4. This resulted in 100,000 pseudo users and 2,499,416 feature vectors, 51% of which have the frustrated label. All 64 distinct feature vectors—2
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values raised to the (5 features + 1 label) = 26 = 64—are present in the pseudo user
set. Interestingly, this resulted in the same performance as in the leave-one-user-out
evaluation, validating our technique.
For the differentially privacy mechanisms, we use N = 100, 000,  = ln(10), and
δ = 1/100, 000. We considered several values of d (d = {1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32, 64}) and took
10 samples at each level. For the frequency thresholding models, we looked at several
values of k (k = {2, 5, 10, 50}). We found no effect from the privacy mechanisms on
performance. The artifact space is small and even at the high threshold required for
d = 64 under ZEALOUS, 57 of the 64 distinct artifacts were released. While the
impression coverage changed, the coverage of distinct artifacts remained high for all
levels of d and k. This result suggests that frustration can be modeled privately for
large user bases.

7.6

Limitations

The data used in this chapter is both small and biased. Among the biases is the
overlap in tasks given to users—tasks in the training set overlap with tasks in the
test set. However, the coarseness of the feature values used in the global models may
mitigate this to some extent. Nonetheless, an in-the-wild experiment would provide
valuable insights into the generalizability of the results found here.
The small sample size makes it difficult to know how representative the results are.
Large differences appeared between the cross-validation experiments on the training
and development set and the final experiments on the test set. A larger study is
needed to better understand the impact of these models in a real system.
We analyzed one global model here based on the best performing classifier from
previous work. There are many other models, such as ones that rely on additional
features of the type we used, which would increase the feature space. Other models
rely on sequences of actions, such as “SCVC”, meaning the user issued a search, click
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on a result, viewed the page, and then clicked on a link. Further work is needed to
understand the effects that sanitization has on these and similar models.

7.7

Summary

We considered two research questions: 1) how does personalization affect frustration
detection and 2) how does sanitization affect frustration detection. We considered
local data and global data by themselves as well as several integrated models. Using
data from a user study we conducted for previous work, we demonstrated that local
data can add substantial and statistically significant benefits. We also found that,
using a simulated training set of 100,000 pseudo users, privacy mechanisms have no
effect on the performance, even for large thresholds. For a practitioner interested
in deploying a privacy-preserving frustration detection system, our results suggest
that they gather labels from many users and use the integrated model to detect
frustration for users that have provided labels, and the global only model for users
without annotations.
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CHAPTER 8
CROWDLOGGER

In this chapter, we describe CrowdLogger, an open source browser extension for
Firefox and Google Chrome.1 To evaluate the applications we described earlier in
this thesis, we used a combination of the AOL search logs, TREC data, and data
collected during a laboratory study. A complimentary evaluation, which we leave for
future work, is to collect data from users in-situ and have them use the applications
we described. In order to launch such studies, we require a platform on which to
conduct them. To this end, we have implemented Crowdlogger, which serves as
a generalized platform for mining and collecting user data (privately or not) both
passively and interactively, prototyping IR applications, evaluating IR applications,
and conducting user studies.
CrowdLogger works as follows. Consenting participants download the browser extension, which then provides them with a list of available Apps and Studies, collectively
known as CrowdLogger Remote Modules, or CLRMs. CLRMs are JavaScript and
HTML code modules that provide a service, such as an IR application prototype (in
the case of Apps), or collect data for research (in the case of Studies). They have access to an application programming interface (API) provided by CrowdLogger. This
API, described in Section 8.1, allows CLRMs to access user data, store new data,
interact with users, and upload data. Figures 8.1, 8.2 and 8.3 show screen shots of
the extension in action.
1
Source code: https://code.google.com/p/crowdlogger/; Web site: http://crowdlogger
.cs.umass.edu/
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Figure 8.1. A screen shot of the CrowdLogger menu in Google Chrome. It is
non-obtrusive and allows users to quickly toggle logging on and off.

From a researcher’s point of view, CrowdLogger provides an easy way to prototype a
new system, evaluate it using real user data, and conduct studies over a potentially
large number of users. CrowdLogger takes care of logging, data input/output, server
communication, and pre-defined privacy policies. We implemented CrowdLogger with
the goal of maintaining a large user base, which can be shared by multiple researchers
conducting independent studies. If users downloading CrowdLogger for a particular
study decide to keep it installed, they might see another study advertised in the CLRM
listings and elect to participate in that one, as well. Our hope is that the CrowdLogger
user network will provide researchers with a pool of potential participants for user
studies, in addition to those they would normally advertise to.
For the purposes of this thesis, the important aspects of CrowdLogger are as follows.
First, it implements the CrowdLogging framework, allowing for the private aggregation of user data under several definitions of privacy. Second, it allows client-side
logging and user modeling. Third, it allows for user interaction, e.g., users can be
asked to label their data. Fourth, it allows for IR applications to be evaluated either
implicitly through user behavior or explicitly through feedback from the user. Earlier in this thesis, we described three IR applications; while we did not conduct user
studies with CrowdLogger to evaluate these applications, we have either implemented
them as a Study module or they could be implemented as one.
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Figure 8.2. A screen shot of the CrowdLogger Status Page. This is where users can
set their preferences, find notifications from researchers, update CLRMs, and manage
their search history.

Figure 8.3. A screen shot of the CrowdLogger App and Study page, listing CRLMs
available for install.
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Other tools exist for performing some of the functionalities encapsulated in CrowdLogger. For instance, the Lemur Query Log Toolbar2 was developed and released
with the goal of collecting a sizable search log for use within the IR research community. Implemented as a Firefox and Internet Explorer extension, it logged many
user interactions, including web search queries, viewed page text, copied and pasted
text and scrolls. This data was uploaded once a week to a centralized location. The
primary purpose of the Lemur Toolbar was to collect data and it did not allow interactions with users as CrowdLogger does. Also, the only notion of privacy in the Lemur
Toolbar was that each week’s worth of data was stored under a unique, anonymized
user identifier. Another piece of software similar in spirit to CrowdLogger is the HCI
Browser introduced by Capra (2011). The HCI Browser was made to be used for interactive, task-based IR studies. While it does log user behavior similar to that logged
by the Lemur Toolbar, it was not made to be a passive logger, as CrowdLogger allows.
Both of these loggers are open source and can be modified by researchers for other
ends, but doing so requires understanding the internals, reworking them, and then
releasing the software to a new batch of participants. CrowdLogger allows extensions
to be programmed as CLRMs, which can be installed, uninstalled, and updated on
the fly and share a common user base. At the same time, since the software is open
source, researchers can modify the underlying system to suit their particular needs
(though they will lose access to the CrowdLogger user base), just as with the Lemur
Toolbar and the HCI Browser.
The remainder of this chapter begins in Section 8.1 with an overview of the API exposed by CrowdLogger that allows researchers to leverage the CrowdLogging framework, implement IR application prototypes, perform user studies, and evaluate sys2

http://www.lemurproject.org/querylogtoolbar/
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tems. We describe some example CLRMs that we have implemented for CrowdLogger
in Section 8.2. Finally, we end with a summary in Section 8.3.

8.1

CrowdLogger API

In this section, we outline the API exposed to developers in CrowdLogger. The API
is meant to abstract many common functionalities as well as provide an easy way to
provide privacy. There are several major API categories:
• User behavior (historic and real-time)
• Aggregate user data
• User interface
• Local storage
• Privacy
• Server-side access
We discuss each of these below.
User behavior. This API provides access to the locally stored user log, which
includes the following user interactions: web searches on Google, Bing, and Yahoo!
and the displayed results; page loads, focuses, and blurs (when the page loses focus);
clicks on search page results; clicks on links; browser tab additions, removal, and
selections; and logging status (when logging is turned on and off). In addition to
having access to the user’s interaction history, the API also provides a function that
CLRMs can use to register for a real-time stream of user interactions. One example
of using this feature is to prompt users with a questionnaire when they enter a new
search.
Aggregate user data. This API gives CLRMs access to crowd logs, if they exist, or
create new ones otherwise. The motivation is that if an IR application implemented
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as a CLRM requires global data, it can use this API function to access it if that data
already exists on the CrowdLogger server or gather it otherwise. The API is agnostic
to privacy policies, and therefore developers can use this function to access/create
sanitized or unsanitized crowd logs.
User interface. One difficulty of implementing logging software is dealing with cross
platform issues. As a Firefox and Google Chrome browser extension, CrowdLogger
works across non-mobile Windows, Macintosh, and Linux/Unix system. However,
programming for both Firefox and Chrome can be troublesome as CLRMs run on
both browsers (there is no notion of a Firefox or Chrome only CLRM). To prevent
developers from having to include many switches in their CLRMs to deal with Firefox or Chrome idioms, the user interface API provides wrapper functions to open
windows, get favicons, and interact with CrowdLogger’s messaging service.
Local storage. While CrowdLogger takes care of logging many important user
interactions, CLRMs will likely still need to log information to a user’s machine.
This can be achieved with the local storage API. For example, a CLRM for gathering
page quality annotations from users may want to save that information locally. Local
storage is also necessary for maintaining state between browser restarts.
Privacy. This API provides a number of components used in CrowdLogging, including basic encryption, encryption with Shamir’s Secret Sharing, and anonymized data
uploading.
Server-side access. This API provides functions for communicating with a server
to send data, receive data, or both. This does not access the CrowdLogger server,
but rather allows communication between the CLRM and any arbitrary server that
a developer needs access to. One reason for requiring server access is to upload user
data. Another is to perform a server-side computation on some user data. Developers
may also need access to crowd logs not stored on the CrowdLogger server.
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k
1
2
3
4
5

Query freq.
Impressions Users
4905 4905
1803
46
490
13
402
6
156
1

Query reform.
Impressions Users
6194 6194
1783
12
118
1
89
1
36
0

Query-click
Impressions Users
2816 2816
830
9
288
1
209
0
126
0

Table 8.1. Number of distinct queries, query pairs, and query-click pairs with at
least k impressions or k users. Data was collected with CrowdLogger over two weeks
in January 2011.

CLRMs are required to list the APIs they want access to so that users can be informed
during the installation. For example, if a CLRM need server-side access, users should
be aware as their data could be uploaded.

8.2

Examples

We have implemented two studies and one prototype using CrowdLogger. The first,
which preceded the CrowdLogger API and CLRMs, evaluated the coverage of extracting queries, query pairs, and query-click pairs using different privacy policies in the
CrowdLogging framework. We ran the study for two weeks in January 2011 with 16
anonymous users. Not much significant data was collected—only a single query was
shared by at least five of the users—but the system implementation was a success.
Table 8.1 shows the number of distinct queries, query pairs, and query-click pairs
consisting of at least 1–5 instances or shared by at least 1–5 users. More details of
the study can be found in our previous work (Feild et al., 2011).
We also implemented a prototype of a system called the Search Task Assistant (Feild
& Allan, 2012), the left window in Figure 8.4. This system automatically groups a
user’s search history—queries and page visits—into search tasks. It is not quite as
advanced as the search task identification techniques we describe later (there is no
personalization yet), but it does allow users to re-group tasks, search their task and
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Figure 8.4. A screen shot of the Search Task Assistant, an application implemented
using the CrowdLogger API.
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Figure 8.5. A screen shot of the Understanding Web Search Behavior study, a
CLRM implemented using the CrowdLogger API.

search history, and displays tasks and searches that appear to be related to their
current task. This implementation of the Search Task Assistant demonstrates the
usefulness of CrowdLogger as a platform for prototyping. While CrowdLogger Apps
are a great way for researchers to demonstrate a system, we believe they may also be
used as an avenue to maintain users between studies. If CrowdLogger is providing a
service to users, they may be less likely to uninstall it at the end of a study.
We have also implemented (but have not carried out) a study in CrowdLogger called
Understanding Web Search Behavior. The goal of the study is to acquire user annotations for a number of IR applications. Specifically, groupings of search tasks and
relevance labels for web pages and query recommendations. Screen shots are shown in
Figures 8.5 and 8.6. The study makes use of many of the APIs, but does not consider
privacy in the uploading phase; the University of Massachuestts Institutional Review
Board protocol for the study allows us to collect raw data for our use only, but crowd
logs can be released from the collected data. This demonstrates that an interactive
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Figure 8.6. A screen shot of the task grouping assignment in the Understanding
Web Search Behavior study. All of a user’s searchers are automatically grouped and
displayed in drag-and-drop interface. The user can then drag searches (the filled
boxes) between task groups (the larger, unfilled boxes) to correct mistakes made by
the automatic algorithm.

study can be implemented as a CLRM and that the platform allows flexibility in the
study parameters, e.g., an empty privacy policy.

8.3

Summary

In the chapter, we introduced a novel system called CrowdLogger for collecting user
data and performing user studies. The system implements the CrowdLogging framework, demonstrating the feasibility of CrowdLogging in a live system. CrowdLogger
is cross-platform and open source, making it a good candidate for distributed research
studies. We gave several examples of CrowdLogger in action, including a study of
mining artifacts, an App called the Search Task Assistant, and a study for collecting
user annotations.
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CHAPTER 9
CONCLUSIONS

The two themes of this thesis are privacy and personalization. Personalization at the
user level allows information retrieval system implementors the opportunity to tailor
system behavior to each individual user, providing a unique, and hopefully superior,
experience. In this thesis, we considered privacy an orthogonal issue, but one that
is of increasing interest. Users want to protect their privacy while still receiving
the benefits of a service, like web search. Researchers want to share data sets of
user behavior with the research community at large, but must provide a policy for
protecting user privacy in order to satisfy the demands of users, lawyers (in the case
of industry researchers), and institutional review boards (in the case of academic
researchers).
It is within this context that we considered ways for collecting data privately and the
effects of personalization and privacy on three information retrieval applications. In
this chapter, we summarize the contributions of this thesis and give an overview of
future work.

9.1

Summary of contributions

We introduced a novel framework call CrowdLogging for collecting and mining search
behavior from a distributed group of users in a privacy-preserving manner. This
framework is useful for (1) researchers that must provide some mechanism to protect
users for approval by their institutional review boards and to gain the trust of users,
as well as for (2) large web search companies that want to release data to the research
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community. The framework logs user behavior on each user’s computer, where the
user has full control over it. Data is mined at the consent of users and sent encrypted
to a centralized server. The framework depends on secret sharing, which allows the
server to decrypt data only if it receives a sufficient number of distinct keys for a given
piece of data. For example, CrowdLogging can be used to decrypt the set of queries
that have been submitted by at least five users, without exposing queries entered by
fewer than five users, resulting in sanitized data.
We considered several privacy mechanisms for sanitizing data that work within the
CrowdLogging framework, formalizing two naı̈ve mechanisms (F Ta and F Tu ) and
introducing a novel (, δ)-indistinguishable mechanism (DPu ). We described several
weaknesses of each of the mechanisms, including an empirical experiment on the
AOL query log data demonstrating the ability to infer unsupported artifacts using
F Ta and F Tu . We explored the parameter settings necessary under the DPa and DPu
mechanisms in order to achieve comparable query artifact coverage to that of F Ta
and F Tu using the AOL search log. We found that the parameters settings, namely
of , required to reach approximately the same coverage as frequency thresholding are
unreasonable— values of 10 or more for values of k < 200. Our findings pertain to
query artifacts released using the AOL search log and do not necessarily generalize
to other data sets, though the process we use can be applied to other data sets and
artifact classes.
We introduced a template for describing how local user data and global data aggregated from many users are collected, processed, and combined for use within an
application. Leveraging local data, either by itself or in combination with global
data, allows us to provide a personalized experience for each user. We looked at how
personalization could be applied to three IR applications and analyzed the effect of
both personalization and sanitization on performance.
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The first application we explored was search task identification. We demonstrated
the variability in individuals’ perceptions of what constitutes a search task, finding a
Fleiss’ Kappa as low a 0.53 among six annotators’ labels across ten user histories. This
is the first such analysis in the search task identification literature that we know of. We
gathered annotations for over 500 user histories extracted from the 2006 AOL search
log, labeled by ten annotators—38 times as many user histories as used by the current
state of the art research. With this data, we introduced several models for providing
personalization, but found they perform similarly to using a non-personalized random
forest classifier, all achieving between 94% and 95% macro accuracy across users. Our
experiments showed the random forest classifier significantly out-performs the current
state of the art model. We further demonstrated that sanitization has an overall mild
effect on performance and can even improve performance under certain conditions,
namely when the F Tu mechanism is used with k = 100.
The second application we considered was task-aware query recommendation, for
which we introduced a novel model that combines query recommendations for each
query within a task, giving more weight to queries based on either temporal distance or same-task likelihood. It relies on personalized search task identification, as
described above. We found that leveraging on-task search context provides a large
boost in MRR for many evaluation queries—more than 25% on average. However,
our CrowdLogging approach to privacy has a substantial impact on recommendation
performance, rendering the quality so low as to be useless in a real system in most
cases we consider.
The third and last application we considered was searcher frustration detection—
detecting when users become frustrated as they search for information. We explored
the effects of personalization on frustration detection and showed that it can provide
substantial performance improvements—as much as 9% in F0.5 . We also demonstrate
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that with a simulated user base of 100,000 users performance of global models is not
affected by sanitization.
Overall, we found mixed results for sanitization. When used for classification problems that rely on feature vectors as artifacts, sanitization has less of an impact (and
can even boost performance in the case of STI). However, when artifacts cover a large
space, such as query pair text used for query recommendation, sanitization has a substantial, negative impact on performance—at least when aggregating across 617,000
users. One possible way to reduce this effect is to modify the artifact representation, which we demonstrated can at the very least improve artifact coverage in crowd
logs. Another is to aggregate over many more users, something that is difficult to
achieve without access to a large-scale commercial product. If sanitization is still an
issue even after modifying the representation and increasing the user base, it may be
prudent to use an algorithm that does not depend on global data.
Finally, we described an open source system that implements the CrowdLogging
framework. Available as a browser extension for Firefox and Google Chrome, it
also serves as a platform with which to perform in-situ studies of user search behavior, evaluate IR applications, and provide research prototypes to interested parties.
CrowdLogger allows researcher-defined JavaScript/HTML modules to be remotely
loaded and exposes an API for: accessing a user’s real-time or past browsing behavior;
uploading data to a server privately, anonymously or in the clear (as approved by the
user); interacting with the user via HTML and JavaScript; accessing a remote server
for computational purposes; and saving data on a user’s computer. We described two
studies and one prototype that have been implemented with CrowdLogger.

9.2

Future work

There are many interesting avenues of future work stemming from this thesis. For
example, using CrowdLogger to perform user studies for each of the IR applications
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we considered here. Such user studies would be valuable for several reasons. First,
global data would be up-to-date, as opposed to the dated queries present in the AOL
search log. Second, in situ studies allow us to measure the performance of our systems
in their intended environment rather than simulations. Third, in user studies, users
are the annotators of their own data, so we do not have to worry about third-party
annotators guessing a user’s intentions.
One of the limitations of some of the experiments we conducted is that the AOL search
log is outdated and potentially biased (AOL was past its peak as a popular search
engine by 2006). Experiments with more recent search logs would provide additional
data points and allow us to draw more general conclusions from our results. One
avenue for accomplishing this is to partner with major web search companies, such as
Microsoft Bing or Google. Another is to conduct large scale user studies, e.g., with
CrowdLogger.
In our analysis of task-aware query recommendation, we discovered that search task
context can be both helpful and harmful; extending this work, it would be interesting
to devise a method for automatically detecting when search task context will be
helpful. Another direction is to consider the effects of using other recommendation
algorithms besides term-query graphs—including methods that do not rely on search
logs—and whether search context helps there, as well.
We found that privacy was prohibitively expensive in terms of utility for task-aware
query recommendation. One hypothesis is that forming a term-query graph from a
much larger log—millions or billions of users’ worth of data—would allow for more
reasonable performance when sanitized. The most likely path to accomplishing this
would be to use a log from a large web search company.
When quantifying the effect of privacy on searcher frustration detection performance,
we used a large simulated training set. An interesting question is whether the simulated training set is realistic. Future work should address this by obtaining frustration
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labels from a larger set of users. Other future work includes developing a multi-class
detector that can classify the cause of a user’s frustration within the search process.
Doing so may allow adaptive system to intervene in helpful ways.
In considering privacy, we explored the coverage of privacy mechanisms over different
artifact types. However, we did not perform an analysis of the content differences
between the data released under various privacy mechanisms. It is possible that
two mechanisms provide nearly identical coverage, but have substantial differences in
terms of the artifact revealed. Extending this line of thought, it is also unclear what
the relationship is between coverage and performance. That is, two data releases
have large differences in content, but similar coverages, will their performance be
drastically different, or very similar? We leave these explorations for future work.
When quantifying privacy, we relied on k for frequency thresholding and the theoretical bounds guaranteed under differential privacy,  and δ. Future work should
consider other means for discussing, qualifying, and quantifying privacy loss—what
does it mean to a user that  = ln(10)? What exactly are the risks associated with
participating in a data collection with a given level of  or k? Without lay descriptions, it is difficult to explain the risks to users, lawyers, and institutional review
boards.
We only considered batch mining operations: given a search log spanning some
amount of time, here is how it can be mined with respect to a privacy policy. However,
one of our long-term goals is to mine data from a live stream of user interactions over
a prolonged period of time. Future research questions surrounding this include how
to sample from users and how to handle older data. The latter question is interesting
because data that is relatively old—e.g., older than year—may be less sensitive or
less correlated with a user’s current search activity. These may have implications for
the differentially private mechanisms we considered, the result of which may reduce
the privacy loss associated with released data under those mechanisms.
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Another question we leave for future work is how much data does one need for an
application in order for privacy to not have a significant negative impact on effectiveness. From our experiments, we know that this number will vary across applications
and artifact types—the effects of sanitization over feature vectors extracted from 352
users were mild for search task identification, while sanitizing query reformulations
from 617,000 users provided virtually no utility for task-aware query recommendation. In addition, there are many kinds of artifacts that one can extract from user
data and many applications that can use them; we have only scratched the surface
in this thesis, and a good vein of future work is to establish how different classes of
artifacts are affected by sanitization in different situations and how best to represent
artifacts to maximize performance in a wider variety of applications. Taken together,
a useful contribution would be a taxonomy of applications and artifact types with
which an implementor could estimate the minimum number of users required in order
to provide some level of performance.
There are many ways that personalization can be applied to a given information
retrieval application. In this thesis, we only looked at certain ones. Future work
should consider other methods of leveraging a user’s local information to improve
for the three applications we considered. For example, we could consider group-level
personalization (the privacy implications of this would need to be explored).
We have several long-term goals for CrowdLogger, one of which is to encourage wide
adoption of the platform. One of our intentions when designing CrowdLogger was that
it be used by a large number of users for prolonged durations, allowing researchers
to recruit participants from the existing user base. For this to happen, we need
to demonstrate the utility of CrowdLogger. One way to demonstrate usefulness is
to conduct a variety of user studies and remote evaluations of information retrieval
system using CrowdLogger. Another is to ensure it is easy for participants to use
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and easy for researchers to develop Study and App modules. Future work includes
further developing CrowdLogger to meet these requirements.
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APPENDIX A
GLOSSARY

Artifact: See search log artifact.
Crowd log: A histogram of artifacts extracted from one or more user logs.
Global model: A model built using data from a crowd log.
Information retrieval application (IR application): A component of an IR system. Examples include: ranking, re-ranking, relevance feedback, and query
auto-completion. We specifically consider three additional applications: query
recommendation, search task identification, and frustration detection. In the
literature, this concept is often described as an information retrieval task. However, as a major piece of this dissertation concerns search tasks, we use the
phrase information retrieval application to avoid confusion between the two.
Local model: A model built using data from a user log.
Personalization: The act of incorporating information about a user into the processing of an IR application.
Privacy policy: A protocol governing how artifacts must be treated with respect
to user privacy to form a crowd log. If a privacy policy does not specify any
actions to reduce privacy loss, we call it an empty privacy policy.
Sanitized global model: A global model built from a crowd log constructed with
a non-empty privacy policy.
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Search: A query and all of the search behavior occurring afterwards until either the
next query or the end of the session is encountered (Feild, Allan, & Jones, 2010).
Search log: A set of entries, each describing a search event. Entries often include an
identifier, a time stamp, an event descriptor, and additional information about
the event.
Search log artifact (Artifact): A piece of information mined from a search log.
An artifact can involve the composition of multiple entries within a log. Examples of artifacts include: individual queries, query-click pairs, query reformulations, and feature vectors.
Search session (Session): All search behavior—queries, URL clicks, page views,
etc.—immediately following the end of the previous search session or the beginning of the log if no previous search session exists until there is a period of
inactivity. We use a period of 26 minutes, as measured empirically by Lucchese
et al. on a sample of the AOL search log (Lucchese et al., 2011).
Search task: A search task consists of one or more searches that share a common
information need. In previous research, the terms query chains (Boldi et al.,
2008; Radlinski & Joachims, 2005) and goals (Jones & Klinkner, 2008) are
also used to describe tasks. Our definition is different from that used in the
information seeking literature, which considers a task to consist of several facets,
including its goal, source, and the process by which it is carried out (Li, 2009).
Searcher frustration: The level of agitation experienced by a user due to the mismatch of search expectations and outcomes.
Sufficiently supported: An artifact is sufficiently supported by a privacy policy if
it exists in the sanitized crowd log.
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User search log (User log): A search log in which all events share the same identifier. This assumes that identifiers correspond to individual users.

159

APPENDIX B
DETAILS OF DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY

In this appendix, we provide the technical details for the three privacy mechanisms
based on differential privacy: DPu , DPa , and ZEALOUS. In order provide a provably
private mechanism, we can consider relaxations of differential privacy, such as (, δ)indistinguishability, introduced by Dwork et al. (Dwork, Kenthapadi, et al., 2006).
This is defined as follows:
Definition B.0.1 ((, δ)-indistinguishability (Dwork, Kenthapadi, et al., 2006)). A
randomized algorithm A is (, δ)-indistinguishable if for all data sets D and D0 that
differ in at most one individual’s data, and all S ⊆ Range(A):

P r[A(D) ∈ S] ≤ exp() · P r[A(D0 ) ∈ S] + δ.

With this relaxation, we have introduced a slack variable, δ, which allows more privacy
to be leaked. Generally, it is recommended that 0 < δ <

1
,
U

where U is the number

of users contributing to the input data sets (Korolova et al., 2009).
Korolova et al. (Korolova et al., 2009) , Götz et al. (Götz et al., 2011), and we (Feild
et al., 2011) established (, δ)-indistinguishable algorithms for releasing search log
data, which we describe next. First, we introduce some vocabulary that will be used
by the various algorithms. Let U be the number of users contributing to an input
set, Count(a, A) be a function that counts the number of instances of a that occur
in set A, Countu (a, A) be a function that counts the number of distinct users that
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Algorithm 1: Release private query click graph (Korolova et al., 2009)
Input : A search log D; the maximum number of queries and clicks each user
may contribute: d, dc , respectively; Laplacian noise parameters:
b, bq , bc (these stand for: noise for thresholding on k, noise for releasing
queries, and noise for releasing clicks); the query threshold, k.
Output: A query-click graph.
1

2
3
4

Set Q and C to be the first d queries and dc clicks from each user in D,
respectively
Q0 ← {q : Count(q, Q) + Lap(b) > k}
For each q ∈ Q0 , output hq, Count(q, Q) + Lap(bq )i
For each URL u in the top ten results for q ∈ Q0 , output
hq, u, Count(u, C) + Lap(bc )i

contributed a in set A, and Lap(b) be a function that randomly samples a number
from the Laplacian distribution with µ = 0 and variance b.
The goal of the algorithm introduced by Korolova et al. is to release a sanitized
query-click graph from a search log. The process is described in Algorithm 1.
We tailor this slightly to deal with arbitrary artifacts, allow any set of d artifacts to
be used rather than the first d, and we remove the steps related to building a query
click graph, yielding the artifact thresholding differential privacy algorithm (DPa ),
shown in Algorithm 2. Assuming the experimenter sets the privacy parameters  and
δ, Korolova et al. suggest setting:

k = d 1−
b =

d
.


ln

2δ
d



!
,

(B.1)
(B.2)

This setting of k minimizes the noise added in step 3 of the algorithm and assumes

1
that exp 1b ≥ 1 + 2 exp k−1
.
( b )−1
Götz et al. describe the ZEALOUS algorithm, which is described in Algorithm 3.
Two important distinctions between the ZEALOUS and DPa algorithms are that
where DPa allows each user to contribute d total artifacts and defines k in terms of
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Algorithm 2: Artifact thresholding differential privacy (DPa )
Input : A set of artifacts, D; the maximum number of artifacts each user may
contribute d; Laplacian noise parameters b, br (these stand for: noise
for thresholding on k and noise for releasing); the artifact threshold k.
Output: A histogram of artifacts with noisy impression frequencies.
1
2
3

Set A to be d artifacts submitted in D by each user
A0 ← {a : Count(a, A) + Lap(b) > k}
For each a ∈ A0 , output ha, Count(a, A) + Lap(br )i

the number of instances of an artifact, ZEALOUS restricts each user’s contribution
to d distinct artifacts and defines k in terms of the number of distinct users that
contributed each artifact. ZEALOUS can achieve (, δ)-indistinguishability with the
following settings:

b

=

2d
,


(B.3)

k =d 1−

!
2δ

log

d



,

k 0 = 1,

(B.4)
(B.5)

where k, k 0 , d, and b are defined as in Algorithm 3. Note that these settings are
very similar to those proposed by Korolova et al. However, the noise parameter b is
given twice the weight. This is because of how Götz et al. define the sensitivity of
ZEALOUS. Let us take a moment to understand what sensitivity is and how it can
be used. Dwork et al. (Dwork, McSherry, et al., 2006) define sensitivity as follows:
Definition B.0.2 (Sensitivity (Dwork, McSherry, et al., 2006)). The L1 sensitivity
of a function f : Dn → Rm is the smallest number S(f ) such that for all search logs
D, D0 ∈ Dn that differ in a single individual’s d artifacts,

||f (D) − f (D0 )||1 ≤ S(f ).
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Algorithm 3: ZEALOUS (Götz et al., 2011)
Input : A set of search artifacts, D; the maximum number of distinct
artifacts each user may contribute d; Laplacian noise parameter b; the
user thresholds k, k 0 .
Output: A histogram of artifacts with noisy user frequencies.
1
2
3

Set A to be some set of d distinct artifacts submitted in D per user
A0 ← {a : Countu (a, A) > k 0 }
For each a ∈ A0 , output ha, ui : u = Countu (a, A0 ) + Lap(b) ∧ u > k

In the case of the algorithms listed above, f is a function that builds a histogram of
artifacts and their counts. The confusion arises around how we define search logs that
differ. If we think of D has having a particular user’s data and D0 as not, then the
sensitivity of building a histogram is d, since a user’s data can only effect at most d
elements of the histogram. If, however, we consider D and D0 to differ by the contents
of the single user—rather than use one subset of d artifacts from the user, we use a
different set of d artifacts—then the sensitivity of creating a histogram is 2d, since
in the edge case there is no overlap between the two sets of d artifacts. According to
Dwork et al. (Dwork, McSherry, et al., 2006), the noise parameter b should be set as
follows:

b=

S(f )
.


(B.6)

Thus, if we consider the latter variation of sensitivity, then we can update Equation B.2 to match Götz:

b=

2d
.


(B.7)

We introduced an algorithm called user thresholding differential privacy (DPu ) (Feild
et al., 2011), a modification of the DPa algorithm that maintains that each user can
contribute d total artifacts, but where the threshold k is based on the number of users
that contributed an artifact, as shown in Algorithm 4.
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Algorithm 4: User-thresholding differential privacy (DPu )
Input : A set of search artifacts, D; the maximum number of artifacts each
user may contribute d; Laplacian noise parameters b, br (these stand
for: noise for thresholding on k and noise for releasing); the user
threshold k.
Output: A histogram of artifacts with noisy impression frequencies.
Set A to be d artifacts submitted in D by each user
A0 ← {a : Countu (a, A) + Lap(b) > k}
For each a ∈ A0 , output ha, Count(a, A) + Lap(br )i

1
2
3

To prove that this technique is (, δ)-indistinguishable, we need only slightly alter a
portion of the proof presented by Korolova et al. Specifically, we can update Equation
9 (Korolova et al., 2009), which in its original form1 is as follows:
ny

1X
exp
2 i=1



Count(yi , D0 ) − k
b



d
≤ exp
2



d−k
b


,

(B.8)

where D0 is a dataset with a single user added, versus D, which is the same dataset
but with that user removed and y1 , . . . , yny is the set of queries which are unique to
D0 . Count(yi , D0 ) can return at most d, since a user can only contribute at most d
artifacts. However, under the user frequency model, Countu (x, D) is used in place
of Count(x, D). Thus, Countu (yi , D0 ) is at most 1, since yi is unique to the one user
whose data is in D0 but not D. This yields the following, tighter bound:
ny

1X
exp
2 i=1



Countu (yi , D0 ) − k
b



d
≤ exp
2



1−k
b


.

(B.9)

This has ramifications for δ, giving us the following optimal user frequency threshold:

k =1−

1

d ln( 2δ
)
d
.


(B.10)

We have changed the notation slightly to be consistent with the notation used in this thesis.
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DPu has the same privacy guarantees as DPa , but because of the change in the
definition k, if we set k constant, d under the DPu model is always the same or
greater than d under the DPa model. In short, DPu allows for more artifacts to
be contributed per user than with the DPa algorithm. However, at the same time,
the threshold criteria are tougher for DPu —an artifact must be issued by k distinct
users, not issued k times by potentially fewer than k users, as is allowed with the
DPa algorithm.
Because of their differences, each of these (, δ)-indistinguishable algorithms have
different utility with respect to the number of artifacts they release given a common
input search log D.
Going beyond (, δ)-indistinguishability, Götz et al. prove that with the right parameter configuration, the ZEALOUS algorithm is also (, δ)-probabilistically differentially
private (Götz et al., 2011). This is a more conservative relaxation of differential privacy, yielding stronger privacy guarantees than (, δ)-indistinguishability, defined as
follows:
Definition B.0.3 ((, δ)-probabilistic differential privacy (Götz et al., 2011; Machanavajjhala et al., 2008)). A randomized algorithm A is (, δ)-probabilistically differentially
private if for all data sets D we can divide the output space Ω into two sets Ω1 , Ω2
such that
P r[A(D) ∈ Ω2 ] ≤ δ,
and for all data sets D0 that differ from D by at most one individual’s data and all
S ⊆ Ω1 :

exp(−) · P r[A(D0 ) = S] ≤ P r[A(D) = S] ≤ exp() · P r[A(D0 ) = S].
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As Götz et al. explain, this definition says that A satisties -differential privacy with
high probability. All of the outputs that breach -differential privacy are included in
Ω2 , and the probability of an output being placed there is controlled by δ.
In ZEALOUS, (, δ)-probabilistically differential privacy can be attained using the
following parameter configuration (Götz et al., 2011):

b≥

2d
, and




 


−1
2δ
k − k ≥ max −b ln 2 − 2 exp
, −b ln
.
b
U · d/k 0
0

In order to minimize the second threshold, k, the authors show that k 0 should be set
as:

2d
k =
.

0
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